POVERTY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN THE SLUM AREAS OF LARGE CITIES IN TURKEY

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FA&ÇK

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Report aims at investigating the extent to which social exclusion is experienced in Turkey, with special attention to the slum areas of six metropolitan cities: Adana, Ankara, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, İstanbul and İzmir. The results presented here are based on three commissioned papers on various dimensions of exclusion, a series of in-depth interviews with stakeholders and researchers/academics on social exclusion and discrimination, and finally a set of twelve focus group meetings and a survey (with a sample size of 1863) conducted in the slum areas of the six cities mentioned above. The research has also benefited from the comments and suggestions of the participants of two workshops (one held in İstanbul and the other in Gaziantep), where the preliminary results of the survey were discussed.

This Report on social exclusion has been prepared for the European Commission, Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities DG (with grant no. VC/2005/0155), with the aim of serving the Joint Inclusion Memorandum (JIM) process. (Additional funding was made possible by the Research Foundation of Boğaziçi University—grant no. 06M101.) In preparation for full participation in the EU "Open Method of Coordination on Social Inclusion"[1] upon accession, Turkey has started (at the end of 2004) to work on the JIM, which is currently being drafted under the coordination of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MLSS). In order to support the feeding-in of this research into the JIM drafting process, an early version of this report was sent to the MLSS' and the EU-Commission's services.

Although the focus is on poor people in general (with an emphasis on those living in the slum areas of metropolitan cities), attention is also paid to marginalized people (the old, the disabled, internally-displaced people, Romani people, street-children, etc.), and to issues of unemployment, education and urbaneness.

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Social exclusion is understood in this Report (following the European Commission's definition) as a process whereby certain individuals are pushed to the edge of society and prevented from participating fully in social life, by virtue of their poverty, their lack of basic competencies and lifelong learning opportunities, or as a result of discrimination. Thus, exclusion from economic life may result from the lack of basic skills and education *or* from political or cultural discrimination. Such exclusion may become self-perpetuating, because the lack of resources will make it more difficult to overcome poverty. When the excluded find

[1] http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_inclusion/objectives_en.htm

themselves in residential proximity with others in their condition, spatial segregation becomes an additional constraining element in their lives. Social exclusion is therefore treated as a multidimensional concept, including not only income, but also other indicators that define the conditions of the life-world. Acknowledging that social exclusion may have economic, cultural, political and spatial dimensions, each triggering/strengthening one another, emphasis is placed on self-sustaining cycles where negative conditions attain permanence due to mutually-reinforcing interactions among different dimensions of exclusion.

Despite the fact that Turkey has achieved relatively high growth rates in the last few years, per capita income is still very low compared to EU levels (note that when the average of the GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards for European Union [EU25] is standardised at 100, the figure for Turkey is calculated, for 2005, to be as low as 29.1). This, coupled with a much skewed income distribution, leads to the expectation that there will be a significant poverty problem in the country. Indeed, even though the population falling under the "food poverty" line (a line that is just enough to survive physically) is insignificant, the picture dramatically changes when one considers the "risk-of-poverty" rate (which is defined as 60% of the median of equivalised net income of all households). 26% of the population were below that line in 2003. The geographical unevenness of income distribution makes the picture more disturbing, as average per capita income in the East is less than half of the West. This unevenness is visible in indices of "human development", such as the life expectancy figures where there is an 8-year difference between the East and the West. A further dichotomy is between the rural and the urban parts of Turkey; the fact that about one-third of the population lives in rural areas while the share of agriculture in GDP is considerably less than half of that percentage, indicates the extent of income differentials.

It is arguable that the principal determinant behind poverty is the high rate of unemployment which has persisted during the last decade and shows no signs of abating in the near future—unless improbable structural change occurs. The economic growth that the country has enjoyed seems to have a small effect on employment. Furthermore, the large weight of the informal sector in the country—conservative figures put it at around 30% of total non-agricultural employment—implies that even some of the employed are likely to live without job security and social insurance.

Social services, if properly designed, can potentially counterbalance these problems by addressing poverty and lack of security. In the case of Turkey, however, social programmes are under-funded, suffer from administrative and organizational problems (which translate to efficiency losses), and they fall short of meeting equitability criteria. Education, health and

pension schemes currently provide low quality and inadequate services except to the privileged few at the top of the income and status scale. Furthermore, specifically designed schemes aiming at alleviating poverty fall short of meeting their targets. The picture is even grimmer if we consider that traditional mechanisms of cooperation and insurance against risks, such as the family and other social networks, are also in the process of erosion.

Since a significant portion of the society are either unemployed or employed in the informal sector, with no social security or health insurance and deteriorating social safety, we can conclude that there is, potentially, a high incidence of social exclusion. Although local governments and civil initiatives have been making some contributions in areas of health and education, and there are some new social assistance projects designed to reduce poverty, such as the Conditional Cash Transfer programme, it is obvious that long-term structural interventions are necessary to prevent a significant portion of the society from permanently remaining at or below the poverty line.

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Slum areas in cities are no doubt the most vulnerable spaces of concentrated social exclusion processes. Migration from the countryside to the cities began around the 1950s, as a result of both push and pull factors, and still continues. Only one-fourth of the population lived in the cities in 1950, now the ratio is two-thirds. The first migrants, who built their *gecekondu* (shanty) houses, sometimes literally overnight, on the outskirts of big cities, provided cheap labour for the emerging industry in a period when governments were unable to satisfy the housing needs of this section of the society. Governments mostly pursued populist and patronage-based policies: there was an implicit bargain where migrants were allowed to occupy mostly public land and build informally, and would be provided with municipal services in exchange for their votes. As a result of these promises, the 1966 "*Gecekondu* Law" became the legal basis for the permanence of the shantytowns. In the 1980s, however, due to continued urbanization and an increase in the building density in city centres, coupled with the rise of the service sector, the housing demands of the middle class grew and the value of land around the large cities increased rapidly. Consequently, single-storey houses with small gardens started to be replaced by multi-storeyed "apartment block *gecekondus*", a process which later led to the segregation between "*gecekondu* owners", who now became landlords, and "*gecekondu* tenants". This new social division was aggravated as a result of the massive movement of internally-displaced people (IDP), from the countryside of eastern and south-eastern Anatolia to cities both in the West and in the region, during the 1990s. This new wave

of migrants, generally believed to be at around one million, was the result of armed conflict in the South-east.

The *gecekondu* neighbourhoods generally house the "working poor". This population is the labour force that is in fact (though not permanently) working, but unable to meet their basic needs and thus living at or under the total poverty line. In addition to low wages, informal employment (which mostly means an irregular job and uncertain employment), fluctuating income (either because the employer does not pay regularly or the worker has to change jobs often) and the lack of social security networks may be the reasons for this situation. As a result, the *gecekondu* dweller is at risk of exclusion due to poverty.

Gecekondu areas cannot be drawn in clear-cut borders. Nonetheless, they can be shown to share certain features: since most of these houses are built haphazardly, we cannot talk about city planning for these regions. The quality of the buildings is poor. There is blatant illegal usage of electricity from high-voltage wires. Fire engines or ambulances would have difficulty entering the narrow streets in case of emergency; garbage trucks have similar problems. Infrastructure is inadequate: there is a lack of sewerage, which may result in the pollution of the underground water; playgrounds, parks and public buildings are of below average quantity and quality.

Exclusion caused by poverty, as a manifestation of the political-economy of the production and distribution processes, is the defining dimension of social exclusion in the country. Yet, as mentioned above, there also exist cultural and political dimensions of exclusion, and discrimination is equally experienced due to unrecognized or unclaimed rights. The literature survey we have conducted makes it clear that the excluded belong to diverse vulnerable groups (the disabled, the elderly with no relatives, street children, etc.) and the processes of exclusion are manifold: labour market, education opportunities, access to health services, political rights, etc.

In order to grasp the manifestations of social exclusion in Turkey, with an accent on *gecekondus*, we commissioned three papers. The study by Bediz Yılmaz, which carries the spatial exclusion debate to the Tarlabaşı (İstanbul) area, offers important observations on the intertwined manifestations of different types of exclusion. This study discusses the dynamics of a deprived inner-city neighbourhood within the context of the *gecekondu* problem of Turkey. The migration wave of the 1990s was mainly a forced one (internally-displaced people). A broader analysis is provided by Deniz Yükseker of the consequences of this massive displacement of population and of its social costs. And finally, highlighting the important problem of child labour, Serra Müderrisoğlu writes about the problems faced in

school by children of poor families in İstanbul, given, on the one hand, the competing demands of work and, on the other, the ethnic and spatial discrimination experienced daily.

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Against the backdrop of these observations, the research we have set out consisted of three components: 1) We conducted 34 in-depth interviews with central as well as local government officials, NGO and civil initiative representatives, and academics on issues pertaining directly or indirectly to social exclusion. 2) We organised a total of twelve focus group meetings. In each city under investigation we ran one group with men and another with women. The total number of men interviewed was 39 and that of women, 44. (3) We administered a survey of 1,863 persons in the *gecekondu* and deprived inner-city areas of the six cities under investigation.

The salient conclusions that we have drawn out of this multi dimensional picture can be summarised as follows:

- As expected, poverty emerged as *the* problem which many of the households live with, and, for most of them, poverty has become a lifestyle. Half of the participants in the survey declared that they felt excluded from the society because of their state of poverty. As to the causes of poverty, at the top of the list were the following items: low wages in the unskilled (and mostly informal) work that the majority of our target group is employed in (with an additional dimension of gender segregation); problems in accessing capital; low human capital level due to low levels of schooling; productivity losses due to problems with habitation (for example, crowded family and small space, bad sanitation, malnutrition, lack of heating); problems in accessing information regarding small-scale (generally home-based) production/sale; insufficiency of the supply of services for training or courses intended to increase employment opportunity; low participation rate in the labour market due to household responsibilities or disability; discrimination at work. There were significant discrepancies among the cities where we conducted our research.
- What is more striking is the fact that Turkey has a very high incidence of working poor. The risk-of-poverty rate among those who are employed is currently at the level of 23% (which is threefold of the EU25 average). This reality is more than true for the neighbourhoods we conducted our study.
- Poverty was found to give rise to a set of problems in accessing the most basic levels of services in the areas of health, education and housing. The results of the survey indicate that nearly two-thirds of the households do not have any formal insurance against health or employment risks, or retirement options, that there are barriers in accessing education

(as sending kids to school was found by many as too costly), and that sanitary conditions are not ideal (e.g. one-fifth of the residential units with no running water and another fifth with no toilets inside). The overall rate of education in slum areas was also alarming: more than one-fourth of the respondents are illiterate at all and only less than one-fifth have completed secondary school. It is not surprising that one-fourth of the surveyed stated that they felt socially excluded due to their level of education. There are clear signals that the current level of poverty would in turn bring about a low level of human capital in the next generation, perpetuating low-waged employment—thus creating a vicious cycle of poverty-lack of education-poverty. Poverty, finally, was found to aggravate the problems of the disabled.

- Respondents were critical of the inadequacy and poor quality of state-provided health and education services. Complaints were that the supply of education and health facilities in the *gecekondu* areas was appreciably lower when compared with the city average (manifested as lack of personnel and equipment in the health facilities and crowding in education units); preschool education and services for taking care of the children and the elderly were not satisfactory; there were few extra-curricular activities for children; illegal payments were demanded in accessing health-care and education. The research also revealed that some of the children faced problems in school because their mother tongue was Kurdish, that, in some cases, girls were not allowed to go to school or to continue education after a certain level due to cultural reasons, and that education opportunities for the disabled were inadequate and services were poor in quality.
- The existence of spatial exclusion was mentioned by respondents, with the emphasis on being discriminated (in the labour market especially) because of living in certain neighbourhoods. Physically-disabled people were said to be suffering more in *gecekondu* areas due to lack of proper infrastructure and housing.
- Our research revealed a set of concerns about disadvantaged/vulnerable groups facing serious problems in *gecekondu* areas, which can be categorized as:
    - The young lack the conditions for fully benefiting from educational opportunities (extra-curricular activities are very limited, classrooms are overcrowded, houses do not provide conditions for studying, etc.); besides, some are forced to work part-time or full-time and some are obliged to take care of a dependent person instead of devoting time to school (the general picture in the families with many children is that some work to support the family, some take care of the dependent people in the household and only some receive education of mostly bad quality).

- The disabled were found to have serious problems of health, education, space and employment, and rehabilitation facilities. But, more importantly, it was emphasized that there were serious problems in claiming the rights of the disabled in the public sphere. This may cause the disabled people to withdraw from society. The children of disabled parents face additional difficulties.
- Being a woman in *gecekondu* areas was found to create additional problems or deepen existing problems: female participation in education and in labour markets is low, taking part in the political decision-making processes is very low, intra- as well as extra-family violence is common (the extreme point being "honour killings"), women are forced to bear many children, and they assume the responsibility for taking care of the children, the ill, the elderly and the disabled. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that, women will find it difficult to develop/realise themselves and fully participate in societal life, and will therefore face serious problems in gaining autonomy and empowering themselves.
- Strong evidence emerged that those who moved to the city after forced migration constitute one of the most troubled subgroups, with a more acute experience of exclusion. Because their introduction to urban life was abrupt, this population became "consumers" rather than "producers" over a very short period of time and had to confront serious problems, poverty being the most important, that could affect both the present and the future, among which were low social capital, and children having to work in order to contribute to the family income, thus being unable to attend school. In these families, the number of children per household is high, residential spaces are small and of low quality, benefits from social networks (relatives) are lacking; these families have further problems in obtaining Green Cards (a means-tested programme designed to give the poor who are not part of any insurance scheme, access to health care) due to still owning assets (house, fields) in their place of origin, even if these are no longer income generating. The "Return to Village and Rehabilitation" campaign, offering incentives to those who might want to return, has had negligible success.

- Problems other than the ones discussed above, may be listed as follows:
  - The data reveal social, cultural and political exclusion directed towards certain ethnic groups. It is significant that one-fifth of the participants in the study said that they are excluded due to ethnicity.

- Problems also exist due to religious beliefs: a significant number of the surveyed, although not as many as did for ethnicity, stated that they experienced exclusion due to religious beliefs. Specifically, discrimination is experienced by members of sects other than the majority Sunni (especially Alevis). It must be mentioned that, as non-Muslim population is extremely small at the country level (less than 0.5%), we did not encounter any non-Muslims in our study. Nonetheless, it may be stated that there exist social, cultural as well as political exclusions towards non-Muslims or non-believers at the general country level.
- The manifestation of exclusion experienced by the population seen as "marginal" by the society due to sexual orientation, criminal record, etc., remains largely unexplored; though there is anecdotal evidence that exclusionary practices are widely experienced by these groups.

- A significant number of the individuals representing the *gecekondu* or deprived inner-city neighbourhoods of the cities in which the survey was undertaken stated that they experienced exclusion in several dimensions (as already mentioned), yet the very same population also stated that they themselves have attitudes which exclude certain groups (those with criminal records, alcoholics, those with mental disorder, AIDS patients, homosexuals, etc.). Therefore, a significant number of the respondents are potentially excluding as well as excluded.
- Lastly, we should mention that concerns were raised that the social exclusion issue does not receive necessary attention in public debate, in the political arena, academia, or the mass media.

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In the face of this general picture of the dimensions and processes of social exclusion in the *gecekondu* or deprived inner-city areas of six cities in Turkey, we will propose the following as counteracting measures:

- Studies should be conducted so as to clarify which segments of the economy are driving growth and employment in different parts of the country. Studies should also aim to find in which sectors stronger growth is likely to generate increased employment (i.e. to examine the growth-employment relationship). As already mentioned, about one-third of the population lives in rural areas while the share of agriculture in GDP is considerably less than half of that. The pace and pattern of urbanization will shape Turkey's economic and geographical landscape. Recalling that

rural people are on the average less educated, future migration waves are likely to bring thousands of potential job seekers with very low human capital to urban areas. There should therefore be an attempt to slow down de-ruralisation. Expansion of off-farm employment and income generation in the rural areas would help in reducing migration to the cities, and might prevent the emergence of larger pockets of urban poverty. In the same spirit, active labour market policies aiming to train unskilled persons toward employment in newly emerging areas of labour demand (social services in health and personal care would be one example) should be pursued.

- Continuing education and training programmes to raise skill levels and employability will be useful in order to avoid the poverty trap in urban slums. In developing policies, structural problems that are both the reason and the consequence of unemployment (the existence of an informal sector, seasonal fluctuations in labour demand, low labour force participation for women, erosion in union strength), and policies targeting these conditions, should be analysed from a multidimensional perspective. Government policies should attempt to reduce the inequality in income and wealth distribution among households and across regions.
- The quality and quantity as well as the equitable supply of social services should be improved. Education is often the key to escaping the generational transfer of poverty. An intelligent policy to ensure access to education is the best long-run measure against exclusion. Inability to access health services is a debilitating condition that deepens the sense of exclusion. A universal health insurance raises the levels of confidence and security and allows individuals to seize opportunities for improving their conditions. Qualitative and quantitative data indicate that both the health and education services, when looked at the country level, are short of satisfying the demands of people at large; furthermore, there are serious spatial imbalances in terms of personnel and infrastructure (that affects quantity as well as quality) in both the health and education sectors.
- There should be exclusively-designed policies aimed at poverty reduction. Special care should be taken that vulnerable groups, such as street children, children in need, the elderly and the disabled who are in need of assistance, women whose repression gets aggravated due to poverty, internally-displaced people, as well as the spatially excluded, should have priority access to social services. Social assistance schemes should be implemented to tackle the problems of the disabled and the elderly; the reach and quality of health and education systems should be improved, so that the new

generation have an opportunity to escape the poverty trap which results from inadequate access to education. Social assistance schemes that would target the poorest of the poor, such as basic income and food provisioning at schools, should be designed and implemented. The old-age pension for the poor and the monthly benefit to disabled persons who live in poverty already exist. Care should be taken that these programmes reach all the eligible persons. Efforts should also be made in order to implement already-existing laws on disabled people's access to labour markets as well as to rehabilitate individuals with criminal records through creating job opportunities (such as vocational training programmes).

- The development of all these policies and their successful implementation depend on the efficacy of public institutions. For this reason, it is necessary to create participatory and transparent mechanisms with governmental regulations for increasing the efficacy and efficiency of these institutions, to decrease the amount of bureaucracy and to provide coordination between the units working in the same field. It is also very important to increase the partnership between the government, NGOs and the private sector working in the social security and support fields.
- Care should equally be taken to deal with social exclusion processes emerging from cultural and political conditions. Although decreasing the poverty rate and increasing the level of education in general will help in dealing with the cultural and political manifestations of exclusion, constitutional rights should be erected to defend those excluded groups that are discriminated against due to a set of non-economic reasons. Concomitantly, the general public should be educated in the meaning of these rights in order to strengthen the legal protection.

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The research that we have conducted in the slum areas of six metropolitan cities in Turkey have made it clear that a significant amount of people living in these areas are distanced from jobs, income, education and training opportunities, with little access to power and decision-making bodies, creating the unavoidable outcome that some are pushed to the edge of society. This Report acknowledges that social justice is based on the triad of distribution, recognition, and participation. Distributional justice is defined not only as a sphere shaped by economic processes but also as a sphere of *redistribution* conducted by governmental intervention. Justice in recognition is seen as pivotal in determining the principles of inclusion or in accepting differences manifested at various levels and platforms. And finally, justice in participation is defined as determining the equitable principles regarding the participation of

individuals, groups, stakeholders and civil initiatives in decision-making processes, and the points of resistance of minorities against the majority. Only through implementing social justice at the society level, can we address the social exclusion problem in a deeper and more radical level.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

This Report aims at investigating the extent to which social exclusion—defined as a multidimensional concept, including not only income, but also other indicators that define the conditions of the lifestyle—is experienced in Turkey, with special attention to the slum areas of six metropolitan cities: Adana, Ankara, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, İstanbul and İzmir. The results presented here are based on three commissioned papers on various dimensions of exclusion, a series of in-depth interviews with stakeholders and researchers/academics on social exclusion and discrimination, and a set of 12 focus group meetings and a questionnaire (with a size of 1,863) conducted in the slum areas of the six cities mentioned above. The research has also benefited from the comments and suggestions of the participants of two workshops (one held in İstanbul and the other in Gaziantep), where the preliminary results of the survey were discussed.

The Report opens up, in Chapter 1, with a *tour d'horizon* on the concept of social exclusion by ways of providing a critical literature survey. This Chapter suggests that exclusion from economic life may result from the lack of basic skills and education or from political or cultural discrimination and that such exclusion may become self-perpetuating because the lack of resources makes it more difficult to overcome poverty. When the excluded find themselves in residential proximity with others in their condition, the spatial segregation becomes an additional constraining element in their lives. Acknowledging that social exclusion may have economic, cultural, political and spatial dimensions, each triggering/strengthening one another, emphasis finally is placed on self-sustaining cycles where negative conditions attain permanence due to mutually-reinforcing interactions among different dimensions of exclusion.

Against the backdrop of this theoretical clarification, we then turn our focus to the case of Turkey. Chapter 2, in that regard, aims at providing, first, a general assessment of social exclusion in Turkey, with emphasis on social exclusion processes experienced in the slum areas of urban centres, through an overview of the existing literature on the subject. Within this general framework, the chapter then presents the three papers that were commissioned for this project. The study by Bediz Yılmaz, which carries the spatial exclusion debate to the Tarlabaşı (İstanbul) area, offers important observations on the intertwined manifestations of different types of exclusion. This study discusses the dynamics of a deprived inner-city neighbourhood within the context of the *gecekondu* problem of Turkey. The migration wave of the 1990s was mainly a forced one (internally-displaced people). A

broader analysis is provided by Deniz Yükseker of the consequences of this massive displacement of population and of its social costs. And finally, highlighting the important problem of child labour, Serra Müderrisoğlu writes about the problems faced in school by poor-family children in İstanbul, given, on the one hand, the competing demands of work and, on the other, the ethnic and spatial exclusion experienced daily.

We then present, in Chapter 3, the results and the analysis of the survey study that we have set out for this project. We applied a three-step procedure to fulfil our aim: (1) We conducted 34 in-depth interviews with central as well as local government officials, NGO and civil initiative representatives and academics on issues pertaining directly or indirectly to social exclusion. (2) We organised a total of 12 focus group meetings. In each city under investigation we ran one group with men and another with women. The total number of men interviewed was 39 and that of women, 44. (3) We administered a survey of 1,863 persons in the *gecekondu* areas of the six cities under investigation. The basic aim of conducting in-depth interviews and organising focus group meetings was to provide insights into the preparation of our survey study. We felt the need to better grasp the multi-dimensional nature of the social exclusion problem before we set out our questionnaire. These interviews and focus group meetings were also instrumental in analysing the results of our survey study. Our research has also benefited from the comments and suggestions of the participants of two workshops. The two-day workshops (one held in İstanbul and the other in Gaziantep), where the preliminary results of the survey were discussed, were instrumental in helping us not only to clarify our findings but as well as to better formulate our policy suggestions. Finally, the Department for Coordination with the EU, of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security of Turkey, shared their expertise and provided many helpful comments to our findings.

We finally present our concluding remarks (in terms of the results of our study together with our policy suggestions) in Chapter 4. The research that we conducted in the slum areas of six metropolitan cities in Turkey made it clear that a significant number of people living in these areas are distanced from jobs, income, education, and training opportunities, with little access to power and decision-making bodies, manifesting in the unavoidable outcome that some are pushed to the edge of society. Our research has also unveiled that social exclusion may also be experienced due to factors other than economic ones: Cultural, political and spatial factors may play important roles in the lives of people. It is further noted that vulnerable groups, such as the elderly with no family ties, the disabled and street children, are subject to various sources of additional discrimination.

The Report closes up by proposing the incorporation of social justice, based on the triad of distribution, recognition and participation, into the society if one would like to address the social exclusion problem in a deeper and more radical level.

Note that, unless otherwise stated, all data are from TURKSTAT (State Institute of Statistics of Turkey) and EUROSTAT.

CHAPTER 1

POVERTY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION: A THEORETICAL OUTLINE

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The Principle of Social Justice: Different Approaches, Different Interpretations

The principle of social justice, with different manifestations from period to period, society to society, geography to geography, constitutes one of the most important components of social life. Throughout history, until the last decade, this principle had primarily been tested in the economic field: hence, social justice debates for the most part had been indexed to the wealth/income distribution problem. To put it differently, production and distribution processes had occupied almost all of the social justice debates. The index for the operationalization of social justice generally consisted of income/wealth distribution coefficients and poverty ratios. Within this approach, social policies for social justice aimed to improve income/wealth distribution and/or targeted poverty alleviation. Of course, the preferred policies depended on the prevalent economic system. In market societies, regulation and social expenditures dominated, resulting in welfare states such as in Western Europe after World War II.

Following World War II, when an excess of labour force was not common amongst "developed countries", the method of realizing the social justice principle was reduced to defining the shares of aggregate production for different groups of society (share of labour, share of capital, or share of industry, agriculture, banking, etc.). The late 1970s and the 1980s were years when Fordist production methods were abandoned, labour productivity increased, segregation in the labour market intensified (between educated and high-waged "domestic" workers on the one hand and uneducated and low-waged "foreign" workers on the other), and unemployment became increasingly more permanent.

It is not surprising that at this juncture we see the beginning of a broader framework for the concept of social justice. The insufficiency of explaining social justice solely by economic magnitudes through income/wealth per household/capita was recognized, leading to the inclusion of different dimensions in the discussion, such as health (attempts made to make this qualitative by using indices like expectation of death at birth, percentages of death of babies before one year of age, number of patients per doctor) and education (attempts were made to make this qualitative by using indices like literacy, years of education, enrolment ratio, book consumption per capita). Nonetheless, this broadening of perspective was

insufficient in bringing about a radical change in the perception of social justice as an economic process. Better access to health and education services could be achieved by increased income; economic growth was thought to eventually be able to reduce poverty. On the other hand, in "developing countries", the formation of suburbs/slum areas as a result of the painful shift from agriculture to industry and the existence of a growing informal sector despite the formal started to be included in the debates on social justice.

Criticisms on perceiving social justice largely from an economic perspective and reducing it to a mere income/wealth distribution (dealing with regional differences was also included) and to poverty alleviation began to be voiced more loudly in the political and academic spheres in the 1990s. The main point was that although they were willing to, individuals/families/groups were fully or partially unable to participate in certain fields of social life due to reasons other than economic ones. To put it differently, the departure point was that certain groups are pushed out of social life because of processes that are non-economic or cannot be reduced to economic reasons—thus, the emphasis being given on the existence of "social exclusion". Of course, in the final analysis, we are talking about a society that awards economic success with inclusion; but economic exclusion cannot always be reduced to economic reasons. As a result, in social policy debates, especially when the European Community is considered, it is necessary to include a multidimensional concept of social exclusion.

Poverty/Social Exclusion: Descriptive Clarification

After this short *tour d'horizon*, we want to clarify the way we are going to use the concepts of poverty and social exclusion in this study. Here, we would like to state that although different definitions for both of these concepts are possible, we prefer to use the ones provided by the European Commission:[1]

> Poverty: People are said to be living in poverty if their income and resources are so inadequate as to preclude them having a standard of living considered acceptable in their society in which they live. Because of their poverty they may experience multiple disadvantages through unemployment, low income, poor housing, inadequate health care and barriers to lifelong learning, culture, sport and recreation facilities. They are often excluded and marginalized from participating in activities (economic, social and cultural) that are the norm for other people and their access to fundamental rights may be restricted.

[1] *Joint Report on Social Exclusion* (2004). For a selection of studies on poverty and exclusion in Turkish, see Oruç (2001), Şenses (2001) and Sapancalı (2003).

As the definition suggests, what is lacking is the financial resources themselves and the individual/family/group fails to achieve the minimum standard of living that society considers acceptable primarily because of the lack of financial resources. Here, the effects of the lack of resources are both direct (e.g. low income) and indirect (e.g. failure to benefit from health services). It is important to pay attention to the subjectivity in the definition: the "standard of living considered acceptable", no doubt, is an approach that includes relativity from society to society and from time to time. That means, what is used here originates from a definition of relative poverty. What defines poverty is where it stands within the framework of the general situation of the society lived in. Yet, this definition still confines itself to the economic dimension. We will also be using the term poverty in its economic meaning.

> Social exclusion: Social exclusion is a process whereby certain individuals are pushed to the edge of society and prevented from participating fully by virtue of their poverty, or lack of basic competencies and lifelong learning opportunities, or as a result of discrimination. This distances them from jobs, income and education and training opportunities as well as social and community networks and activities. They have little access to power and decision-making bodies and thus often feel powerless and unable to take control over decisions that affect their day to day life.

This definition of social exclusion suggests the existence of a series of dimensions, including the economic one, which may create conditions for exclusion out of social life. In passing note that, in line with the above definition of social exclusion, the Article 13 of the EU treaty provides a legal basis for the adoption of Community measures to combat discrimination on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation, thus extending Community competency in the field of equality beyond the grounds of sex and nationality, and reflecting the fundamental Community principles of equality and non-discrimination.

At this juncture, in order to clarify the demarcation between these two correlated concepts, it is important to highlight the differences. According to Graham Room:[2]

- Social exclusion is a multidimensional concept and includes not only income, but also many other indicators that define the standard of living.
- Social exclusion should be discussed from a dynamic perspective and as a process, it is necessary to analyze the factors that trigger exclusion within a process.

[2] Room (1999); for a related study see Barnes (2002).

- Social exclusion appears in relationships; although poverty is equivalent to a distributional problem regarding the lack of resources for individual or household, social exclusion rather puts emphasis on the lack of social participation in relationships, lack of power and non-existence of social integration.
- Social exclusion means serious disconnection from the rest of the society.
- Social exclusion has a spatial dimension. Deprivation is due not solely to the lack of financial resources at the individual or household level; it is also possible that lack of or low quality of public services provided where the individual/household lives may cause exclusion. Also, in places where social exclusion is consistent, it becomes impossible to form the relationships necessary to break through the exclusion and the risk for the continuation of the exclusion increases both at the level of personal motivation and social opportunities.

Now, we would like to follow an analytical approach to define the relationship between poverty and social exclusion by forming the 2x2 matrix below in order to make the debate more concrete (see Table 1).[3]

TABLE 1: POVERTY VS EXCLUSION

	Excluded	Not excluded
Poor	1	2
Not poor	3	4

As understood from the table above, we have four possible categories. Category 1 is both poor and excluded (as in the example of a low-income family excluded due to living in shantytowns). Even in such a situation, it is necessary to analyze different dimensions in order to understand whether poverty is the ultimate reason or one of the reasons for exclusion. In Category 2, although there is poverty, one cannot speak of exclusion (as in the example of a student who is in a financially bad position). For the people in this category, the valid assumption (accepted by society) is that the poverty is temporary, meaning the situation of poverty will not result in the formation of an excluded "underclass" or caste category by becoming permanent. Category 3 shows people who are excluded from society due to other reasons although they do not have any problems accessing financial resources (as in the

[3] This table and the following lines are adapted from the *Edmonto Social Plan* (2005) study.

example of an individual who has sufficient income, but is still excluded due to religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity). Last, Category 4 defines the majority, included in society and has no financial problems.

Within this framework, we might ask the question of the relationship between financial inabilities and social exclusion. As discussed above, it is possible for exclusion not to appear where poverty exists or vice versa. But, in many cases, poverty and exclusion co-exist, rendering the question of causality relevant.

While dealing with the question as of whether economic inability causes exclusion or the existence of exclusion due to non-financial reasons results in poverty, both theoretical and applied studies have drawn attention to the correlation between social exclusion and financial inabilities. In cases where state-provided security networks are working, even when there are policies against political and legal exclusion, cultural exclusion may still continue. In developing countries, political and legal safeguards are not fully sufficient to satisfy all the promises of citizenship. In both contexts, it is difficult to satisfactorily absorb new groups, and, often, problems of exclusion come to the surface. So, the experience of migration and migrants most frequently reflects the correlation between financial inabilities and exclusion. The most common reason for migration is economic. Therefore, migrants, in addition to being newly arrived outsiders, are also poor. Are these people excluded due to being "migrants", and, therefore, fail in various spheres, such as the labour market, or are they excluded as a result of poverty? This complex question can only be answered in a context-specific manner. A certain causality working in a direction in one context may well work in the opposite direction in another.

Manifestations of Social Exclusion

In the categorization above, the case in the second box is more valid in times when the economic system works consistently with optimistic models. Actually, until recently, social policies, too, were built on the assumption of material poverty being temporary. In fact, in recent times as the Fordist employment system has been lost prominence in developed countries and as the development patterns of paternalistic regimes that guaranteed societal integration in developing countries are no longer successful, the possibility for "temporary" poverty to become persistent has increased. Therefore, it is not wrong to say that social exclusion is a concept that mostly coincides with poverty, but yet has gone beyond its one

dimensional, static character. Considering these factors, social exclusion is manifested in various ways, some of which are set out below:[4]

- Economic exclusion: Short-term or long-term unemployment and/or lack of credit opportunities due to having fallen out of the labour market. In places where social policies are working well, it is possible to avoid economic exclusion by retirement, unemployment benefits or social assistance mechanisms. At the extreme level of economic exclusion, personal incomes and government transfers might be insufficient even to satisfy the basic needs. Additionally, exclusion would become acute if transfers through social and family mechanisms were not capable of being regular or satisfactory in quantity. This would bring about problems like malnutrition, poor health conditions, poor standards of living (homelessness in the extreme), barriers in access to education facilities, lack of care facilities in old age, etc. The most extreme case of economic exclusion may be "exclusion from life" as the bottom line is hunger and—obviously—hunger damages the mental and physical capabilities of the individual. It justifies poverty and makes it permanent.
- Spatial exclusion: The situation of having problems and barriers in accessing to and benefiting from certain spaces as a result of a series of causes. Spatial exclusion has two major intertwined components. The first one is that the majority of society excludes, discriminates or disregards the individual because of the place/geography in which she lives. This perspective may create the phenomenon of "forgetting" people living in certain spaces. The second component, which is independent of the financial opportunities of individual/household, occurs because of the poor quality and quantity of the public services provided in the geography, as a result of which one cannot get fully involved in social life.
- Cultural exclusion: The state of not being able to be fully involved in the social and cultural life independent of economic capability. It includes not being allowed into the existing activities of social life, facing barriers or being unwelcome for certain reasons; for example, when the majority is taken into account, different ethnicity/race or religion, not being able to speak the language of the majority fluently, accent, different dress codes or sexual orientation.

[4] For details, see: Dufy (1995), SEU (1997), Walker and Walker (1997), Byrne (1999), Barnes (2002) and Sapancalı (2003).

- Political exclusion: The state of not being able to enjoy citizenship rights, especially political and legal rights, fully or partially, facing direct or indirect barriers in involvement in political life. This situation could mean certain groups losing security in the public sphere, being distanced from politics, or being outside of the political life at the extreme level. This naturally would result in questioning the existence of an environment in which one can participate in discussion and decisions.

No doubt different kinds of exclusion are intertwined and reinforce one another. Exclusion, as a process, should be analyzed by regarding these dimensions and dynamics between them.

It is a fact that different types of exclusion do trigger/strengthen one another. For example, political exclusion could result in economic exclusion by causing one to be out of the political decisions about distribution and allocation processes. On the other hand, economic exclusion could cause cultural and political exclusion as it results in barriers in integration to society due to economic inabilities. As a result, it is possible to mention a self-sustaining vicious cycle in exclusion processes due to the interactions between different dimensions of exclusion. The possibility for the children of an excluded family to break through exclusion is generally low; therefore it is necessary to underline the intergenerational cycles in this regard as well.

Another important factor that reflects the complex nature of the exclusion problem is that exclusion does not create a monolithical social stratum. It is possible for a certain excluded group to be involved in the exclusion of another group for a different reason than theirs because, as discussed above, exclusion can have several different reasons. For example, the position of a person excluded by the majority for a certain reason (like ethnicity) is not known when another person with a different reason (like sexual orientation) for exclusion is considered. Some may prefer (as a result of a series of reasons and processes) the "solidarity of the excluded" whereas some others may have an exclusionary attitude. One should bear in mind the fact that individuals have more than one social identity and the relationships between these identities are important in understanding exclusion.

Another necessary distinction in the analysis of social exclusion is the one between exclusion as an individual and as a social attribute.[5] If whatever leads to exclusion is seen as a personal trait, the basis of the analysis becomes the individual/household/group and it targets the explanation of the features of persons who are not a part of the activities perceived to be

[5] See ILO (1996).

normal (or necessary) by society.[6] Here, the dynamics between the existing reasons/processes are analyzed, regarding the past of the people who are the unit of analysis and that exclusion may occur as a result of cumulative reasons/processes. On the other hand, if exclusion is considered to be a social attribute, it becomes a title for the existing rights and the general political, economic and cultural structure of society. If the general framework is drawn by the overall structure, institutions and rules, it is more likely to be thought that the decisions of individuals/households/groups are taken within the boundaries of these constraints. As a result, the unit of analysis is no longer the individual/household/group, but rather the surrounding environment, considering the assumption that exclusion is rooted in the structural characteristics of society.

We should keep in mind that applicable suggestions for political and social policies can only be based on this kind of analysis. It is a meaningful effort to try to solve the problems of the social structure via policy making. On the contrary, if the problems are seen as personal, the recommended solutions naturally will remain at the individual level. In such a case, the advice would be to improve personal qualifications or personal capital (human, cultural or social). Yet one should bear in mind that exclusion at the individual/household/group level mostly would bring about exclusion in structure, institutions and rights. Therefore, it is not sufficient to relate exclusion only to a single factor (individual or society).

Social Exclusion: The Measurement Debate

We need to clarify the methods for the measurement of social exclusion in order to draw policies out of the debate we have been discussing at the methodological level up until now and to decide on how to determine the targets. Two problems occur concerning measurement. First, if social exclusion is a multidimensional process, how are we going to aggregate the various strands of exclusion in different dimensions? Secondly, how are we going to measure whether there is exclusion or not when dimensions are analyzed separately? Of course, there are no clear or widely accepted answers to these two different (but correlated) questions. It is

[6] The methodological framework by this approach generally is that individuals have not only wealth/income, but also human capital (which determines the level of education and capabilities), social capital (which includes the relationships and networks between the family, friends and relatives) and physical capital (which defines the quality of the space lived in) and argues that lack of stocks of different capitals results in exclusion (see *Edmonto Social Plan*, 2005).

not even possible to bring about a single scale that is applicable to every society, every geography, every time period, as the concept gains specificity according to context.

It is, no doubt, sometimes possible to obtain objective measures and assume that there would not be any objection to using these measures by considering the comparisons between countries and regions: examples like nutrition under a certain level of calories, lack of health security, lack of primary education are objectifiable cases that could be compared across societies and different periods of time. Or, there is no need for further discussion in the case of a geography where a certain ethnic group is not allowed to enjoy public rights. Yet, for example, understanding whether cultural exclusions due to religious or sexual orientation exist and to provide an index for such exclusion is very difficult. In such cases, subjective analysis is inevitable.

Objective or subjective measurements should ideally provide us with observations on whether a certain level of exclusion exists or not and, if it does exist, with the density of the exclusion. Since, however, we do not have an objectifiable measure that will allow us to obtain an aggregate picture from the observations at different levels, the position of the person doing the analysis concerning the method for this aggregation becomes decisive. At this point, the middle course is to analyze whether the groups that are defined as being vulnerable and having the risk of social exclusion are experiencing exclusion or not. Social policy-makers try to draw a map of exclusion by focussing attention on groups with a high risk of exclusion, like the people living in shantytowns, people without retirement/health insurance, the dependent and disabled, and children on the streets.

Social Exclusion: Causes

It is hard to provide clear pictures of the causes of social exclusion when multidimensional processes are considered. So, we prefer to settle for categorizing certain processes causing exclusion instead of going into detailed debates. Needless to say, the categories we are to define are expected to be in interaction just as exclusion processes are.

- Economical organization of production and distribution processes: As the income dimension is an important part of the exclusion concept, the creation and distribution of income and the structure of these processes are important in understanding exclusion. The transformation of the economic system changes the structure with time. For example, the decrease in the amount of economic

activities using unskilled labour (due to both globalization and the increase in productivity) has changed patterns of employment both qualitatively and quantitatively. In addition to that, employment generally has become more informal, insecure and irregular. This kind of transformation, of course, increases the risk of economic exclusion. If the economic situation and the structure of the employment affect both the wealth/income of individuals directly and the services they receive, like education and health, indirectly and additionally shaping how future generations will grow up, then the analysis of the political economy of the time becomes an important aspect of the social exclusion debate.

- Cultural structure: If cultural structure in general and expressions in particular are accepted to cause exclusion, then it is important to have a detailed picture of the formation and the components of this structure. Cultural structures, sometimes or maybe more often, may create the attitudes and behaviours that might cause individuals to exclude others unconsciously. People may consider culturally excluding others or being culturally excluded as natural, as they do not intend to internalize the dominant culture without questioning. Of course, differences among the dominant cultures of various countries exist due to accepting different cultures.
- Definition of rights: Social structures are formed by defining a certain series of rights as *a priori* (of course, these definitions sometimes might be implicit and they improve, transform and vary as societies evolve). The definition of these rights and which clauses are included in them are, at the final stage, subjects intertwined with the social exclusion debate. Another expression of the definition of rights appears at how power is regulated in social life, regarding that individuals and groups have different stocks of power.
- Institutional structures: The structure of institutions formed within the social structure sometimes might cause exclusion and sometimes prevent it. Concerning this, it is not wrong to assume that an institutionalist analysis would play an important role in understanding the social exclusion problem.

Of course, every approach trying to reduce social exclusion has to specify (implicitly or explicitly) a set of causes and to make efforts to eliminate them. This set of reasons for exclusion might be more structure-based for some and therefore demand radical structural changes whereas, for others, social exclusion might have a nature that could be resolved by more gradual measures.

Social Justice-Social Exclusion

Concluding our remarks, we would like revisit the social justice principle discussed at the beginning. As argued above, today it is accepted that social justice is based on the trilogy of distribution, recognition and participation.[7] Distributional justice is defined not only as a sphere shaped by economic processes but also as a sphere of *redistribution* conducted by governmental intervention. Therefore, it is based on not only the economic system, but also on how social culture and politics influence governance in regulating distribution. Justice in this sphere determines the principles of how production is to be distributed between both the generations of today and the future. Justice in recognition determines the principles of the level of inclusion or alienation of difference at various levels and platforms. The more difference is accepted as normal, the more it is recognized. Last, justice in participation determines the principles about the participation ability of individuals/households/ groups/regions in decision-making processes and the points of resistance of minorities against the majority.

The specific combination of these three principles, together with their "ingredients", necessarily reflect an ideological choice; but it should be acknowledged that these three components are to be considered simultaneously by recognizing their interaction.

[7] For a parallel study, see Keyman (2005).

CHAPTER 2

POVERTY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN TURKEY: A TOUR D'HORIZON

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General Picture

Regarding the strong relationship between exclusion and poverty, we would like to begin this section with a set of observations with regard to manifestations of poverty in Turkey that are commonly agreed upon by the majority of studies conducted on poverty (Gürsel, Levent, Selim and Sarıca, 2000; World Bank, 2001, 2003, 2006; Adaman, 2003; Buğra and Keyder, 2003; Erdoğan, 2003; Erman, 2003; Yalman, Sonat, Tayanç and Tayanç, 2004; DPT, 2005; SIS/World Bank, 2005; UNDP, 2005; Zenginobuz, 2005; Altuğ and Filiztekin, 2006).

- It is a fact that the high growth rate in recent years has not resulted in sufficient increases in new job opportunities and hence unemployment has been on the rise. There seems to be no comprehensive or structural intervention into the social and economic spheres in order to decrease unemployment in the short/medium terms, and the rate is rising especially for the young.[1] There is an additional concern that this situation may worsen with the flow towards the cities of an expected excess supply of labour because of the shrinking of the agricultural sector (İzmen, Filiztekin and Yılmaz, 2005). It is unavoidable that unemployment, with the lack of safety nets, likely will bring about social exclusion. Another very important problem of the labour sector is gender-based discrimination.[2]
- A partly related and partly independent observation is that, both for individuals/households and for regions, income and wealth distributions are dramatically skewed. Although per capita income has risen substantially, thanks to high growth in recent years, this amount is very low when compared to the European average (note that when the average of the GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards for European Union [EU25] is standardised at 100, the figure for Turkey is computed as of the year 2005 as low as 29.1). Low level of per capita income coupled

[1] A striking picture of the very low employment effect of economic growth is that between the years 1980-2004, although the working population rose up 23 million, the new-created labour force was limited to 6 million (for further discussion on the problems of the labour market in Turkey, see SIS/World Bank, 2005). The level of unemployment by March 2006 exceeds 11%, which was 6.5% in 2000! The unemployment rate for the 15-24 age group is as high as 20%.

[2] As it is known, the labour force participation rate for males is around 65%, whereas it falls down to 25% for females (for further discussion on the labour force participation, see Tunalı, 2003; SIS/World Bank, 2005).

with very unequal income distribution brings about a very high portion of the population that is either around or below the poverty line. It is true that the percent of the people under the hunger line is not great, but many people are very close to this line.[3] A related observation is the existence of a significant portion of the population who are employed but still are unable to distance themselves from the poverty line—becoming a sort of "working poor". The effects of low employment rates and the impact of the informal sector on keeping wages low are equally noticeable.

- There is a series of costs associated with the informal sector that controls 30% of production. One of these is that the sum of collectable tax is roughly 30% less than what it would be (Özar, 1996; Çarkoğlu and Eder, 2004; Zenginobuz, 2005). Additionally, due to the low shares of social expenditure in the state's priorities, the services in sectors like health and education are low in both quality and quantity. Also, the organizational/governmental problems in the production and delivery of public services are known to exist; this results in loss of efficiency. One should bear in mind the important point that the high debt burden of the country causes a significant portion of the tax revenue be spent on repaying the debt.[4]
- Due to high unemployment and the large informal sector, social security (in the sense of retirement and health) fails to cover an important portion of the population (the real portion covered still occurs to be over the actual level in formal statistics because of double counting—despite the fact that this mistake has been recognized by official bodies).[5] There are signals about the decreasing power of the family and other social networks that traditionally have compensated partly for the lack of social security (Buğra and Keyder, 2003). Although the fertility rate in Turkey in general is decreasing, the only security for many families outside the social security web (and who are probably poor) is to have many children—this, in return, has brought about a

[3] The GINI coefficient that is around 0.42 and the S80/S20 ratio that is around 10 (with 2003 figures) indicate a skewed income distribution. Although those below the "food poverty" line is around a mere 2%, the figure goes up to 26% when the line is drawn as "risk of poverty", which is defined as 60% of the median of equivalised net income of all households—with 2003 figures (for a through discussion of the poverty problem in Turkey, see SIS/World Bank, 2005). What is more striking is the fact that Turkey has a very high incidence of working poor. The risk-of-poverty rate among those who are employed is at the level of 23% (which is threefold of the EU25 average).

[4] As known, the performance of the country in literacy, the enrolment ratio, the number of students per teacher, patients per doctor, life expectancy, child death rates and similar basic health and education indicators is very poor when compared with the European average (Adaman, 2003).

[5] The Household Survey reflects that one third of the population is not covered by any social security. As expected, the probability of having no insurance increases as household income falls (SIS/World Bank, 2005).

relatively high population increase and excess labour supply when compared with Europe. It is worth emphasizing the significant regional gap in family sizes.

- There are serious questions about the equity and rationality in the allocation of public resources—whatever the motives could be. The easiest example of these sorts of questions is the regional gaps in basic public services, like education and health.[6] However, clear statements have been made about making efforts to abolish the regional gaps both in five-year plans and in negotiations with the EU.

As a result, a significant portion of the country suffers from poverty in terms of household income, or is very close to this line. The existing social services can only partly answer the needs of this population. Although local governments and civil initiatives make important contributions in areas like health and education, the poor are supported through various (in cash and in kind) means, and several public projects on the alleviation of poverty and governmental/organizational regulations have begun in certain fields, long term structural interventions are equally necessary to prevent a significant percent of the population from suffering from poverty. This portion will face social exclusion unless the quality and quantity of social services increase and the equity principle is considered in the allocation of these services.

Suburban (shantytown) areas are among the first locales of dense social exclusion processes. As our focus of study is on these areas, we will first take a look at the creation processes of these shantytowns and what they imply for the discussion on exclusion (Keyder, 1993; Buğra, 1998; Akşit, 1999; Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001; Altıntaş, 2003; Buğra and Keyder, 2003; Eder, 2003; Yıldırak, 2004).

Gecekondu is the Turkish word for informally constructed housing in land on which there is no proper ownership. Usually the construction is also illegal. As such, *gecekondu* is similar to a whole family of informal solutions to the housing problem of migrants in rapidly growing cities of the South. The generic word is "shantytown", referring to the temporary nature of the construction and its quality, and to the haphazard nature of the construction

[6] The "Human Development Index" prepared by UNDP catches the regional gaps clearly (UNDP, 2005). Life expectancy for the West of the country is around the European average (72), whereas it falls to 60 for the South East region; similarly, the literacy rate is above 90% for the West and around 65% for the South East. The fact that the overall illiteracy rate is close to 15% and that almost one out of four women is illiterate is to be taken very seriously. Note that currently there is no universal health coverage in the country; in order to be able to get access to public health services you need to be working in the formal sector. Those who are the poorest of the poor are eligible to get the so-called "Green Card", with which they can get the basic of health coverage free of charge.

materials. The *bidonville* in French colonial Africa, the *favela* in Brazil, and various other versions of such quickly and illegally built housing are of the same category. The Turkish word literally means "built overnight", connoting mostly the fact that the earliest *gecekondus* had to be constructed and foundations laid while the authorities were sleeping in order to claim the plot. The construction would continue once an understanding was reached.

The migration from rural to urban areas in Turkey began in the 1950s. Here, the combination of the pressure of an increasing population in agriculture, coupled with the mechanization of agriculture (increase in labour productivity), resulted in excess labour in the rural areas, and this created a "push" from the rural areas to the cities. Also, as the newly growing industry around the cities could not satisfy its labour demands from the urban population, it created a "pull" for the rural population. Therefore, we can speak of both a push and a pull behind urbanization. Only one-fourth of the population was living in the cities in the beginning of the 1950s, whereas this ratio is 65% today.

The first *gecekondus* in Turkey were built in the 1950s in Istanbul; the phenomenon spread to other cities in subsequent decades and reached a peak in the 1970s. Most of the land that was occupied for construction purposes was public property, or the property of foundations (*waqf*) which no longer existed or could no longer defend their claim. In the farther perimeter of the cities squatters built on agricultural land on which, legally, there could be no housing construction. These various degrees of illegality implied that it was within the rights of the authorities to demolish what was constructed, and to label as criminal both the act and the perpetrators. However, this seldom happened. It was often politically expedient to accommodate the squatters while denying them full legal ownership.

When we look at the 1950-70 period, we see that the private sector preferred not to get involved in the housing construction, largely due to land problems in the cities, and focused instead on industry. For industrial investments, there was a need to balance the cost of foreign technology with cheap labour. Cheap labour was provided by the part of the population recently migrated to the cities: living in *gecekondu* and working in the informal sector. The newcomers settled around the big city centres were to provide cheap input to the industry, because they were not paying any rent, and for informal workers, there was no tax to pay except indirect taxes. Governments, unable to satisfy the shelter needs of this section of society, did not object to the use of the public lands of the Ottoman era as settlement areas; as described below, politicians began to consider this population as a source of votes.

The first wave of migrants to the city were poor, with few possessions. They quickly started enjoying the privileges of early arrival, however, especially if they built on land that

was closer to the desirable areas of the city. Later arrivals in the 1960s and 1970s often had sufficient funds for the initial costs of laying claim to a squattable plot, for construction materials, and for the necessary pay-offs. Families from rural areas built up single-floor houses overnight with the support of the previously settled, and tried to improve the quality and add extensions to the house over time; but construction quality was usually low, as there was always the possibility of it being destroyed and demolished. During this period there was much debate among politicians and planners about *gecekondu* neighbourhoods. The mostly local nature of the interaction between squatters and the government allowed decisions to be made by district mayors whose main constituency were the population of the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods, or their cousins who would soon arrive in the city in the same manner, and embark on the same process of construction.

With the transition to multi-party politics after World War II, populist and patronage-based policies were followed and the suburbs came to be seen as sources of potential votes. Political bodies began their promises of title deeds and infrastructure services for these areas. As a result of these promises, the 1966 "*Gecekondu* Law" became the legal base of the permanence of the suburbs. With regard to the nature of the relationship between local/central governments and the suburbs, sometimes solutions were provided for the legal and spatial problems of the suburbs and sometimes the police were there to destroy all the houses. Therefore, some neighbourhoods were provided certain services, like electricity, water and sewage, while others strove to overcome these problems themselves by very primitive means—this generally meant the mass collection and burning of garbage or the discharging of raw sewage into nearby creeks. The general picture was that of primitive neighbourhoods stuck between the city borders and industrial areas, consisting of one or at most two-floor houses with a small surrounding space of land for gardening, inhabited by the people of similar geographies.

In the 1980s, with rapid population increases in the cities, the density of building in the city centres and surrounding areas increased; the arrival of a services sector in the city centres in relation to improvements in the services sector and many other factors that should be understood together resulted in the middle class choosing areas close to urban centres for settlement, which resulted in former peripheral shantytowns becoming more valuable. Therefore, apartment-building settlements of the middle classes sprang up next to the suburbs and shantytown properties themselves became tradable. Related to this, the single-storey houses with gardens described above were replaced by "apartment block *gecekondus*". Of course, the role of construction and multi-floor permissions given in the Özal period (the

1980s) was pivotal in this process. The debate was thus resolved in favour of populist accommodation of the reality: in most cases de facto possession was transformed to de jure ownership, illegal status was regularized, zoning restrictions relaxed. Owners were allowed to convert their single-storey houses, often with gardens where they grew vegetables and kept animals, to multi-storey apartment buildings. There are now very few *gecekondu* neighbourhoods which look like the original shantytowns with ramshackle buildings. Instead, there are buildings with several units, which look relatively sturdy, although badly constructed and usually unfinished, with no concession to aesthetics.

At the beginning of the 1980s there was a transition period for the suburbs, as a result of which a differentiation emerged between "*gecekondu* owners" and "*gecekondu* tenants". Since the 1990s tenancy has become more common. New migrants do not have the possibility of finding land to occupy. There are many competing claims on land and the authorities no longer look the other way. Most new migrants do not have the foothold or the financial ability to embark on the building of a dwelling. In the big cities, there is no new construction of *gecekondu*; on the contrary, under the provisions of a new project (*Kentsel Dönüşüm* or urban transformation), mayors are trying to raze old *gecekondu* neighbourhoods. Growing tenancy has brought about a differentiation between the poorer new migrants and the old ones, who have emerged as owners of rental property. It was thus inevitable that the newcomers found themselves in poverty because of the additional cost of rent. Another reflection of this process was that newcomers to the neighbourhoods as tenants were unable to benefit from support relations on the basis of their cities of origin as much as the older immigrants had done, and therefore felt more isolated in their place of arrival.

The boundaries of suburban neighbourhoods cannot any longer be drawn in clear-cut lines. The main reason for this is the transformation of some of the *gecekondu* houses into apartment blocks. Sometimes the quality of these buildings is not low (especially if they, one way or another, were able to obtain permission to build); another reason is that the slum regions may be "cleared away" in order to satisfy the shelter needs for medium/high income groups. But to the extent that borders may be drawn, there are certain similarities in these neighbourhoods: as we are talking about houses built overnight (or quickly) and neighbourhoods that developed haphazardly, there is no city planning for these areas. Therefore, lack of planning should be added to the low quality of the buildings as another defining feature. Illegal usage of electricity from high-voltage wires is visible; fire engines or ambulances would have difficulty entering the unplanned streets in cases of emergency, as do garbage trucks. In some cases, waste water is not collected properly due to the lack of sewage

systems and it pollutes the underground water. Most of the time, playgrounds and parks in these neighbourhoods are below the city average, from the point of view of quantity and quality.

We should also not forget to mention that in addition to the *gecekondus* built on empty lands, in the city centres or in their vicinity, some neighbourhoods may be left unoccupied for a variety of reasons. The houses and apartment blocks will then be in ruins because of lack of maintenance, and the poor will then move in to fill the vacuum. These inner-city slum neighbourhoods in big cities (especially İstanbul, Diyarbakır and Adana) usually accommodate internally-displaced migrants (on this see below), street children and those working in the underground world (petty-crime/prostitution/drug/etc.)

Taking all these into account, it is not possible to provide a clear and uniform picture for houses/flats in the *gecekondu* and inner-city slum/deprived areas in Turkey. The processes of adaptation for the migrants to city life, the difficulties in this process, the attitude of the city inhabitants, the effects of the newcomers on labour markets and many other problems have been the subjects of sociological, economic and political studies (see, for example, Erder, 1996; Erman, 2004; Keyder, 2005).

When we look at migration today, we see that in the middle of the 1990s the dominant component of urbanization was the forced migration wave (internally-displaced people—IDP). These migrants, generally accepted to number around one million, left their rural homes to move to the suburbs of the big cities as a result of the armed conflict in south-eastern region either through state pressure or out of fear of staying in the middle of the conflict. They generally were unable to convert their agricultural assets into money. As mentioned above, the first (1950-1990) wave was both a pull (cities and the industry around) and push (productivity increases making increased rural population redundant) type of migration, whereas the new migration wave has been shaped around the political arena. Some of the new comers have also settled in inner-city slum areas. These are dense settlements where a family or several young males may rent a single room in an old house or apartment, with rudimentary utilities. The most concentrated urban poverty is in these areas. Such “slummification”, with its attendant concentration of poverty, may also occur in some former *gecekondu* neighbourhoods, which become denser as population increases and apartments are subdivided or same units house larger families. Hence, forced migration brought about spatial concentration of the displaced population in poor and run-down neighbourhoods of İstanbul, Diyarbakır and Adana, which in turn enabled “entrepreneurs” and landlords to exploit IDPs as

cheap labourers and helpless tenants, respectively. (Göç-Der, 2001; Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001; Başak Kültür ve Sanat Vakfı, 2004; Ayata and Yükseker, 2005; Kirişçi, 2005).

The suburbs and inner-city slum areas generally consist of the "working poor". This population is a labour force that is in fact (though not permanently) working, but still unable to meet its basic needs and lives in constant need of support. Therefore, working is not enough for the economic well being of the individual (recall the high rate of poverty-at-risk ratio among the working people—see footnote 3 above page 16). Informal employment (which mostly means irregular jobs), irregular income (either the employer does not pay regularly or it is necessary to change jobs often), a lack of social security networks and similar problems may be the reasons for this situation, as well as the important role of the insufficient level of minimum wages. As a result, the suburban individual is falling out of social life through poverty. Of course, outside of poverty, it is possible to experience exclusion for many other reasons. In order to grasp these points, it is indeed necessary to look at nation-wide exclusionary processes.

We think that it is possible to understand the most important reason for exclusion in Turkey through poverty, that is by focussing on the political economy of production, distribution, and re-distribution through state policies. Yet, as mentioned in the above section, there also exist cultural as well as political dimensions of exclusion, and several forms of discrimination may be experienced due to insufficiency of rights and social prejudices. Acknowledging once again the multidimensionality of social exclusion, when studies on vulnerable groups are reviewed, we observe the following:

- The effect of poverty on children and the young through the processes of education and labour; and street children: Studies in this area generally analyze the effects of spatial and economic exclusions that families face on the children and the young. Departing from the facts that the risk-of-poverty rate is as high as 34% for children (compare the country average rate of 26%), that poverty increases with family size and that thousands of children of age 6-14 are actively in the labour market (for a thorough discussion, see DİE, 1999 and SIS/World Bank, 2005), the difficulties experienced by this group became apparent. Also, despite improvements brought in through educational reform and the raising of compulsory education to eight years, the education system is still lacking in many areas and this inevitably affects the young population (Chawla, 2005; SIS/World Bank, 2005). Street children are a growing problem and there have been studies on this issue in recent years (see, for

example, Akşit, Karancı and Gündüz-Hoşgör, 2001; Altıntaş, 2003; Yıldırak, 2004; SIS/World Bank, 2005). Children in need constitute yet another topic to which focus was given.

- The elderly: Population at the age of 65 and over constitutes approximately 6% of the total population and this ratio is in increase. Of this cohort, those who are not insured by any of the social security schemes are almost totally dependent on their families for living and for care. Although the so-called "65+ age benefit" may provide some relief, poverty is an important factor in the exclusion of the elderly. To the extent that family networks are growing weaker, elderly people will certainly experience difficulties in their daily life, which will keep them outside social life (see, for example, TÜBA, 2003; various issues of *Türk Geriatri Dergisi*).
- The disability situation: With the first comprehensive survey conducted by TURKSTAT in 2002 across the country, it became possible to see the profile of the disabled population countrywide. Despite the fact that the disabled population constitutes 12% of the total population, it is difficult to cite many comprehensive studies conducted in this field, other than those conducted by a few academics and by the foundations and associations working in this field (see, for example, Kimsesiz Çocukları Koruma Derneği ve Özürlüler İdaresi, 1997; DİE, 2004).
- The migration problem: Both voluntary- and forced-migration have been the subject of study with increasing interest. The "Back to the Village" policy, which aims to motivate those displaced migrants to return to their place of origin, has also been the focus of recent studies (see, for example, İçduygu, Sirkeci and Aydıngün, 1998; Barut, 2001; Başak Kültür ve Sanat Vakfı, 2004; Ayata and Yükseker, 2005).
- Exclusion due to gender or sexual orientation: Gender-based exclusion has mostly been debated in the context of the labour market. Violence against women (and "honour killings", in the extreme) has been another point of focus. On the other hand, studies about exclusion due to sexual orientation mostly have been shaped around constitutional guarantees (see, for example, Erder and Kaşka, 2003; CEDAW, 2005; issues of *Kaos GL* magazine).
- Exclusion due to religious practices: We observe that the majority of the studies under this heading have been on the debate whether or not the state, identifying with Sunnis, has been discriminating against other sects, mainly the Alevis. At the centre of this discussion lies the issue of whether the Alevis' religious rights have been sufficiently protected by the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey—the practical issue being

that although mosques have a legal status, Alevis' *Cem Houses* do not (see, for example, Çakır and Bozan, 2005).

- Ethnicity problems: As is well known, only the various non-Muslim groups (Armenians, Greeks, Jews, although the Jewish community opted out of their status shortly thereafter) were accorded minority status with the Lausanne Treaty. Studies on these people, as well as other unrecognized groups of different ethnicity, have been increasing in recent years; they mostly focus on Romani people facing cultural exclusion, and on the Kurdish issue, which seems to have cultural/political/economic aspects (see, for example, Kirişçi and Winrow, 2000; Aksu, 2003; İncirlioğlu, 2005; Marsch and Strand, 2005).
- Other: Nomads, certain professional groups, patients with certain illnesses, drug addicts, ex-prisoners and illegal workers have been the subject of some research (see, for example, İçduygu, 2003; Lordoğlu, 2005).

Therefore, when we make a general assessment of the issue of exclusion, we observe one branch of studies being conducted on vulnerable groups (the disabled, the elderly with no relatives, street children, etc.). Another branch of study is on the areas/processes of exclusion: education, health, labour market, political arena are all the foci of these inputs. It goes without saying that the analyses that manage to grasp the overall view and that can put the issue in a larger picture will have much deeper penetrative power. It should be added that the political, economic and socio-cultural exclusion processes we have been discussing are likely to worsen in certain areas of the large cities, within a "spatial" aspect. The multidimensionality of the exclusionary processes in the suburban and inner-city slum areas unfortunately reflects the facts of today.

In order to grasp the manifestations of exclusion across Turkey in a better way, we asked for support from leading academics in order to be able to better understand the following topics:

- The study of Bediz Yılmaz, which presents the spatial exclusion debate on the district of Tarlabaşı (İstanbul), offers us important observations on the intertwined manifestations of different kinds of exclusion. This study discusses the dynamics of a neighbourhood "abandoned" in the city centre within the context of the suburban problem of Turkey.

- The second migration wave that started in the middle of the 1990s, as emphasized above, was mainly a forced one. A deeper analysis is here provided by Deniz Yükseker on the consequences of this migration wave and its damage onto IDPs. Yükseker also presents a set of policy suggestions to deal with the problems that this second wave has imposed on these people.
- Regarding the importance of the problem of child labour, which is a very important problem for the slum areas, Serra Müderrisoğlu voices the difficulties of children attempting to realise an ambition for education despite their obligation to work, and the ethnic and spatial exclusion that a child experiences via case analyses.

Far Away, So Close: Social Exclusion and Spatial Relegation in an Inner-City Slum of İstanbul

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"More often than not, a building falls into ruin; these are in such a bad state that seeing people get in and out, one is astounded by the dimensions that the cockroaches could get".
"The centre of cheap drugs in İstanbul…It is dangerous".
"The old Greek houses are still upright, killing their inhabitants slowly with damp".
"An area in which the police cannot penetrate some streets".
"The world would probably resemble Tarlabaşı after the Third World War. Disorderliness, history, people from all around the world, asymmetry…If we were to play with İstanbul in 'Simcity,' this area would be dark red in the map of crimes".
"Tarlabaşı is like mud… you shouldn't touch it, if you ever touch, it sticks on you and you can never get rid of it… (in the eyes of the little pickpocket living in this 'reputable' neighbourhood of İstanbul, Tarlabaşı is this)".
"When you arrive at the lower side of Tarlabaşı Avenue, not even a tiny reminder of İstiklal Street is left. If it's past 12, walk fast. Watch your back. If it is daytime, raise your head to look at the buildings… Look carefully. Do you recall? That one was shown on the TV as an illegal brothel".
"In no other neighbourhood do people hate each other more than these people sharing the poverty. The Romani people hate those from Kayseri, the ones from Siirt hate the Romani people, those from the Black Sea hate the Kurds to death…"

From the entries for Tarlabaşı at Eskisözluk.com, an online dictionary (2000-2005) [www.eksisozluk.com]

These phrases not only describe most of the aspects of Tarlabaşı (old houses, delinquency and crime, prostitution, a heterogeneous population, poverty), but also reveal the image of Tarlabaşı in the public opinion. This image, although based on facts, is an exaggerated one which has the consequences of stigmatisation for the inhabitants and of segregation for the locality. It contributes to the creation of a stronger urban frontier than the physical one symbolized by Tarlabaşı Avenue, separating the poverty-stricken slum area of Tarlabaşı on the downhill side from the well-to-do Beyoğlu area, a centre of entertainment, cultural and commercial facilities. This paper presents some elements to comprehend the interdependent vicious circles of social exclusion and spatial relegation as experienced in this slum area. It offers a spatial-oriented look at the multi-faceted issue of exclusion and claims that space plays a key role in patterning and aggravating the social exclusion.

The spatial aspect of poverty has been widely explored in urban studies in Turkey mainly by looking at the squatter settlements on the outskirts of cities, viz. *gecekondu*, and the informal housing characterising these areas.[7] Yet, especially after 1990s, with the new wave of internally-displaced people, some neighbourhoods nearby city centres metamorphosed into

[7] The two most prominent studies on poverty and exclusion in the peripheral neighbourhoods are those of Erder (1997) and Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2001). For a recent investigation on the notion of *gecekondu*, see *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, Thematic Issue No. 1, 2004 [http://www.ejts.org].

slum areas—which are quite visible in İstanbul, Diyarbakır and to some extent Adana. Although *gecekondu* and deprived inner-city areas have lots of common features (poverty being the obvious denominator), there exist many differences as well, manifested in spatial, legal, cultural, political and economic dimensions. We hope to contribute to the discussion of spatial exclusion by shedding a humble light on an inner-city neighbourhood which has grown to be as segregated as the poor squatter settlements, if not more.

A Neighbourhood De-formed and Re-formed by Migrations

Tarlabaşı is an informal name given to an area forming almost a rectangle between Tarlabaşı Avenue on the south, which runs parallel to the İstiklal Avenue, one of İstanbul's most attractive cultural and commercial centres, Dolapdere Avenue on the north, Ömer Hayyam Street on the west, and Taksim Avenue on the east; and comprising six officially defined neighbourhoods: Bostan, Bülbül, Çukur, Kamer Hatun, Kalyoncu Kulluk, and Şehit Muhtar. Hence, Tarlabaşı represents the ambiguity of all slums: while it is geographically very close to the "heart" of the city, socio-economically it is very distant.

İstiklal Avenue, lying between the upper side of Galata and Taksim, was the major thoroughfare of Pera that developed as the modern part of the city with the growing foreign commerce of the Ottoman Empire which integrated in the world capitalist system in the early nineteenth century. The *Grande Rue de Pera*—the actual İstiklal Avenue— developed as a residential and commercial centre for foreigners as well as the upper-strata of the non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, contrary to the older parts of the city. But every part of Pera did not enjoy the same economic status: although neighbours, Tarlabaşı and Pera, in fact, never sheltered the same social strata. The topography also is reproduced in the social structure: the well-to-do classes dwelled on the upper part along the main street, while the lower classes settled downhill, Tarlabaşı Avenue serving as a frontier between the two. Those who settled in the Tarlabaşı area were also non-Muslims, but represented the working class.

Changes in this pattern appeared as early as the Second World War, with the implementation of the Wealth Tax (1942), followed by the events of pillage that took place on September 6-7 (1955) and the deportation of Greeks with Greek nationality (1964). So, after the 1950s and especially the 1960s, the neighbourhood witnessed a double flow of population: while the founding population, that is, the non-Muslims emigrated, rural migrants from Anatolia migrated. These population flows had a major impact on the built environment: because of these events, but especially the deportation of the Greeks, their properties have

been either sold under their value or left unattended, paving the way to occupation or illegal renting and selling operations.

One of the local administrators (headman—*muhtar*[8]) in Tarlabaşı stated that until the 1960s, people who resided in this section were generally Greeks and that the few Turks who existed were mainly from Erzincan and Sivas. After the 1980s, parallel to the loss of popularity of Beyoğlu as the most prestigious central business area, Tarlabaşı entered into a vicious cycle of dilapidation. Especially, the enlargement of the Tarlabaşı Avenue as a main axis between the old city and the Beyoğlu area at the end of the 1980s deepened the social differentiation of the İstiklal and Tarlabaşı sections. Already under the threat of physical degradation, Tarlabaşı entered into a course of social degradation and became a place famous for petty crime, drug dealing, and prostitution. It became the place of livelihood for the drop-outs of society: Romani people, transvestites, and prostitutes unable to settle down in other places, as well as newcomers to the city, single young men living in the bachelor rooms of the inner-city, international migrants, mostly Iraqis and West Africans seeking temporary refuge in Turkey, and Kurdish conflict-induced migrants from the East and South-east.

As a result, this neighbourhood is far from comprising a homogeneous population. Each new decade since the 1950s has brought a new group of migrants: those from the Black Sea region and from the Marmara region (these latter are mostly Romani people) who arrived mostly before 1960s were followed by the mass arrival of migrants from central and eastern Anatolia (mainly from Sivas, Erzincan, Konya and Kayseri) between 1960-1980, and after 1980s the main migrant group arrived from south-eastern Anatolia and to a lesser extent from eastern Anatolia and this group was mainly (though not exclusively) of Kurdish ethnicity. The Kurdish migration can be roughly divided into two: during the 1980's it was principally a voluntary type of migration due to economic reasons whereas after 1990 it became an involuntary migration (combining forced and impelled migration, giving way to displacement and flight, respectively) due to political-cum-economic reasons following the armed conflicts between the PKK and the Turkish army.

It should be stated at the outset that the different migrant groups are in different socio-economic (and spatial) positions and thus have not been equally affected by social exclusion. While the previous migrant groups have been better off in all aspects of urban life, the recent migrants have suffered mostly from an exclusionary procedure the dimensions of which will

[8] The lowest unit in local administration, *muhtars* are elected for a term of five years by the electorate of neighbourhoods in cities and villages in the rural areas and have a list of basic duties and some powers. Governors, although unable to take decisions on behalf of *muhtars*, have the power to veto their decisions.

constitute the issue of this paper.[9] Spatially, the innermost neighbourhood of Tarlabaşı, the Çukur *mahalle* (neighbourhood), where the social exclusion has been revealed to be most severe, is where the Kurdish population is mostly concentrated and also where the built environment is the oldest and the most decayed.

Multidimensional Exclusion in Tarlabaşı

The notion of social exclusion, which in Europe is more privileged than notions of poverty, marginality or underclass, is a multidimensional notion and points to the inadequate functioning of the institutions which are responsible for social integration. Hence, this concept shifts the focus of analysis from individuals to society. Thanks to this notion, it is possible to give an account of deprivation not only in terms of income, but also in terms of substantial citizenship, which could be defined as having equal chances of participation in various areas of society, such as politics, work, welfare systems and cultural relations.[10] In order to concretise these somewhat abstract definitions, in what follows we will discuss the different aspects of exclusion as observed in Tarlabaşı.[11] To the first three classical dimensions, namely the economic, social and political dimensions of exclusion, we will add the spatial and discursive dimensions. The motive behind this kind of presentation is that in Tarlabaşı, the spatial and discursive dimensions of exclusion aggravate the exclusionary processes and are indispensable for an understanding of exclusion in that locality. Furthermore, it can be argued that in this slum neighbourhood, poverty can be labelled as exclusion because of these two additional factors. If we think of the dimensions of exclusions as superposed layers, in Tarlabaşı, the inhabitants are smashed under five layers of exclusion.

[9] The Romani people constitute an exception to this assumption, because although they are one of the oldest settler groups and although they have a fairly high level of income due to the entertainment business in which they work as musicians, they still are affected by most dimensions of social exclusion. This is due to the particular social position of this group who constitute the real and principal excluded of Turkey.

[10] See Castles and Davidson (2000) for the concept of *substantial* citizenship as opposed to *formal* citizenship.

[11] The observations in this paper are based on an ethnographic fieldwork realized with conflict-induced Kurdish migrant households and formal interviews conducted with other inhabitants of Tarlabaşı, the local administrators, employees of state institutions in relation with the locality, the employees of the Metropolitan Municipality and the District Municipality, NGOs, political parties, academicians, researchers, journalists working on the neighbourhood or on poverty in general. The qualitative investigation is complemented with quantitative data gathered from the last census results (2000) and a five per cent sampling of the previous one (1990) concerning the six neighbourhoods as well as two sociological surveys (Ünlü, Alkışer and Edgü, 2000; Dinçer and Enlil, 2002).

Economic Dimension

The economic dimension concerns mainly the questions of income and access to goods and services. The first issue to consider is income poverty, which presents the following features: high rate of unemployment and low levels of income for those with an employment. Compared with the averages of the Beyoğlu district (14 per cent), to which Tarlabaşı belongs, and of İstanbul (11 per cent), Tarlabaşı has a higher rate of unemployment (20 per cent), based on the results of the 2000 Census. Within Tarlabaşı variations do exist: while Bostan and Kalyoncu Kulluk have rates of male unemployment nearly as low as that of Beyoğlu, those of Çukur, Bülbül, Kamer Hatun and Şehit Muhtar are significantly higher than Beyoğlu. For female unemployment, on the other hand, the picture is darker and it is observed that Çukur and Şehit Muhtar present the worst rates with averages of 38 per cent.[12] This is due to the fact that these two neighbourhoods are those which the conflict-induced Kurdish migrants inhabit in a concentrated manner. This finding hints at the fact that within Tarlabaşı, some zones are more excluded than others and Çukur *mahalle* is at the bottommost.

Although unemployment is an important factor of exclusion, it can shed only partial light on income poverty because of the informal sector that offers room for income-generating activities to the unemployed. Hence, this context differs sensibly from what is depicted for the American ghettos by the term *spatial mismatch,* which points to the growing disparity between the location of the employment possibilities and the residential area of the inner-city inhabitants.[13] Unlike the American case, inner cities of Turkish metropolis cities, including İstanbul, can not be characterised by a complete dislocation of economic activities. On the contrary, it can be argued that migrants choose the inner-city as their first point of settlement because of the employment opportunities. The inhabitants of Tarlabaşı seek to use the centrality of the neighbourhood as an asset in their survival strategies. Indeed, in addition to the low rent level, Tarlabaşı provides diverse employment opportunities due to its situation in the Central Business Area and in proximity to the cultural and entertainment centres of attraction.

However, a closer look at the employment structure reveals that having a job does not suffice to prevent social exclusion. The most important aspect regarding the employment structure of Tarlabaşı is that the access to the formal labour market is extremely limited and only access to precarious, irregular, temporary jobs in the informal sector without social

[12] Data are compiled by the author, on the basis of the results of the 2000 Census.
[13] See Wilson (1991).

security and with low wages is available. The employers tend to accumulate either in self-owned commercial (groceries, coffee-houses, restaurants, repair-works, etc.) or manufacturing (textile, timber, metal, paper workshops employing mostly fewer than 10 persons) activities; while the employees are workers in the food-drink and entertainment sector (as waiters, day- or night-guards, dishwashers, cleaners, etc.) or in the above-mentioned workshops. Romani people work for the most part as musicians in show-business or in night-clubs and restaurants. Moreover, street jobs constitute the most recurrent activities for all but particularly for the Kurdish migrants: ambulatory street vending (fruits and vegetables differing according to season, bottles of water, music tapes, toys, everyday accessories and gadgets, bus tickets; prepared meals, especially stuffed mussels, and rice with chicken, etc.); collecting used paper, cardboard, and cans for recycling; shoe-shining; weighing people, etc. In these conditions, although more than one member of the households are working, the income generated by each is so low that the overall household income remains low.

Besides income poverty, it is the reliance on assistance that hints at the level of extreme poverty of the households within this neighbourhood and at their limited access to commodities in general. Interviews with the local administrators of the six neighbourhoods in Tarlabaşı revealed the fact that, in each, holders of the Poverty Certificate (a certificate given by headmen which will enable one to get in cash and in kind help from local governments or from state institutions, and which is one of the crucial documents in applying to get a Green Card with which those with no social security coverage may get the basic health treatment) entitling the holder to aid provided by various state and municipal institutions, made up the majority of the neighbourhood's inhabitants and that every kind of aid was met with a rush of interest. In the assistance scheme, the Mutual Aid and Social Solidarity Fund[14] plays a major role since it provides not only monetary assistance (although distributed on an irregular, ad hoc and improper basis), but also non-monetary items such as medicines, heating material and clothes. A considerable part of the households in Tarlabaşı receive hot meals distributed on a daily basis by the Beyoğlu Municipality. The State Institution for Social Services and the Protection of Children (usually via the Child Centre of Beyoğlu), İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality, and occasionally NGOs and political parties, provide assistance in the form of food, clothes, household appliances, heating and school items. In any case, the number of the needy is disproportionately greater than the aid that is provided by these institutions and we can assert that access to commodities is limited for the Tarlabaşı residents.

[14] See Buğra and Keyder (2003).

Social Dimension

The social dimension of exclusion covers three main aspects: access to public goods and services, access to the labour market, and social participation.[15]

Access to public goods and services is primarily concerned with the access to services for education and health. These two issues are of extreme importance for an analysis of social exclusion because they give this concept a greater explanatory power *vis-à-vis* the deprivation than the concept of poverty based merely on income measuring. In the case of Tarlabaşı, due to the fact that the rule is employment in informal activities and that the access to the formal labour market remains exceptional, the majority of the households are not covered by social insurance. This leads to a lack of access to proper health care in the case of simple diseases; however, in case of serious diseases or accidents, the Green Card grants access to free medical care in public health institutions. This card is delivered after a means-test and can be considered as an indicator of extreme poverty. No data is available on the exact number of Green Card holders in the neighbourhoods constituting Tarlabaşı, but our interview with the officials of the Mutual Aid and Social Solidarity Fund in Beyoğlu District revealed that in the area, Green Card holders made up a significant part of the neighbourhood's population. In addition, our observations within the neighbourhood showed that the Green Card plays an important role in the survival strategies of poor households, especially when it is considered that, as in any poor neighbourhood, bad living and working conditions make the inhabitants of Tarlabaşı more prone to serious illnesses.

Regarding education, our main observation concerns the high level of school drop-out for children at the age of compulsory primary education (ages 6-13) for two principal reasons: first, many households cannot renounce the income obtained by child labour; and second, despite the fact that public primary schools are in principle free, the poorest households cannot afford the registration fees (which, although legally forbidden, are widespread in practice) and school supplies. In Tarlabaşı, the overall level of schooling is very low. If we combine the rates of the illiterate, of those who are literate but have no diploma, and of those who have the primary school diploma, we see that the great majority of Tarlabaşı's population (78 per cent) received no or very little education.

Concerning other kinds of public goods and services, for example, clean water, sewage, sanitation facilities, electricity, etc., as a historical inner-city neighbourhood with properly

[15] See Bhalla and Lapeyre (1999, pp. 22, 47).

built infrastructure, Tarlabaşı is not lacking as a peripheral squatter settlement would be, but the problem here is the age of the systems, which are extremely decayed. On the other hand, because of the extremely dense urban fabric, the neighbourhood lacks open spaces and public facilities, making the streets the principal areas of public interaction and entertainment.

Access to the labour market has already been discussed above under the economic dimension. Here, we shall only draw the attention to the most important aspect of employment in Tarlabaşı: child labour, which, as already mentioned, is a widespread practice among the households in Tarlabaşı. However, it particularly concerns the involuntary Kurdish migrant households in which the fathers are either unemployed or occupied with daily, precarious jobs, and the mothers mostly are forbidden to work outside or too occupied with domestic duties. The children work mainly as street vendors (this activity consists essentially of selling packages of paper tissues, chewing gum, washing car windscreens or shoe-shining and is mostly realised by little ones, between the ages of 6-13), or as workers in textile sweatshops (mainly from the ages of 12-13). Child labour plays a paradoxical role in the livelihoods of the urban poor. On the one hand, it creates the essential resources for the survival of the household in the short run and makes it possible to improve living conditions in households with numerous employable children. On the other hand, it constitutes the essential factor of social exclusion in the long run because the access of the children to education, the principal means of long-term integration and upward social mobility, is severed. In that sense, as a short-term coping strategy, child labour constitutes an ingenious "local solution"[16] that the Kurdish migrant households developed to better their situation of social exclusion, however, it hinders the implementation of long-term strategies.

The last issue of the social dimension relates to the social participation which may be discussed in terms of deteriorated social fabric. In the case of Tarlabaşı, high criminality and weakened solidarity networks may be cited as two indicators of such a deteriorated social fabric.

The entries given by the users of the virtual dictionary cited at the beginning of the paper already illustrated the fact that Tarlabaşı is a neighbourhood infamous for its criminality. It must be underlined that the involvement of the residents of Tarlabaşı in crime is not a new affair; the memoirs of writers who lived in Beyoğlu abound with stories on how the sloping streets of Tarlabaşı have witnessed all sorts of crimes throughout the history of the area.[17] Nevertheless, recently, the name of the neighbourhood has been associated more than anything

[16] Karatay's expression (2002, p. 3).
[17] For instance those of Scognamillo (1990) and Gülersoy (2003).

else with criminality. The district of Beyoğlu ranks second after Eminönü in terms of criminal activities, the most frequent ones being purse-snatching, pick-pocketing, and thieving from cars or houses.[18] Within Beyoğlu, it is the Tarlabaşı area where these activities are mostly concentrated. The criminal activities mostly take place on the major avenues or streets of the neighbourhood, which are defined by a high rate of extra-residential functions (commerce, production, storehouses), whereas the inner streets with high residential functions are safe. This shows that, in the majority, criminality is oriented not towards the residents of the neighbourhood, but towards strangers. However, the fact that delinquents are nested in the neighbourhood and they are successful in the enrolment of the neighbourhood's youngsters in criminal gangs is a serious indicator of a deteriorated social fabric. In a recent interview with a journalist, one of the members of the largest purse-snatching gang in Beyoğlu revealed amazing facts of how the gang is located in Tarlabaşı (in Çukur *mahalle*), how some policemen are involved in it by means of bribery, how the gang enrolled new thieves by providing them with the possibility to earn and spend large amounts of money, how the child workers of the textile sweatshops of Tarlabaşı are eager to enter the gang and how the girls of the neighbourhood were eager to marry the boys of the gang.[19]

Networks of solidarity constitute another aspect of the issue of social participation. In a country like Turkey, where the social side of the state (or its left hand, in Bourdieu's terms) is rather underdeveloped, familial or neighbourhood solidarity networks have always played the most important role in the survival strategies of the urban poor. What is more, they not only have prevented the poor from falling into absolute poverty, but have also permitted them to climb up the social ladder.

In an outstanding study on the transformation capacities of the urban poor based on a peripheral district of İstanbul, it is stated that in comparison to the inhabitants of peripheral squatter settlements, those of the inner-city slums constitute the poorest and perhaps the most desperate sections of the city's population.[20] Although the inner-city poor are certainly not as hopeless as what is depicted, it is true that they lack resources. If one such lacking resource is plots of land available for occupation, another is hometown- or religious sect-based solidarity networks. It is not that networks based on hometowns or such are completely absent in Tarlabaşı, but given the environment of widespread poverty, these work more as informational networks than as solidarity ones. That is, in the case of Tarlabaşı, kinsmen may be helpful for

[18] See Ünlü et al. (2000).
[19] See Doğan (22/06/2005).
[20] See Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2001, p. 38).

providing some useful information (a house with affordable rent, places where aids is being distributed, how to apply for public assistance, where one can buy the cheapest wood for winter, etc.), or lending small amounts of money; however, at the scale of the neighbourhood it would be more accurate to speak of a competition for scarce resources (in terms of employment or assistance) than of a solidarity. Thus, in a period in which the whole of society suffers from a transformation of the welfare regime, the protection/solidarity net provided by close kin is no longer as efficient as before,[21] the inner-city poor are not exempted from this process of the loosening of the safety net of solidarity. Even so, it must be recognised that despite their weakened form, social networks constitute an essential resource in the survival strategies of the poor in Tarlabaşı.

Political Dimension

The political dimension of exclusion is understood in terms of the lack of political representation and influence, which is often described with the following statement: "the excluded have no voice". Yet, even if the excluded are not represented as such in the political arena, they are affiliated with different political parties which they think represent them in terms of religion or ethnicity.

The results of the last (municipal) elections show that the population of Tarlabaşı did not constitute an exception to the overall electoral pattern in which the AKP enjoyed great popularity and obtained the majority. Besides, we can assert that, on the one hand, the religious identity of Tarlabaşı's inhabitants is strong, and on the other hand, the "party of the dominated" discourse of the AKP was successful in this neighbourhood which thought it had found a voice through this party. The Kurdish population was divided along two identities: religious (those who voted for the AKP) and ethnic (those who voted for the DEHAP). DEHAP is the only party to be established in the neighbourhood: both the head-quarters for İstanbul and the branch for the Beyoğlu district are within the boundaries of the neighbourhood. Although it obtained a high percentage of votes, it does not reflect the demographic weight of Kurds within the overall population in Tarlabaşı. The representatives of the party affirm that they do not have sufficient control over the neighbourhood where the religious vein is strong, and especially on the youth, among whom the gangs have great

[21] See Buğra and Keyder (2003).

influence.[22] Lastly, the fact that the nationalist party (MHP) obtained a quite important share of votes is sign of a possible ethnic conflict within the neighbourhood.

These remarks illustrate that political exclusion is not necessarily a primary concern for the bulk of the inhabitants of Tarlabaşı; however, three issues reveal some elements for such exclusion. The first one is the inexistence of political or associational mobilisation for the neighbourhood, which not only reveals the lack of a political know-how with the objective of improving the living conditions in Tarlabaşı, but also the lack of a sense of neighbourhood identity and attachment. The second regards the fact that some segments of Tarlabaşı's population cannot be said to fully enjoy their political rights: the displaced Kurds who lack identification papers and residential registration which are necessary to be able to vote. The international migrants (legal or illegal) do not have the right to vote in any case. The third issue is at the national level: concerning legislative elections, the existence of a 10 per cent national threshold prevents a real representation of the Kurds in parliament.

Spatial Dimension

Social exclusion rarely is separated from spatial segregation. The spatial dimension of exclusion in the case of Tarlabaşı concerns essentially the extremely bad physical conditions of living. Only a small number of the old brick houses dating from the nineteenth century have seen any kind of repair since the departure of the non-Muslim inhabitants of the neighbourhood. This process of degradation paradoxically has been aggravated by the attribution to Tarlabaşı in 1993 of historical urban site under protection status. According to this, the inhabitants are not allowed make any changes to the exteriors of their buildings, unless the necessary permissions are obtained from the Committee of Protection. However, given the poverty of the inhabitants, restoration work is beyond their financial powers. In that case, the inhabitants can rely only on internal amendments. As a result, the general appearance of the neighbourhood is a decayed one and every year a few buildings collapse, sometimes resulting in casualties. Thus, most of the buildings are now dilapidated, or even ruined, and some have been abandoned. Furthermore, this decaying built environment is intensified by the fact that the houses are more often than not overcrowded due to an excessive spatial subdivision and large household populations.

[22] Interview with those responsible for the youth of DEHAP-Beyoğlu, July 2003.

Another facet of spatial exclusion is the concentration effect. In other words, living amidst the excluded deepens the social distances and makes it more difficult to break the vicious circles of social exclusion. The neighbourhood effects can thus be understood in this framework: even if Tarlabaşı offers some advantages (such as cheap rent or employment opportunities), it has an undeniable effect of pulling down its inhabitants for the reason that place and people interact. Hence, the fact that thieving activities are nested in Tarlabaşı and its surroundings influences and attracts some settlers of the neighbourhood who would probably not be involved in these acts if they have had settled elsewhere. Still, if some Tarlabaşı inhabitants are involved in illegal activities, this is because they have no other choice to assure their survival. In that situation, illegal activities may be understood as being part of survival strategies.

Finally, it should be noted that in the case of Tarlabaşı, the spatial aspect has an additional significance: due to its position at the heart of the city, the social distance of its inhabitants is hard to ignore. Indeed, the social exclusion within Tarlabaşı is more visible than that of an equally (or more) deprived squatter settlement situated on the outskirts of the city.[23] Hence, poverty becomes a disturbing phenomenon when a group of poor people get out of their neighbourhood not as workers or peddlers, but as beggar-like street-vendor children, as pick-pockets or snatchers, as prostitutes, or simply as visitors.

Discursive Dimension

As we noted at the beginning of the paper, discourses play a major role in the exclusionary process and aggravate the actual socio-spatial state of exclusion. In the case of Tarlabaşı, two sets of interconnected discourses irreversibly stigmatise its inhabitants.

The first one is spatial stigmatisation, which promotes and is promoted by the bad reputation of the neighbourhood identified with criminality and prostitution. The inhabitants of Tarlabaşı, by the mere fact of dwelling there, are labelled as delinquents or morally lacking. The second is connected to this, but surpasses the spatial boundaries: the inhabitants of Tarlabaşı are subject to an ethnic stigmatisation according to which the Kurds are identified with terrorism, the Romani people and (more and more) the Kurds with criminality and filthiness, and the Africans with drug-dealing.

[23] Pérouse (forthcoming) depicts one such locality in his article on the Ayazma squatter area.

The public opinion clichés in Turkey towards the urban poor in general and towards Kurdish migrants in particular (in brackets) show a striking similarity with the discourse on 'dangerous classes,' according to which these groups could be defined by the rejection of the norms and values of mainstream society, state dependency (if the state would give them some money like unemployment benefits, they would never ever work again), refusal of the work ethic (they linger all day long in the coffeehouses while their children work in the streets), the failure of morality (they occupied the cities, plundered all the land; they are very dirty and have no idea of urban culture), the denial of family values (they give birth to 10 children and don't care for them; they leave them grow up in the streets) and finally, criminality (they control all the drug dealing business, extortion, pick-pocketing; even the children are thieves; they are all terrorists anyway).[24] Tarlabaşı is at the centre of this stigmatising discourse because it represents the visible facet of exclusion due to its closeness to the centre and to the reported events of increased delinquency. Tarlabaşı generates fear, and the more it is stigmatised as such, the more its inhabitants are trapped in the vicious circles of social exclusion, and the more they have no choice but to be involved in fear-generating activities.

By Way of Conclusion: From "Integrating" to "Exclusionary" Poverty

Work is considered as the main criterion that defines an individual as socially included since in the modern societies, social cohesion is based on work.[25] This understanding, limited to work, proves to be inadequate for developing countries like Turkey, which have never witnessed a completely formalised employment structure or a full-fledged Welfare State. That is why, in Turkey, where everyone has work thanks to the informal activities, an analysis of social exclusion should go beyond the criterion of possession or dispossession of work, and include other factors. If we are to define social inclusion as the participation of all the members in the benefits generated by society, we necessarily conclude that the urban poor are more excluded than other social groups. The concept of integrated poverty provides a useful tool to question social inclusion/exclusion.[26] It refers to a situation of poverty in the traditional sense in which the poor are numerous and hardly discernable from the rest of society and they do not constitute an underclass but a widespread social group and they are thus not subject to any stigmatisation. Although their standard of living is low, they remain strongly inserted in

[24] See Morris (1996, p. 161).
[25] See Castel (1995).
[26] See Paugam (1996) for a typology of poverty.

social networks organised around the family and district or village, and even if they can be touched by unemployment, it does not confer a devalued status and is generally compensated by the resources drawn from the informal activities.

However, we argue that in Turkey, the environment of integrated poverty, which, for many decades made it possible for the urban poor to integrate into urban society with the help of informal activities as well as informal housing, is getting transformed under the destructive effects of the neo-liberal oriented structural adjustment programmes and weakening social solidarity bonds. Henceforth, it is possible to observe a certain decline in the integrating capacity of the informal activities as well as in the protective capacity of family supports.

In Tarlabaşı, we observed that this neighbourhood proves to be an invaluable space in which to trace the signs of this transformation and the creation of a new urban poverty. This inner-city area, a territory of urban relegation par excellence, illustrates that the informal activities no longer suffice to integrate socially; that the society is becoming increasingly polarised across the fault lines based on class, religion and ethnicity; that the inner-city slums are no longer transitory places for the rural-to-urban migrants but perpetual spaces of relegation; that the conflict-induced migrant Kurds are the primary candidates to become Turkey's underclass[27] because of the unprecedented conditions of their flight/displacement and settlement in the cities;[28] that social exclusion in Turkey, today more than ever, takes its roots not only from poverty, but also from ethnic segregation and stigmatisation; and finally that, social exclusion is undeniably coupled with spatial segregation.

We argue that we are witnessing a new poverty structure that can be called "exclusionary" integrated poverty as opposed to the old one, which was "integrating" integrated poverty. This denomination is to stress that although the general model of poverty has remained unchanged in Turkey (that is, widespread throughout the country), one part of the poor at the lowest stratum of the scale has seen its living conditions degrading and is being subject to a multi-dimensional exclusion.

Although we believe that the vicious circle of exclusion may only be reversed by major structural changes, the success of some practices in sustaining social integration in the short term should be recognised. These practices include institutions such as Social Centres and

[27] This concept, subject to many controversies, is used in this paper in a structural sense, in order to point to, following Wacquant and Wilson (1993, p. 42), "a new socio-spatial patterning of class and racial domination, recognizable by the unprecedented concentration of the most socially excluded and economically marginal members of the dominated racial and economic group".

[28] These unprecedented conditions include, among others, unprepared migration and settlement (in material and immaterial levels), the cutting off of all relation to the village (no subsistence provision from the village), massive migration including the elderly and children (increasing the number of dependent people), spontaneous migration (leaving no time to integrate gradually to the city), and a heavy political label (Kurds equal terrorists).

Child/Youth Centres, which function as intermediaries between the state and the urban poor.[29] This kind of social work should be developed further by not only opening new centres in other areas that concentrate (or that are candidates to concentrate) social and spatial exclusion, but also by providing the existing ones with more ample resources that would permit them to widen the range of services that are being offered and include, among others, mid-day meals and after school activities for school children, primary health care, and shelters for women and children under the threat of violence. Basic income support, advocated by Buğra and Keyder (2003), is a primary measure to be taken to help poor households, not only in Tarlabaşı but throughout Turkey, in their everyday struggle for survival which might, along with other social policy measures, also be invaluable in helping them to break the vicious circle of surviving on a daily basis.

[29] See the articles of Karatay (2002) and Hayat (2003), both social workers.

Severed from Their Homeland and Livelihoods: The Internal Displacement of Kurds in Turkey As a Process of Social Exclusion

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Although more than a decade has passed since internal displacement took place in south-eastern and eastern parts of Turkey in the course of the conflict between security forces and the PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party), the social, economic, political and legal problems have not been fully resolved, even though the official acknowledgement of the issue in 2002 made an important cornerstone in providing solutions to the problem. The eviction of several hundred thousand people from their rural homes created serious political, social and cultural problems—manifested not only on these people but also on the localities they moved in. Thousands and thousands, most with very low levels of human capital, found themselves either in the *gecekondu* or more likely in the deprived inner-city areas of big cities, most notably İstanbul and İzmir in the West, Adana, Antalya and Mersin in the South, and Diyarbakır in the South-east.

The situation of IDPs continues to remain critical as of today. Although the government aims at complementing the "Return to Village and Rehabilitation Programme", renewed clashes between government forces and Kurdish militants have raised fears of a return to violence and thus doubts about the success of the programme. Apart from the increased tension in the region, several factors continue to slow down the return of IDPs, the most important one being the continued economic underdevelopment of the region.

The following lines discuss the problems faced by IDPs, focusing on the multi-faceted social exclusion processes that these people went through, by considering the experiences of six IDPs with too many common points.

Six Individuals, One Shared Predicament

Zarife lives in a squatter settlement in Diyarbakır with her parents and siblings. She was seven years old in 1993 when her family fled their home after the gendarmerie set it on fire in their village in the Kulp township. Now, she is 19. Zarife works as an informal childcare worker for a military family in Diyarbakır; one of her sisters works in a cotton gin; their parents, now in their 50s, never worked in the city.

Derya's height at 150cm belies his age of 21, but so do the wrinkles on his face which make him look much older. He has worked in a small factory knitting socks in the industrial district of Yenibosna in İstanbul since he came from Van two years ago. When the PKK repeatedly attacked their village in the Çatak township, many adult men in the village became government-paid "village guards". When the clashes with the PKK intensified, they fled the village and moved to the provincial centre of Van in 1992. Derya was eight years old. Unable to go to school after the move to the city, Derya first worked as a street vendor and then as a porter—which is why he is so short, he explains—but then decided to try his luck in İstanbul after he completed his military service.

Sevgi also used to work off-the-books in a clothing atelier in Yenibosna, from the age of 11, but then had to quit her job when she acquired an inflammatory condition from inhaling cotton dust. They fled their hometown of Lice in the wake of a large military operation in 1994 and moved to central Diyarbakır. A few years later, her family sent her to stay with her brother and his wife to work in İstanbul. Later on, the rest of the family joined her in İstanbul. Now, most of her unmarried siblings work in the clothing industry while her parents stay at home.

Saliha, 37, is from a village of Lice. Her family fled their village in 1994 and moved to the town centre when security forces and village guards forced them to do so. Shortly after, her husband "disappeared" when the gendarmerie troops clashed with a funeral crowd in a neighbouring village. Unable to make a living in Lice, Saliha, her mother-in-law and her small children migrated to the town of Tarsus in Adana province. There she worked ploughing lettuce fields in the summer. After her mother-in-law died a year later, she moved back to Diyarbakır. Since then, she and her four sons have been going to the Central Anatolian province of Yozgat every summer to plough sugar beet and lentil fields.

Naile, 43, a mother of eight children, lives in the Balat district of İstanbul's historic peninsula. When she, her husband and children decided to move from the Hani township of Diyarbakır to İstanbul in 1992 because of the intensifying clashes between the military and the PKK, they were able to sell his teahouse and some animals. With the proceeds, they made the down payment on a derelict house in Balat, which most likely was owned by Greeks who had emigrated prior to the 1970s. While her husband worked informally as a waiter in a small cafe, she did piecework at home. As this money was not enough to make ends meet, let alone pay off the loan for the house, their sons shined shoes and their daughters sold packages of tissue paper and chewing gum after school hours everyday in historic Eminönü Square.

Yunus, 24, works off-the-books as a waiter in a restaurant in İstanbul that is operated by two men from his home province, Tunceli. He had worked as a waiter in Hozat township before his family fled their evacuated village in 1994 to join him in the town centre. Later, first Yunus, and then his parents and four younger brothers moved to İstanbul to join his older brother who had lived there for much longer. The older brothers worked and helped the younger ones finish high school. Complaining that his parents have never adjusted to big city life, Yunus says they would go back to their village if it were plausible. As for his own intentions, the newly married man responds: "I have more accounts to settle with İstanbul. I won't go back".

What is common to these six people and their families is that they are internally-displaced Turkish citizens of Kurdish ethnicity.[30] During the height of the "low intensity conflict" between the Turkish military and the separatist PKK militants, more than 900 villages and 2,500 hamlets were evacuated by either the security forces or the PKK in the rural areas of the eastern and south-eastern provinces. Official figures citing the State of Emergency Governorship (*Olağanüstü Hal Bölge Valiliği*), which ruled the region between 1987 and 2002, claim that about 350,000 villagers were evicted from their homes, whereas NGOs and international human rights organizations put the figure of internally-displaced persons (IDPs) as high as 3 million. Although there are no statistics on the number of IDPs, a credible figure might be close to 1 million.[31] The majority of these people migrated to provincial centres in the region (mostly Diyarbakır and Van), to coastal cities in the south (Mersin, Adana and Antalya) where income earning opportunities as agricultural labourers or tourism workers exist, and to the major metropolitan centres of İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir.

Internal displacement has created layers of socio-economic, political and legal problems. This essay will focus on these problems to the extent that they have led to processes of exclusion from exercising citizenship rights, participating fully in the labour market, accessing health services and educational opportunities, and from recourse to customary

[30] All of the above are pseudonyms. I interviewed these people as part of my collaborative research with Bilgin Ayata on Kurdish internal displacement in 2004 (financed by a McArthur Foundation Research and Writing Grant); and in 2005 as a member of a team of scholars investigating solutions to displacement-induced problems under the auspices of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV).

[31] For a thorough treatment of the process and consequences of Kurdish internal displacement during the 1990s, see Ayata and Yükseker (2005). For an assessment of the socio-economic, political and legal problems arising from internal displacement, see Kurban, Yükseker, Çelik, Ünalan and Aker (2006). A rich source of information on Kurdish internal displacement, including INGO reports and relevant decisions by international bodies, is the "Country Profile – Turkey" compiled and regularly updated by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, available from http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/C1E13DEC3D6630EB802570A7004CB2F8?OpenDocument.

sources of livelihood. It will pay particular attention to the situation of women and younger people. The essay will end in some policy recommendations to alleviate forms of social exclusion affecting IDPs.

The concept of social exclusion, as it has been in currency in social policy circles in the European Union as well as in discussions about combating poverty in developing countries, refers to an interrelated set of issues the most typical outcome of which is poverty.[32] Most basically, it denotes the exclusion of people from economic, political, social and cultural activities in a situation in which other citizens in a society can participate in these. Social exclusion can best be understood as a process rather than just outcomes.[33] Likewise, it is most often multi-dimensional rather than having a single source and single outcome.[34] In this essay, I will be focusing on social exclusion created by internal displacement as a *multi-dimensional process*.

Displacement as Severance from Habitual Sources of Livelihood

The evacuation of villages during the course of the clashes between the PKK and the Turkish army abruptly and traumatically cut off tens of thousands of people from their sources of livelihood based on agriculture and animal husbandry. Many people, especially in the mountainous regions, used to engage in subsistence agriculture, while others living in the plains used to practice partially market-oriented farming. But all in all, forced migration left people at the mercy of the market forces in the cities where they migrated: having to work for cash incomes as well as having to supply their basic needs (food and housing) in the market economy.

Zarife's parents visited their village in Kulp each of the last two summers, ten years after having evacuated it. Zarife's mother says she would prefer to return to the village permanently and tend to their fields and raise sheep and cows again. "But there is nothing there", she complains. All of their fruit and poplar trees have been burnt and their fields have not been planted in as many years. More importantly, the village is not habitable because there is no road, water or electricity.

These observations are shared by many. Yunus says that it used to be easier for his family to get by and send his brothers to school when they lived in the village. Their income

[32] For a critical assessment of the concept of social exclusion in a developing country context, see Du Toit (2004).
[33] For instance, see Byrne (1999).
[34] For instance, see Atkinson (2000) and Percy-Smith (2000).

from herding sheep and his father's small salary as the village *muhtar* (headman) was enough. But settling back in the village is difficult for his parents although they don't like İstanbul, because even to rebuild a house is very costly. Likewise, Naile comments that back in the village, "one person worked and fed many people; here many people work but cannot even feed one person". The vegetables, grain and cotton from her father's land in Hani were enough to feed the extended family, and even generate cash to buy necessities from the city. Even Derya thinks so. Although his family's hamlet in the Çatak township of Van is uninhabited and uninhabitable, he considers that surviving in the village would have been easier: "There, you would grow your own food".

Displacement as a Violation of Citizenship Rights

A parliamentary commission investigating forced migration during the rule of the State of Emergency Governorship declared in 1998 that the evacuation of villages and hamlets was carried out extra-legally (*hukukdışı*) and in contravention of the constitutional protection of life, property, domicile, and freedom of travel.[35] People were not only suddenly and often forcefully evicted from their homes, but also received no compensation for their losses or aid for resettlement in a different place.

Therefore, not only were the constitutional rights of the IDPs violated, but at the same time, they were deprived of certain social citizenship entitlements in a country which defines itself as a "social state based on the rule of law" (*sosyal hukuk devleti*), and under conditions where the rest of Turkish citizens continued to take advantage of such entitlements. In turn, the violation of their social citizenship rights contributed to the IDPs' social exclusion.

Since 1999, when the PKK activities were contained and its leader captured by the Turkish military, the Turkish government has started a number of programmes that directly or indirectly targeted IDPs. Chief among these, the Return to Villages and Rehabilitation Project (RVRP) is a programme administered by governorships in the region that dispenses in-kind aid (building materials, farm animals and in some cases government-built housing) to families who wish to return to their villages. In addition to this, a number of nation-wide official social aid programmes (mostly administered by the Social Aid and Solidarity Foundation) are

[35] According to this parliament report, the constitutional rights violated during and after the village evacuations included the principle of equality before the law, the right to protect and develop one's life, the sanctity of private and family life, the sanctity of domicile, the right to property, and the principle of protection of basic rights and freedoms. See *T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi*, "Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu'da Boşaltılan Yerleşim Birimleri Nedeniyle Göç Eden Yurttaşlarımızın Sorunlarının Araştırılarak Alınması Gereken Tedbirlerin Tespit Edilmesi Amacıyla Kurulan Meclis Araştırma Komisyonu Raporu", 53 (Dönem 20) (June 2, 1998).

available to IDPs. These include the Green Card (free healthcare services for the poor), irregular in-kind aid (food, coal, clothing for children, school stationery), and occasional lump-sum payments of money.[36]

But most importantly, the current government passed a law in 2004 (Law No. 5233) for the compensation of damages resulting from "terror and the fight against terror" since 1987. This includes lump-sum payments to the families of persons killed or injured during clashes, and the compensation of material losses incurred because of not being able to access property, or directly as a result of physical damage to property.[37] So far, about 178,000 families have applied to governorships to take advantage of the compensation law. Since only about 13,000 of the applications have been concluded to date, it is difficult to say how effectively the law is being implemented. The law's stated aims are twofold: to contribute to a rapprochement between the state and its citizens, as well as to prevent further cases from being brought before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) by IDPs demanding displacement-related compensation. In the late 1990s, about 1,500 families applied to the ECtHR for such reasons and dozens of them have received compensation from the government through "friendly settlements". But in a ruling in the wake of the enactment of Law No. 5233, the ECtHR rejected an IDP's application on the grounds that the plaintiff had not exhausted domestic legal procedures in Turkey. Thus, the Court recognized Law No. 5233 as an effective legal mechanism to compensate displacement-related damages.[38] ECtHR's "pilot decision" on the non-admissibility of the *İçyer v. Turkey* case[39] means that about 1,500 pending suits will be rejected by the European Court. As this decision practically closes off future recourse to the ECtHR by the applicants to Law No. 5233 (although not in principle), it remains to be seen how effective this law will be implemented in the coming months and years.

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[36] For a detailed discussion of the urban consequences of internal displacement and a criticism of the handling of these problems by the government and the international community, see Ayata and Yükseker (2005).

[37] See T.B.M.M., *Terör ve Terörle Mücadeleden Doğan Zararların Karşılanması Hakkında Kanun* [Law on the compensation of damages arising from terror and the fight against terror], July 27, 2004. The regulation, which operationalizes the law, was issued on October 20, 2004. In Fall 2005, the regulation was modified in response to criticisms.

[38] See NTVMSNBC, "AIHM'den Türkiye Lehine Karar", January 18, 2006, available from http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/357710.asp.

[39] European Court of Human Rights, "Third Section Decision as to the Admissibility of Application no. 18888/02 by Aydın İçyer against Turkey", January 12, 2006, available from http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=1132746FF1FE2A468ACCBCD1763D4D8149&key=46609&sessionId=5650299&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true.

What are IDPs' perspectives on these legal developments? Do they have access to the above-mentioned social programmes? And are those programmes effective and sufficient to alleviate their problems and demands?

Together with their fellow villagers, Yunus' family applied to the ECtHR several years ago to demand compensation from the Turkish government for damages they suffered in the wake of the evacuation of their village. Yunus was hopeful that the ECtHR would reach a positive decision (we talked in summer 2005, long before the *İçyer v. Turkey* decision). However, he didn't think that 25,000 YTL (€16,000) in compensation (the usual amount awarded in previous ECtHR cases) would be sufficient to make a new beginning. He estimated that this amount would be barely enough to buy a basement apartment in İstanbul, or to start a small shop. What is more, for Yunus, this sum can in no way compensate their "pain and suffering" (*manevi kayıplar*). I asked him what would be a suitable amount: "No amount would be enough. We could have spent a lifetime in the village. Had the villages not been evacuated, I wouldn't have accepted even 250,000 YTL (€ 160,000) in return for leaving the village. Yet, the village was different back then. When the village was full of people, both the villagers and the townsmen could earn a living [by producing and trading with each other]".

What about the effectiveness of Law No. 5233? Naile says that her father has applied to the governorship of Diyarbakır to be compensated for his material losses arising from lack of access to his agricultural land. But even if he gets money, this will not help Naile because the land is registered under her father's name. Although she had a share of the produce from her father's land when they lived in Hani, since they moved to İstanbul, she, her husband and their children have constituted a separate household, and hence, a separate economic unit.

Saliha has also applied to the governorship in Diyarbakır to take advantage of the compensation law's clause on damages suffered because of the killing of or injury to relatives in the course of the fight against terrorism. She wants compensation for her husband's "disappearance", that is, his extrajudicial killing. But she will not be able to apply for remuneration of material damages because she has no agricultural property in her name. The land they used to till in the village belonged to her father-in-law.

Overall, Law No. 5233 will be useful in providing a degree of compensation and retribution for the damages suffered due to displacement. However, even assuming that the law will be implemented equitably and effectively, younger people and married women are less likely to benefit from it because of the unequal power structure in extended households

and the prevalent pattern of landholding in Turkey that tends to concentrate land in the hands of the family patriarch.[40]

Many IDPs have acquired Green Cards, which entitle "the poor" to free healthcare in government-run clinics. Given that many urban IDPs work informally (all of the people mentioned in this essay) and hence are not covered by social security, it helps to have the Green Card. But if there is any agricultural property or house registered in a person's name, then his or her application for the Green Card is rejected on the grounds that he or she does not fit the official definition of poverty. Such is the case of Naile: her school age children work on the streets in order to bring home some income, but since they own a derelict house in Balat, their application for the Green Card has been rejected. In the meantime, Naile has had to undergo a number of medical procedures in İstanbul because of illnesses caused, in her opinion, by the psychological hardships she suffered since displacement. They paid the hospital bills with money borrowed from relatives and neighbours.

The psychological trauma of displacement, the ensuing urban poverty, and poor housing, sanitation and nutrition conditions have all contributed to a general deterioration in the physical and psychological health of many IDPs. But just at the time when they need access to the healthcare system more than ever, they have been deprived of it because of joblessness, lack of social security and Green Cards, and the difficulty of communicating with doctors in Turkish (especially for women) in an unfamiliar urban environment.[41]

What about the Return to Villages and Rehabilitation Project? Derya's co-villagers were offered government-built housing in a neighbouring village under the umbrella of the RVRP by the Van Governorship. But his mother refused to move into the housing unit because she did not want to relive the tensions and hostilities among her tribespeople. As Derya explained to me, her family belonged to a tribe, half of which had accepted positions as government-employed village guards,[42] and the other half of which had not. In addition, one of her brothers had been killed by the PKK. In many parts of the East and the South-east, there is ongoing political and social tension between people who became village guards and hence "sided with the government" during the conflict, and those who refused to do so. Therefore, government aid for returnees in the form of housing in "concentrated settlements" that aims to bring together the population of scattered hamlets is not an effective policy.

[40] See Kurban et al. (2006).
[41] For an assessment of the physical and psychological healthcare needs of IDPs, see Kurban et al. (2006).
[42] An amendment to the Village Law in 1985 enabled the government to arm and pay civilian villagers in order to use them in its fight against the PKK. Currently, there are about 58,000 village guards on the state payroll in the southeast. See Ayata and Yükseker (2005).

Similarly, Yunus's parents also rejected an offer by the Tunceli governorship to build housing in a different village which would be militarily more secure than their own. They saw no point in being resettled far away from their agricultural plots.

What about the RVRP's more common form of aid, that is, building materials? Many complain that free building materials are not enough to start a new life in the village. Zarife was of this opinion. Even the cost of transporting the donated bricks and cement to the village was prohibitive. Moreover, even if it were possible to build a house with this aid, the absence of infrastructure would prevent them from living there year-round.

There is a further problem: the RVRP operates under the assumption that IDPs would like to return to their villages, and so it does not consider their needs in the city. For instance, Zarife says that she would prefer not to return to the village even if her father and mother do because she is not used to the rural lifestyle. However, she admits that if she does not have a regular job and income security in Diyarbakır, she will have no choice but to join her parents if they go back permanently.

Displacement as Urban Poverty

This brings us to the question of whether it is realistic to expect massive returns by IDPs to their rural homes. In fact, returning to the village is a distant option for many IDPs. They have more urgent problems to tackle in the cities where they have been living for the past ten years. Without a doubt, village evacuations have not only created a horizontal, geographical displacement for tens of thousands of people, but also a vertical and downward displacement in terms of their standards of living. Abruptly cut off from their sources of livelihood, farmers and herders have found themselves unemployed and unemployable in the city. The men have very little education; in most cases, the women are not literate and many do not even speak Turkish. The men do not have skills suitable for urban employment. But moreover, internal displacement from the East and Southeast has coincided with a stage in the Turkish economy shattered by financial crises and a failure to create employment even during periods of growth. Thus, as the rate of increase in the demand for labour is not keeping up with the pace of growth in the labour supply, most adult IDPs have found themselves at the bottom of the urban labour market. Only one man above the age of 40 (Naile's husband) works among the

people mentioned in this essay. This ratio is parallel to the findings of my interviews with about 50 other households, as well as the findings of other survey research.[43]

Under these conditions, the most common income earning activities in cities such as Diyarbakır, Van and İstanbul are in the informal economy: construction work and street vending for men; piecework at home, house cleaning or childcare for women (if their husbands and fathers agree to their working); and agricultural labour for the families who have remained in the region. Not only is the income from such activities irregular and unreliable, but it is also usually not enough for a family with many children to make ends meet.

Therefore, many families send their school age children to work, either as street vendors or as workers in clothing ateliers, if such work is available. Life in Naile's neighbourhood, Balat, is a testament to this process. Until last year, thousands of men, including many displaced Kurds, living on the historic peninsula peddled goods (from food to clothing, from stationery to pirated CDs) in the informal open-air market of Eminönü on weekends. Last year, police raided the marketplace several times and the government banned peddling there on the grounds that it was an eyesore in the city's top touristic location. As social service workers knowledgeable with the region informed me, when fathers were thus severed from their main sources of income, families started to send their kids into the streets to sell packages of tissue paper.

Here, we discern a spatial differentiation in the forms of work available for the younger generation. In Diyarbakır, Van, Batman or Hakkâri, the paucity of industry and commerce leads both adults and children to seek income earning activities on the street, most typically as street vendors. Likewise in İstanbul's "inner city" neighbourhoods, such as Balat or Tarlabaşı (in the Beyoğlu district), sending kids out to sell packages of tissue paper and chewing gum is a typical coping strategy for poor IDP families who were driven to such run-down districts because of the low rents. Nevertheless, for those who are able to move into industrial districts in İstanbul where rents are much higher, finding jobs in small clothing workshops (often subcontractors for bigger companies) is not difficult. In the second case, sending one or two teenage daughters or sons to the big city and then moving the whole family to İstanbul is not uncommon, as the testimonies of Sevgi and Derya exemplify. However, that usually requires the presence of some close relative who has migrated to

[43] See, for instance, Dağ, Göktürk and Türksoy (1998) and Barut (2001).

İstanbul before the ordeal of internal displacement, and so is able to help the newcomers with finding jobs and places to stay.

Therefore, when assessing the degree of social exclusion of IDPs from the urban labour market, we have to distinguish between those who engage in the most marginal types of coping activities and those who have been informally "integrated" into the urban labour force, albeit without social security and job stability. This differentiation partially coincides with geographical location (inner city versus industrial district, or south-eastern provincial centre versus western metropolis). In turn, this spatial differentiation is determined largely by each household's pre- and post-displacement conditions (e.g., resources that can be turned into cash, close relatives in the city, generational cycles, etc.).

Displacement as a Hindrance to Education

Derya started to go to elementary school in his village. When they moved to Van, he did not return to school. Initially he sold sunflower seeds from a cart, and then he worked as a porter. He sends some of his wages from his job in İstanbul to his family and that helps cover the school expenses of his younger siblings. Sevgi did not go back to school after they left Lice, either. Now she is enrolled in the *açık lise* (open high school) in İstanbul. Conscious that being a garment worker is a dead-end job and perhaps not a long-term possibility for her because of her condition that resulted from inhaling cotton dust, Sevgi wants to become an accountant. That requires a high school degree and then a certificate from a specialized course in accounting. Derya also wishes he could go to open middle and high school, but working ten hours a day and six days a week certainly prevents him from realizing that wish. Yunus and his older brother did not study beyond middle school, but he is proud that his work enabled his four younger brothers to finish high school. Still, he laments that they went to a boarding school where the quality of education did not prepare them for performing well in the university entrance exams.

Saliha is illiterate and only speaks Kurdish. This makes it difficult for her even to file her application for the compensation law. She says she is intent on sending her boys through middle school, but cannot afford it beyond that. After all, how many more years can she plough sugar beet fields in order to feed her children? Naile is also illiterate, but she learned Turkish after they moved to İstanbul. She has been quite active in the local chapter of a political party in the last few years. She says that her neighbours would like her to run for the

neighbourhood *muhtar* during the next local elections, but her illiteracy prevents her from doing that.

The impact of internal displacement on access to educational opportunities is manifold. In some areas, village schools were already closed down because of the fight between the PKK and the security forces. In others, families evicted from their homes found it impossible to put children back to school in the city because of economic difficulties. But at the same time, many people perceive that some level of education is necessary for their children if they are going to stay in the city. The high rate of illiteracy and inability to speak Turkish is a particular drawback for women in adapting to city life. Naile said she went to evening literacy classes in İstanbul, but could not devote enough time to finish the course because of her household responsibilities.

All in all, lack of education contributes to the social exclusion of IDPs in the city. Moreover, the fact that school-age children have to work in order to help their families further contributes to their own future social exclusion. A few years ago, the government started a programme of "conditional cash transfer" for students, a small lump-sum payment to families who agree to keep their children in school and out of the street. Many IDPs in Diyarbakır and İstanbul have applied to this programme. So did Naile, when one of her girls was caught selling tissue paper by social service workers. The social workers helped Naile to apply for this programme, but she did not fit the criteria of eligibility because she owns a house. Nevertheless, Naile keeps her children in school despite all odds.

Displacement and Discrimination Based on Ethnicity

Naile recounts that one of her children was beaten up by the school principal once. When she went by the principal's office to inquire why, she recounts, he insulted her because of her ethnic identity and told her to take her son out of school. Not quick to give up, she threatened to file a complaint against him and succeeded in protecting her child. She perceives that a similar prejudice exists against her family and her neighbours from Hani at the local police department and by the neighbourhood *muhtar,* who is from the Black Sea region. She argues that the *muhtar* regularly omits Kurds when he distributes aid sent by charities to the poor families in the neighbourhood. Her feelings of being discriminated against on account of her Kurdish identity and her relatively recent arrival in İstanbul are shared by other IDPs who live in "old" districts of İstanbul where tensions arise between "newcomers" and "established" residents. But in outlying industrial districts such as Yenibosna, such perceptions are less

palpable. Sevgi and Derya did not think there was discrimination against Kurds in hiring in the clothing ateliers: "Whom are the employers going to discriminate against? All the workers are Kurdish!" Nevertheless, they mentioned prejudice from landlords who did not want to rent apartments to Kurds on the grounds that their families are too big. But, landlords seem to have no problem renting humid basements to migrant men and women.

While forced migration leads to some spatial concentration of the displaced population in poor and run-down neighbourhoods of İstanbul, ethnic prejudice is not the only outcome of this process. Not only in İstanbul, but also in Diyarbakır, spatial concentration also enables entrepreneurs and landlords to exploit IDPs as cheap labourers and helpless tenants, respectively. Thus, spatial concentration of IDPs in unfavourable sections of cities may be another factor contributing to their social exclusion.

The stories of Naile, Sevgi, Derya, Yunus, Saliha and Zarife are unique in certain ways. But their stories also share similarities because they are all IDPs, and because of the patterns and processes of social exclusion that internal displacement has brought in its train. Policies to combat social exclusion in Turkey have to recognize the existence of IDPs as well as the manifold dimensions of social exclusion they have been suffering, yet without losing sight of the gender, generational and geographic differences among their experiences.

Policy Recommendations[44]

To reverse the processes of IDPs' social exclusion requires multi-faceted policies. First of all, the restitution of their violated rights has to be ensured. Second, there should be specific policies targeting IDPs in order to facilitate their return (if they want to do so) or to improve their lives in urban centres. However, in practice it is unlikely that such policies would be able to reach all IDPs, not only because many families may be outside the scope of the definition of internal displacement used in official documents (the compensation law, the RVRP, etc.), but also because gender and generational differences may benefit older and male members of extended families at the expense of daughters and younger sons. Third, we also need broad-based economic and social policies in the eastern and south-eastern regions that would reach greater numbers of people.

[44] These recommendations are taken from Kurban et al. (2006).

Legal Measures

- Law No. 5233 should be implemented fairly and in a way that would ensure the payment of damages to the largest possible number of eligible IDPs. Although the amount of compensations in individual cases may not provide full retribution for material damages, effective implementation of the law would restore a degree of trust among IDPs towards the state.
- The law should be modified so as to give compensation for "pain and suffering" (*manevi tazminat*) in addition to material damages. This would not only help facilitate a *rapprochement* between the state and its citizens in the region, but it would also provide some level of retribution to landless IDPs who were evicted from their homes.

Return and Resettlement

- Returning to villages or other habitual places of residence should be recognized as a right. Returning to villages should be free and voluntary.
- The RVRP should be effectively implemented. Applying for aid through the RVRP should be voluntary and there should be no discrimination at the application procedure.
- Infrastructural investments should be undertaken in rural regions to make evacuated villages habitable again. This would include the building of roads and supplying piped water and electricity.
- Schools and healthcare clinics should be reopened in rural areas where people are returning to their homes and should be provided with personnel.

Economic Policies

- Given that many people are likely to prefer to remain in the urban centres where they have been living for the past decade, policies should be adopted with a view to improving their living conditions. In view of this, cheap loans for small business start-ups and home ownership may be provided to IDPs.
- Employment creation in urban centres of the south-eastern and eastern regions: This would require incentives for investments in agricultural industries as well as the commercial, service and industrial sectors. It should also entail cheap loans for small-scale businesses in the region.

- Agriculture and animal husbandry in the rural areas should be revitalized. This may require preferential farming credits as well as providing returning families with seeds, animals and agricultural supplies.

Social Policies

- Education: Measures have to be taken in order to ensure that all school age children are enrolled in school and that they stay in school. This would also require measures to combat the exploitation of child labour.
- Adult education and job training: Free courses should be made more available and accessible for adult IDPs who never went to school. Courses geared towards skill acquisition for income-generating activities should also be made more widespread. Such adult education and training services should especially target women.
- Health: The Green Card should be made available to a maximum number of IDP families regardless of whether they own rural property, which, in any case, they have been unable to reach since their eviction from their villages. Healthcare clinics and services in the south-eastern region should be made more widely available.

To Work or Not to Work: That Is the Question!

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Although the Government joined, in 1992, into ILO's "International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC)" as a way to demonstrate its commitment to combat child labour, the problem still continues to be a major challenge that Turkey needs to address seriously. The Child Labour Force Survey conducted by the State Institute of Statistics jointly with ILO in October 1999, the latest available, revealed that 10.2% of the age cohort of 6-17 were employed—approximately two thirds being boys and one third being girls. When the age cohort of 6-14 was considered, recalling that employing a child below 14 years old is illegal, the ratio of those working went down to 4.2%, still a magnitude of more than half a million! Although the persistence of poverty and the existence of informal sector in urban areas seem to emerge as the main factor behind the child labour in Turkey, a set of additional dynamics, such as early marriages, high number of children in the household, loosening of the family networks, contribute to the problem. Certainly the 1997 decision of extending the compulsory education from 5 to 8 years and the recent public campaigns that encourage families to send their kids to school, together with the implementation of the conditional cash transfer schemes,[45] helped curb the child labour problem, it is far from being a contained issue. As such, children are found to be working in the home, on the streets, as apprentices and blue collar workers in small establishments and service/entertainment sectors.

Street children are a common social phenomenon of many cities in the world, reflecting the binding forces of chronic poverty, social exclusion and discrimination among many other unique social, political and economic factors that may vary from country to country. Children living or working on the streets have become the "two visible portraits" and scapegoats for the discourse around social, political and economic dynamics inherent in Turkey. The prototypical picture of the young child working on the street typically attracts a mixture of sympathy and pity, while the older prototypical image of the youth who is sniffing a rag that has thinner on it unanimously evokes fear and rage in passers-by. Crimes such as

[45] Currently the Solidarity Fund is running the Social Risk Reduction Program with loans from the World Bank that involves two forms of conditional cash transfers (CCTs). The first one involves cash transfers on the condition of repeated health visits for pregnant women and young children. The second one involves cash transfers on the condition of sending children to primary schools where attendance is mandatory for continuation for receiving the monthly funds. This programme is projected to end by the end of 2006 and may not be continued by the Solidarity Fund. There is a misguided public debate about whether CCTs lead to increased childbirths.

kapkaç (purse snatching) are easily pasted on these "visible" children who carry the stigma of being "potentially criminal" as they grow up. While some of the children or youth can become a part of criminal activities, the background deserves careful attention.

Starting in the early 1990s, both images related to urban poverty shaped by many social and political forces became more visible when young children appeared on the streets selling packages of tissues, running up at stoplights to clean car windows, remaining on the streets late into the evening selling flowers or spending the night on the floors of ATM booths. While many years have passed since the first appearance of children working or living on the streets, much remains to be understood by the public about the reasons and dynamics that led to children being on the streets. Except for the works of a few authors (such as Karatay, 2000; Yılmaz, 2001 and Altıntaş, 2003), the phenomenon is not generally viewed as a consequence of the warfare that took place in the 90s in the South-east, the subsequent involuntary migration and the chronic poverty endured by these families. Rather, most of the discourse that takes place in the media reflects the inherent biases in the way people and opinion leaders look at the situation that surrounds this "visible" side of the picture and leaves out ethnicity and political circumstances, which limits addressing the complex causes of the problems. Such discussions do function as a further social exclusionary tool for those whose lives are being poorly "portrayed" in the media. With few exceptions, families are at the centre of the blame for the state of their children. They are seen as the main push behind the children's presence on the streets. Many argue that parents force the children to work on the streets while they "choose" to remain unemployed, that they are unfit parents who are abusive towards their children and that they should be punished for "sending their children to work (or beg) on the streets".

Everyone agrees that the children should be diverted away from the streets into the educational system, but thinking that schooling will fix all of the numerous problems the children face is incomplete at best. While primary education in state schools is "free", there are prohibitive costs associated with sending children to school. SIS estimates the costs associated with state run primary education as close to $500 per child per year.[46] Families with impoverished means are at severe disadvantages in sending their children to school due to these associated costs. The drop-out rate in the second level of primary education is very high. While the law has mandated eight years of education since 1997, the overall completion rate for the 8th grade is about 80%.[47] Many students from poor families join the workforce by

[46] SIS data, 2003.
[47] SIS Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), 2003.

the time they reach 13 or 14 and thus drop out of the last years of primary education in order to supplement the family income. Thus, one of the educational policies that Turkey has implemented for creating equal opportunities does not work as intended because it is not supplemented by necessary social policies (e.g. adequate child benefits).

The sole focus on children working on the streets as the main group of children at risk misses a broader group of children and youths who work in closed spaces for much longer hours and perhaps more binding and abusive environments. These "invisible" workers carry the brunt of heavy labour, fall farther and farther behind in homework, and are in jeopardy of dropping out of schools. This paper is concerned with how these children and youths view their circumstances and how they make decisions regarding their lives. It is these children and youths who have to work eight hours a day in addition to going to school, and who face immense difficulties in being able to continue their educations. Not being able to go to high school is very real for them. Falling out of the system so early on further hinders their chances of moving out of the poverty cycle, as secondary and higher education is usually the only means by which one can have a more reliable future.

Numerous studies conducted in the late 1990s by social workers (Karatay, 2000; Altıntaş, 2003) gave a consistent picture of the demographic characteristics of the children working on the streets. The families of the children are recent migrants to urban areas mostly from the South-east of Turkey starting in the late 80s when PKK–military clashes intensified. The head of the families were reported to be either unemployed or transient workers with very minimal pay without any social securities, mostly uneducated, who had previously been employed in agriculture in their villages. The household size is large, with an average of 6-8 children per family; they are living in the slum areas of the cities and paying rent. Thus, research findings evidenced the intense poverty experienced by the families who, unlike previous waves of migrants to urban areas, did not wish to migrate but felt the need to do so due to security needs and economic hardships following the intensification of warfare in the region. The unwilling nature of the need to migrate, having little time to prepare for the departure, and not having supportive ties to their place of origin which could aid them in dire times are the three important differences between this wave of migration and previous ones.[48] Many of the protective factors that were in operation in the former migratory periods, such as strong kinship ties, close family systems, safer poor neighbourhoods, no longer exist to the same degree. Chronic hardships endured by the families due to economic disadvantages and

[48] Erman (2003).

social exclusionary experiences put intolerable pressure on the daily existence for many that eventually lead to increased numbers of families dissolving or turning against themselves by means of abuse and addictions. Thus the current crisis experienced by a significant portion of the families involve the interactions of many complex risks that will continue to exist in the lives of the families who are mostly isolated and not covered by any formal health or social security schemes. Youth growing up with a deep sense of dejection and alienation at the social and economic inequalities that promise to continue into their future find little hope in having lives that can be lived out of the poverty cycle.

Youth at the Crossroads

The basic assumption in many studies conducted to explore at the outcomes of children living in poverty is that poverty compromises parenting capabilities, which leads to social and psychological difficulties in the children. Comparisons among youth living in poverty and affluence reveal a much more similar picture in terms of forms of maladaptation between these two very disparate groups. Reports of substance use/abuse, engagements in delinquent behaviours, lack of interest in school or academic work share many similarities.[49] What remain significantly different are the available mechanisms for the affluent youth that help them compensate for a transient period of maladaptation without suffering immense consequences in terms of loss of opportunities and a criminal track record that may hinder their future choices.

Given the fact that youth in impoverished neighbourhoods lack the resources that could fix transitory rebellious activities, and each choice (getting into drugs, quitting school, etc.) they make may have heavy consequences in terms of the paths their lives may take, the circumstances that lead to choices of actions and the surrounding context need to be appreciated before any attempts at "helping" the youth can be actually helpful to them. Teenagers in poor communities have to fight against feelings of dejection and hopelessness in order to stay in the course that is often full of challenges related to discouragement, and real obstacles in attaining what they want.

[49] Luthar and Ansary (2005).

Two Voices from Tarlabaşı

In order to get a better glimpse of the lives of the youth in Tarlabaşı (*Bülbül Mahallesi*), two resilient and academically ambitious young males (ages 14 and 17) were interviewed about their experiences with migration, settling into the neighbourhood, school life, work conditions, neighbourhood events, and the forms of discrimination and social exclusionary experiences they endured.

Tarlabaşı is one of the "slummified", deprived inner-city neighbourhoods in İstanbul, geographically very close to the city centre, where one of the main inhabitant groups emerges as IDPs. Via looking at the experience of the two young males in their struggle to allocate their time and energies between working and education, and at the same time being subjected to various exclusions, the following lines aim at shedding light on the child labour problem in Turkey—the two examples taken from Tarlabaşı may have many replications in other localities in İstanbul and in other metropolitan cities.

The Experience of Migration

The importance of the traumatic events and circumstances around which families have felt forced to migrate to metropolitan cities in the last 10-15 years is brought home by the stories they told me in our conversations. It is clear that the years of terror and feeling unsafe being caught between the PKK and the military has left its marks in the psyches of everyone who has lived through the warfare. Many stories of witnessing actual warfare at night, being scrutinized by the military, being forced to leave the villages without having access to their lands are vividly told, which shows the salience of the emotional burden of the circumstances in which the dislocation starts to unhinge the families. It took many years and many moves before the two families could be reunited in İstanbul, albeit under the dire circumstances of unsteady work conditions for the fathers. It is also evident that there were no support systems available for these families to settle into new lives with adequate opportunities for starting over. The families came to live in a place that hardly knew the details of what took place in the region during the 90s. Thus, the lack of awareness coupled with discriminatory experiences related to being Kurdish added an enormous additional toll on everyone in these families.

It is in this context of unstable jobs for the fathers that Mehmet and Batu[50] entered the streets as young children to make money-selling commodities such as packages of tissue paper or bottles of water. The burden of taking care of the families was spread to the children, who realized that it is imperative for them to work in one form or another. As is reported by many other children who work on the streets, it quickly became the route through which young children in the families were sent to work on the streets under the guidance of an older sibling or relative, who kept an eye the younger ones in case something dangerous was to occur. Many passers-by did not notice this invisible support system and assumed that the families "left" their children on their own to bring in money. The daily earnings were important for the families to continue to survive in the city. Needless to say, the story is not one of romantic notions of intense solidarity among the family members, but one of more sobering facts of living under circumstances that do not allow for good options from which to choose. Both teens talked about their experience of working on the streets, but it was clear that the time they spent working on the streets was not the most troubling one for them in terms of the consequences that affected their lives.

With the recovery from the 2001 economic crisis, more work became available for school-aged children in small businesses such as in the textile workshops spread around the city, excluded from the view of the general public. Working in such closed spaces as opposed to the streets, which involves at times additional eight hours of work after the school at minimal pay, is clearly cited as the most stressful part of working and going to school.

School and Work

> Going to school is nice, but there are some difficulties. You have to overcome those difficulties… (Can you give an example?) For example, you go to work… You wake up in the morning; you go to school at 7. Leave school at 12:30. Have lunch and go to work at 2 pm and work until at least 10 pm. After that you don't have much time left. You go home, it is almost midnight. And then you wake up at 7pm to go to school...

These were the opening comments of my interview with Mehmet (14), when asked about what it was like for him to go to school. From that early point in our conversation until the end, Mehmet talked about the value he places on education and his efforts to succeed in school despite working since the fourth grade.

[50] Names have been changed to preserve confidentiality.

> It is nice to go to school. Teachers teach you things. You are never bored. You have friends. You have breaks. You see your friends during the breaks. When you are at work, your mind is always preoccupied with work. By the evening you are covered in dust. How can I say it, you struggle a lot. At school you have classes, you do your homework and you become successful. You realize that your future is strong. It is a nice thing to go to school.

Mehmet is a 7th grade student who made the decision to quit working three weeks prior to our meeting, against the wishes of his parents. After briefly working on the streets, he had worked steadily at different jobs in textile manufacturing as well as other small business shops since the fourth grade. He is angry and adamant about not going back to work until he finishes school, but this seems highly unlikely as his father is paying off debts and the family is facing serious economic hardships. Currently he is at odds with his family about not working. There are seven children in the family, with him being the second oldest. His father has debts to finish paying off in a few months and asks Mehmet to work until then. Having almost failed a year ago and not doing too well in the beginning of the current school term because of the long work hours, he talks about his efforts to catch up in the last three weeks. He appears hopeful that his grades can improve if he doesn't go to work. Mehmet wants to go to high school and become an accountant.

Mehmet talks in anger when he mentions the pressure put on him by his parents to go back to work:

> I tell them I will go to school. They tell me you won't. I go. They tell me, "You will work". I tell them I won't. I get out of the house and go to the Atatürk Kitaplığı (local library). They keep asking me, "Why don't you work?" I had promised myself earlier this year that I won't go to school. I was so angry at them. They kept saying we won't send you to school, we won't send you to school. I promised myself to show them what I would be like if I didn't go to school. I started hanging out with bad friends… I started hanging out with older people, they were smoking cigarettes. But they didn't understand anything at all… I was hurting myself…

He appears adamant about not working for the rest of the year, but when asked if he feels this can be accomplished, he loses some of his resolve and talks about the uncertainty of the situation.

While getting good grades has been a very important accomplishment for him, the failure to do so clearly burdens him and he finds himself unable to seek the support he needs from his teachers to help resolve his bind.

> (Do you teachers know that you work?) Sometimes they know, sometimes I tell them. When I can't do my homework the teacher asks me why I didn't do my homework and I say, "I work after school". Sometimes they forget that I work… They tell me, do your homework even if you work. They say, "Why do you come to school if you can't study?"

Mehmet shows us a troubled picture in which he is left alone in his struggle to find a way out of his dilemma of just going to school without incurring significant family strife or going to work without jeopardizing his academic achievements.

Batu is a 17 year old who works full time in a textile workshop while registered in the *açık lise* (open high school) and attending *dershane* (private tutoring courses) to prepare himself for the University Entrance Exam. Batu comes across as a very self-disciplined, hard working young person whose ambition is to become a teacher and perhaps return to Mardin to do this teaching. His strong ambitions about academic success came through an important exchange with a teacher in sixth grade.

> We did not attend school regularly when we were in Mardin. We went to the fields, collected things for the animals to eat. But I started school in the sixth grade. There was a social science teacher. Everyone was afraid of him. They said he would beat us. One day he asked us to prepare a section for class. I studied and after my turn the teacher said "good" to me. I realized that if you study, you get praise ("*Aferin*"), that is when I said to myself, I will study from now on. That is when I started thinking about things. Before then, we didn't know much, why we were going, what we will gain from it? We knew how to write, but we didn't know what we were going to become. My first five years in school, my grades were bad, barely passing. But in sixth grade I got honours. We came to İstanbul; they sent my report card and the honours certificate here.

Batu came during the two summers prior to their final move to İstanbul, to sell water on the streets. He attended 7th and 8th grades in İstanbul and was very successful, receiving honours and high honours in both years. While attending school, he worked in different shops. After he graduated from 8th grade, he was not allowed to continue on to high school and started work full time at a textile workshop. The circumstances that led to him not being allowed to register in high school were related to having a relative whose son asked for too much money to go to school.

> The expenses as well as my grandmother pressuring my father that nobody is left to work for the family… There was the brother of a friend who was working and going to *açık lise*. I registered for the *açık lise* without telling my father.

This decision to enrol in *açık lise* proved to be a very important one in Batu's life. He works hard to finish his courses and prepares himself to take the University Entrance Exam. Given that he has heavy responsibilities at work, which pays fairly well, he is often teased about his wish to become a teacher because of the comparability of the salary he makes now to that of a teacher's wages. Batu counsels others who share a similar predicament about how to register for *açık lise* and retain the chance to go to college. He complains that he misses having teachers and feels behind the regular high school students when he attends *dershane* to prepare for the big exam.

School Safety

The guns, weapons, and the daily, at times violent, fights that go on in Mehmet's school were mentioned with numerous examples. He talked about incidents where even the principle of his school is helpless and scared; as in one story in which he is attacked by "elders" of problematic students. While the reports of school violence and drugs being available on school grounds are not particular to Mehmet's school, the safety of the school grounds needs to be addressed.

Discrimination and Social Exclusion

Batu talked at length about his experience of discrimination within the classroom:

> The first year in school we were alienated, because our Turkish was not very good. Because we only spoke Turkish with the teachers there. When we spoke Kurdish at school with friends, they teased us. "Look these came from the villages"… we said to ourselves, we came, but we will be more successful than them. The first term we got honours and the second term we got high honours. 8th grade, the same, honours, high honours, that was good. There were one or two other students from our region and my cousin in my classroom. We spoke with each other. The others didn't speak to us. As if we didn't exist. They didn't do much to us, maybe because there were four of us. If there were only one or two of us, that may have been different. But in terms of becoming friends, they did not become friends with us. They discriminated between who is Turkish, who is Kurdish. Sometimes you pick up a negative energy from them and you feel bad. Also our tradition is different. Girls and boys, they don't interact. But here they do. They looked down on us about this.

Batu went on to talk about other experiences of discrimination and his parting question is a

haunting one. He asked if I thought his police records from when he was working on the street would cause him any trouble as he plans to become a teacher:

> When we were selling water or tissue paper (*selpak*), the police would come and pick us up, asking us what is your name, your last name, where are you from… we wonder, when we are choosing a profession, would these be a negative influence on us?

Throughout the conversation with him, issues around ethnic identity, fears of being discriminated against and his constrained feelings about expressing his anger about things he sees as unfair and doing the right thing to fit in the mainstream culture were palpable.

While Mehmet did not report having experienced discriminatory behaviours, he added that he is careful not to talk Kurdish when he is outside his home. He described this as a "simple habit" that the family had formed. Both teens reported that they did not have Turkish friends, and while this may be "chosen" by them, it still reflects the degree of exclusion from the mainstream culture.

Neighbourhood

Both Mehmet and Batu spoke of the dangers they encounter living in their neighbourhood. They talked about the strife between those from Diyarbakır and Bingöl, about the police coming into the neighbourhood to look after leaders of theft gangs, and about the frequency of theft that goes on almost daily in their neighbourhood. In one story Mehmet described a theft that occurred in the morning as all in the neighbourhood watched it happen:

> One time, I am leaving my house at 7 in the morning, my mom is at the window, I am going to school with my siblings. A guy, at that hour, passing everyone, climbs a window, goes in the house, and comes out 5-10 minutes later—in front of everyone. Nobody can say anything. If someone could say "What are you doing!" he is finished! But nobody says anything…

The more alarming danger in the Bülbül neighbourhood reported by both teenagers was related to guns. While Mehmet denies being afraid for himself, he talks about being afraid for his younger siblings who go out on the street to play.

> Usually every night they shoot at each other… It happens all at once. At once five or ten people gather and then it is not clear what happens… it is not only at night that this

kind of thing happens. It can be during the morning time. What if that happens when they are out playing?

Drugs are also part of the Bülbül neighbourhood. Mehmet and Batu talked about the drug business that runs in his neighbourhood and mentioned that teens and adults, and even some women seem to be using drugs.

Batu talked in detail about his observations about the youth in his neighbourhood. He described a general sense of despair that surrounds them in witnessing the great income disparities that make them want to have more money and look more like the rich kids with trendy clothes. Batu mentioned that the frustration of not feeling they can earn much might be leading some to join gangs that are involved in stealing. The same names for leaders of such gangs were mentioned by Batu and Mehmet, which show how much they were known in the neighbourhood.

Conclusion

Mehmet and Batu represent resilient teens who try to make the right decisions for themselves, for which they need to fight against many obstacles. The circumstances their families are in clearly put great strains on their opportunities to continue their educations, which can lead to their ideal professions. While, both Mehmet and Batu are deeply committed to education, commitment alone does not ensure the use of such opportunities. Teens with less academic ambitions and success can easily drop out without finishing 8th grade or decide not to fight a tough battle to obtain the chance to go to high school. Schools alone cannot be the safe havens they promise to be for children in impoverished neighbourhoods. The school system is under serious attack and does not have enough resources to handle problems related to increased violence and drugs. Youth feel alone and isolated from the many protective mechanisms available to more affluent peers. Attempts at helping children and youth living in the cycle of poverty need to aim at understanding the circumstances that bind them, as the problems are manifold and deeply entrenched.

Child-based social assistance schemes such as conditional cash transfers that target health visits for young children and educational attainment for children as well as minimum income schemes for families need to be extended in Turkey. Also, CCTs need to be structured so as to strengthen the resilience and empowerment of their recipients. State schools need to be provided financial resources that can alleviate the cost that has been passed onto the

families. Schools and neighbourhoods are the main socialization avenues for the children and both need to be supported by social policies that target to create atmospheres of social cohesion and integration. Activities offered through schools need to be at no cost so that no child is excluded due to lack of financial resources and such activities can function as a means for social integration within the social microcosm of the school system. Impoverished neighbourhoods would benefit from community-based social services delivered through community centres. Schools and community centres can cooperate to provide good working alliances for children and youth in the neighbourhoods. Resources available in the neighbourhoods could help attract youth towards positive development. Last but not least, child labour laws need to be enforced more forcefully and workplaces need to be inspected for abuses of child labour. All of these changes need to be framed in rights-based policies rather than charity-minded efforts.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

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PREPARATION OF THE SURVEY: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUP MEETINGS

In order to better design the survey, we decided first to conduct in-depth interviews with high-level officers of the central and local governments in charge of social services, NGOs working on social issues pertaining to poverty and social exclusion, and researchers/academics working in the general area of social policy; and second to organise a total 12 focus group meetings (two in each city under investigation).

The first group of in-depth interviews with the officials (of central and local governments) aimed at understanding the ways in which social policies were defined, formulated and, consequently, implemented—considering the topics such as the nature of social assistance, the determination/categorisation of target groups and the assessment of the impact of help provided. We were equally interested in the governance aspect of such assistance schemes, viz. the ways in which a given amount (in cash or in kind) of help has been allocated to different people in need. The second group of interviews was with the representatives of NGOs working on social issues and social exclusion. The areas of focus of the NGOs that participated in the study ranged from street children to Alevis, from the disabled to homosexuality, from internally-displaced persons to ex-prisoners, and from human rights to "honour killings". In the second group we aimed at understanding in a more detailed manner the areas of activities, the nature of partnerships they have established with other NGOs or local/central government bodies, and the policy changes they were aiming at achieving. As such we have not only gathered precious information with regard to the nature of their activities (past/present/future), but also discovered how different stakeholders have been approaching the social exclusion issue (in terms of defining, setting out its causes, providing solutions, etc.). Finally, we have had the chance to discuss the issues of the informal economy, the unemployment problem, urbanization and the manifestations of poverty with some of our colleagues. All of the interviews (and some of the documents we were provided) were of help in enabling us to better grasp the positions of different stakeholders and official units in charge of social assistance as well as the nature of the social assistance schemes that have been in force in the country. These interviews proved to be vital

in the preparation of our survey study. (The list of the in-depth interviews we conducted is provided as an annex to this Chapter.)

We organised a total of 12 focus group meetings with the aim of discussing the issues pertaining to poverty and social exclusion with people from the slums of the selected cities. In order to see any possible geographical differences we decided to go to each city and, in order to grasp any differentiation between men and women, we acknowledged the necessity of conducting one group with men and the other with women in each city. (We had an additional reason for not mixing up men with women: past experience indicated that when men and women of low socio-economic status were put in the same group, they did not talk in a relaxed and free manner.) Focus group meetings were organised by a professional research company and the research team acted as moderators. The team explained at the beginning the aim of the research and assured that their identities would not be revealed. In total 39 men and 44 women participated in our focus group meetings. The average age for men was 37.5; five were currently unemployed and the rest were working in the informal sector; 32 were married with children; five were (physically) disabled; 32 had migrated (seven of whom in an involuntary way—as internally-displaced) . The average age for women was 34.5; six were not married (yet), and so helping their families through caring their siblings or the elderly; 12 were doing home-production or part-time working in the service sector (mainly cleaning); three were working in the informal sector; two were (physically) disabled; 38 had migrated.

We have structured the talk under the following headings:

- Manifestations of poverty, its impact on health, education and lifestyle.
- Problems of the disabled.
- Non-economic, i.e. cultural, political and spatial, type of exclusions.
- Social networks in helping the families through their struggle against poverty.
- Social assistance they get from various public/private units.
- Their migration stories (those who migrated), in terms of problems they faced, assistance and collaboration they received.
- (For women) The nature of segregation they are faced at home/work/society.

Each focus group lasted about three hours, and notes were taken by assistants (tape recording had proved to be counter-productive in our previous focus group studies, as people by and large had felt a degree of auto-censure). We then went over the notes and through various

categorisation means (including the ATLAS software) we formed a set of modules for the questionnaire.

The issues that attracted attention during the meetings can be classified as follows:

- Poverty, as it is manifested through multidimensional ways (living conditions, education of children, access to health, etc.), has been at the centre of almost all conversations. Furthermore, a constant reference has been made to the dynamic process of poverty, in the sense that poverty made it almost impossible for the young generation of poor families to receive a proper education through which they would be able to get better jobs compared to what their parents have currently been doing for living. In that regard, it was stressed that sending children to schools would mean additional costs be allocated to kids (either in the form of transportation, education materials and meals at schools, or in the form of "contributions" asked by the schools)—and this with a forgone opportunity: they could have helped the families by working (either at home or elsewhere) or by looking after the young siblings or the elderly.
- Apart from economic tensions aroused from sending children to schools, mentioned above, participants pinpointed a set of additional reasons why they were rather pessimistic about the quality of education that their kids would get: some expressed doubts about the quality of education at schools in their neighbourhoods, implicitly claiming the existence of quality differences among schools in their cities; some underlined the fact that kids have no place to study properly (no libraries or public reading rooms in an environment where houses were too small and too crowded) and no extra curricular activities, largely undermining the return of their work; some draw attention to an increasing level of crimes in or around schools; and some mentioned cultural reasons still in force that would make sending girls to school a difficult decision for families. All in all, the existence of economic and other factors has been putting pressure on the education of the young generation in the slum areas, thus creating a vicious circle of poverty-low level of education-jobs with low returns-poverty.
- Lack of employment opportunities in the formal market has been signalled out as the main threat to most of the families living in the slum areas. Participants have stressed that the overwhelming majority in their neighbourhoods (including themselves) were in fact not unemployed for long periods, but rather were working in low-paid jobs in

the informal sector with no job security and no social protection. Too high a rate of turnover seems to be a common denominator in the lives of all the participants. Therefore, periods of employment seem to follow periods of jobless days, and therefore debt to local shop owners and/or landlords (as well as to some friends) emerges as the norm rather than an exception. It was also underlined that more and more illegal immigrants have been employed in the informal sector—thus a decline in the wage rates. Furthermore, participants who were forced to migrate have underlined the fact that in order to get a job even in the informal sector you needed a good network, and that they experienced a further stress in getting into the labour market as they had almost no connections when they moved into cities. All in all, the picture that was emerged was that we were dealing with a group of people who were working and at the same time not able to get out of the poverty trap—thus the term "working poor". Some participants finally mentioned appalling working conditions—60 hours of work in a week, unsafe environment, no guarantee to receive salaries, to name a few.

- In connection with last point discussed above, participants have repeatedly argued that what they were asking for was not assistance (in cash or in kind) but rather increased opportunities in the formal job market—they were deadly in need of job security, social security and a secured monthly income on which they could build their decisions. Uncertainty in their economic life emerged, therefore, as an important element of anxiety.
- Problems in accessing health services have been spelled out almost uniformly across the group meetings. It was indicated that most families like themselves did not have a health insurance coverage and, under no coverage, one would have very difficult times in case of emergencies or in case a member needs continuous care; it was also added that even if one is covered by a health insurance one is likely to make substantive amount of expenses in case of an important operation (including illegal payments asked by operators—under the name of "knife money").
- On a related matter, some of the participants who applied for a Green Card have expressed concern about the way Green Cards have been granted—accusing local officers in not acting impartially, discriminating some families against some others. It is worth stressing that internally-displaced family members expressed their resentment in that their applications were rejected on the ground of family holdings (houses/fields) in the rural areas, even though they were unable to access them.

- When asked the minimum income of a family of five members (three kids, a mother and a father), all inclusive, the figure that was spelled out varied among the cities: For İstanbul it was around 1,250 YTL, around 1,000 YTL for İzmir and Ankara, around 850 YTL for Gaziantep and Adana, and around 650 YTL for Diyarbakır. Most participants indicated that they were short of getting these minimum figures (and most had more than three kids).
- When inquired about the assistance they were receiving from official bodies, most expressed their discontent about the lack of impartiality in the distribution of help (in kind or in cash) as well as about the scattered nature of these schemes. Most expressed their preferences in receiving one single monthly in cash help, with which each family would make its own allocation, rather than multiple in-kind and in-cash helps for which one has to look for. When asked the extent and the nature of help received from NGOs, it was indicated that these were of insignificant manner.
- As all participants were migrants, it was important to know whether they were thinking of returning back to the rural life. Those who migrated on a voluntary basis categorically rejected this offer, on the ground that they all became part of the city life. Those who were forced migrants, however, indicated their willingness to get back to their rural home towns provided they would be compensated for a new start, also adding that their children may well wish to stay in cities and not to go back.
- Once questioned the extent of their networks, most indicated that social safety networks have been loosening and added that this was something of normalcy on the ground that as more and more people were getting below the poverty line there would be less opportunities to help others.
- When the difficulties experienced by handicapped people were discussed, physically disabled participants voiced that the lack of employment opportunities, care and support networks made their life much more miserable, pinpointing especially the spatial problems they have been living through in their neighbourhoods. Furthermore, all raised discontent about the quality of education they were provided in their childhood.
- And finally, when participants were asked to portray the processes during which they felt socially excluded, all pointed out poverty as the main reason of exclusion; to that some participants added that being migrated may well be a reason of exclusion, whereas some others referred to instances where ethnicity (Kurdishness) emerged as

the cause of exclusion. Furthermore, some women participants expressed discontent of being culturally excluded from social life and a few women spelled out the continued violence they have been facing at home.

Our focus group meetings were of great help in the preparation of the survey study, the results of which are presented in the next Section.

PRESENTATION OF THE SURVEY RESULTS

Survey Methodology

The survey study was to be held in the slum areas of Adana, Ankara, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, İstanbul and İzmir. The total number of surveys representing these six cities was decided to be 1,800 (due to budget constraints). Therefore, our primary concern was the distribution of this number among the cities and to decide on the regions of the cities in which the survey was to be conducted.

As argued earlier, the suburbs and inner-city slum areas have inadequate living conditions, both spatially (in terms of the structural quality/aesthetics of the buildings, the existing electricity-water-sewage facilities, etc., space and volume) and geographically (in terms of infrastructural problems, lack of parks/schools/hospitals, unrelatedness to the rest of the city). Yet reliable information on the borders of those places, that is to say the universe of our survey study, is known to be non-existent. Another fact for the case of Turkey is that the borders of the slum areas (if ever drawn) vary across time. This being the case, we had to decide on our survey universe in an *ad hoc* manner.

The suburbs and inner-city slums for each city were determined as such:

1. The 2005 data in the Real Estate and Land Current Prices), published by the Ministry of Finance, were used to list the neighbourhoods in each of the six cities, and the neighbourhoods in the areas with values of the lowest 25% were chosen. In this way, the first elimination was made.
2. "GDP per capita at city level" was used. This measure was calculated by using the 2000 census and 2001 GDP values by TURKSTAT for those six cities. In order to calculate the per household value out of the per capita product, with reference to household sizes for each city, family structures of two adults and two children, one being above the age of 14, for Ankara, İzmir and İstanbul; two adults and four children, one being above age 14, for Diyarbakır, were assumed and "adult equivalence scale" of EUROSTAT (the first adult weighted one, above age 14 weighted 0.5 and below weighted 0.3; meaning 2.3 for Ankara/İzmir/İstanbul, 2.6 for Adana/Gaziantep and 2.9 for Diyarbakır) was used and so the annual product per household (average) at city level was calculated. This number was converted to 2005 values by using the consumer price index at city level (by TURKSTAT). Hence, we

had the product levels at 2005 prices for an average household in each city. 1/4 of these numbers were calculated. As the common denominator for the slum areas is poverty, we made the assumption that the places where the interviews were to be conducted should have household income levels 1/4 below the city average. This was our second elimination.

3. Selected neighbourhood *muhtars*[1] were phoned and, after being informed that subjects were being sought for participation in an academic study, asked whether the annual income of an average household in their neighbourhood was above the level calculated in the second phase or not.
4. Some were eliminated from the first list according to the answers given by *muhtars* and as such our universe was then finalised.

The above described methodology aims at capturing those neighbourhoods that accommodate the poor people; as such not only *gecekondu* but also deprived inner-city areas have been targeted for our research, provided that the average income in the neighbourhood be below a certain threshold. As we do not know the variance of income among neighbourhoods and as from our previous studies we have the observation that the variance differs among households, we did not have reliable information on the population that was included in our classification of poor. Therefore, as we lack the opportunity to outline the population of our universe in each city, we decided to continue our route in the following way:

1. We distributed 1,800 surveys equally among cities (300 per city).
2. In each city, we randomly selected 11 neighbourhoods (one as a spare) among the previously determined neighbourhoods by the method mentioned above.
3. We decided to run an equal number of surveys, meaning 30, in each neighbourhood.
4. We randomly selected the streets in each neighbourhood and came up with 13 streets (three as spares).
5. We decided to conduct 3 interviews in each street.
6. At the household level, head of the family or his/her wife/husband who has knowledge /word on the history, future, income-expenditure situation of the household was interviewed.

[1] Refer to footnote 8 on page 28.

We had two additional conditions for choosing the houses:

1. As there were questions directed at the interviewed person in our survey, we thought the best way would be to apply a quota system. We chose a quota system in which in total 50% female, 50% male, and 8% disabled were to be surveyed. We left the disability situation to the judgment of the interviewed person (although we knew that the disability ratio in Turkey is around 12%, regarding our survey studies in the past, supposing that some disabled people would not consent to be interviewed, we preferred to apply a lower quota, which would presumably result in a 12% ratio when the overall households were considered). We made it obligatory to maintain these quotas with a flexibility of 20% variance at the neighbourhood scale. Under these constraints, we left choosing the houses in the streets to the discretion of the interviewer.

Another constraint was the clause below. If the actual streets could not satisfy the constraints, it was possible to try the alternative streets.

2. We also considered the probability that certain "islands", or "houses of the wealthier population", might exist in the neighbourhoods chosen by our method of discussion. In this case, the interviewers were given categorical information on the typical suburb/slum buildings and their space and warned not to go into the houses outside this definition. Hence, if one or more of the following conditions were not observed, interviewers were asked to drop out such houses:

    a. Building quality was an important parameter: buildings with no plaster or partly fallen out plaster, bad quality doors/windows, asymmetries with no aesthetical concern, etc.,
    b. Inappropriate connection of electricity, telephone or water lines,
    c. Absence of water pipes,
    d. External toilets,
    e. Iron columns left exposed to allow for later, additional construction,
    f. Shabby surrounding area, lack of infrastructural services such as roads/pavement/grass.

3. As the surveys were done under these constraints, the supervisors of the interviewers also were asked to direct the interviewers according to the quotas.

In this way, although the universe was not known clearly, and it was not possible to conduct a study that could be representative in statistical terms, we aimed to eliminate possible bias by spreading the surveys throughout different neighbourhoods and streets.

On approaching the inhabitants of a house, the interviewers explained the aim of the study, that participation was voluntary, that the participants could end the survey whenever they wanted to, and that their answers would be kept confidential. The participants were shown a formal paper prepared in this framework. Third parties were not allowed to be present during the survey except for babies, small children or the dependent. 1/4 of the surveys were crosschecked by a group independent of the interviewers and surveys that logically conflicted or did not satisfy the crosscheck were cancelled out. The number of people who refused to participate was 112; the cancelled out surveys numbered 86. It should be noted that, as a group of inhabitants in one neighbourhood in İstanbul forced the interviewers to stop the survey, the alternative neighbourhood was preferred. This was the only negative incident during the study. Each survey took almost 40 minutes.

The surveys were conducted between 2-19 November 2005. There was no significant change during the mentioned period that would have influenced the answers to the questions. As a result, a total of 1,863 surveys were approved as valid. Considering the possible cancellations, the total number of surveys was slightly above the target. It is possible to follow the cities where the project was undertaken and the number of valid surveys from Map 1.

MAP 1- CITIES WHERE THE PROJECT IS UNDERTAKEN



The surveys were conducted by a professional research company. The interviewers and supervisors were given a full day of training at Boğaziçi University and the important points to be considered were explained. Before preparing the final survey form, the possible problems of passing questions or language were resolved. The interviewers were chosen from the region. Considering that some of the participants would not be speaking Turkish in all of the cities, but especially in Adana, Diyarbakır and Gaziantep, interviewers who were fluent in Kurdish and Arabic were asked to translate the questions (verbally).

Demographics, Employment, Conditions of the House, and Migration

The first group of results shows the general information collected on the 1,863 interviewed people and household members. Figs. 1 and 2 show the general demographic information of the respondents. According to the quota restrictions, the male-female and disabled-abled distinctions satisfied the target (50% male, 50% female, 8% disabled). As the head of family or the person most knowledgeable about the family was interviewed, this mostly meant interviewing parents and so the average age was 42.

FIGURE 1: DEMOGRAPHICS-Gender and Education level



Average age for the respondents is 41,9.

FIGURE 2: DEMOGRAPHIC-Disability Situation



Almost half of the disabled, as expected, were found to be in need of constant care. The percentage of households in need of constant care or rehabilitation other than the disabled added up to 16%, showing that almost one out of every six persons was in need. The education levels of the respondents were lower than the overall average in Turkey. Illiterates made up 27% of the respondents (in Turkey the urban average is around 10%)[2], and those with no diploma made up around 39% (the urban average is 20%) of the total. High school graduates made up 8% of the total (the urban average is 17%). When the gender distribution of the illiterate is considered, the female ratio was 39%, whereas it was 12% for males.

[2] Here and below, while comparing the averages for Turkey in general or for urban sites with the survey results, it should be kept in mind that the average age for the interviewed people is above the average age for Turkey in general as the surveys mostly were conducted with parents. As the ratios change with age, the validity of the comparison should be questioned. As already mentioned, statistics are taken from TURKSTAT unless otherwise mentioned.

FIGURE 3A: EMPLOYMENT SITUATION- MEN



FIGURE 3B: EMPLOYMENT SITUATION- WOMEN



When the employment situations are considered (Figs. 3A and 3B), important differences appear between men and women. It should be emphasized that the majority of the women interviewed were housewives. The reflection of this situation is that only 11% of the women were participating in work life, while 60% of the men were employed and 13% were

unemployed. It is also important to note that daily piecework made up a high share of the work for both males and females. Another point is that as mostly parents were interviewed and continuation to university was very low, students were unable to reach even a 1% employment rate.

FIGURE 4: DEMOGRAPHICS- Migration and Languages Spoken



From the answers to the question on whether the interviewed person had been born in the city in which he or she lived or had migrated there, one-third appear to be locals. The method for differentiating between the migrants as "new" or "old" was as such: the median value for the year of migration was calculated for each city and those below that amount were defined as "old migrants" and those above it as "new migrants". The same approach was used for the six cities in general (the median migration year was determined to be 1988).

A related area concerned language. 5% of the interviewed people did not speak Turkish, 34% spoke Kurdish, 7% spoke Arabic, and 3% spoke either one or more Western languages; so roughly we could say that one-third of the interviewed people were of Kurdish origin (Fig. 4).

The first observation on the general picture of the household (Fig. 5) is related to household size. The average for the six cities was 4.7 (the average for Turkey is around 4.5). It is observed that there were serious discrepancies among the cities (for Diyarbakır it was 5.7, whereas it was 3.8 for İzmir).

FIGURE 5: DEMOGRAPHICS- Household



We will only underline that household size is important for the transition from house to the individual only. We also asked two questions used to understand the general living conditions within the houses (Fig. 6) and observed that in total 19% had their toilets outside the house and 18% lacked running water in the house. The rate of home ownership was 40%, whereas that of paying rent was 44%; the rest, 16%, did not pay rent thanks to their relatives. This shows that family and friendship relations continue to exist at least to some extent (Fig. 6).

Where material security is concerned (Fig. 7), the following are worth mentioning: While 59% of the houses had automatic washing machines and 29% had video/DVD players, only 5% had computers; Internet access was limited to 1%.[3] Also, 19% of the people interviewed stated that they lacked the opportunity to eat three meals per day and 82% stated that they could not afford to buy a newspaper every day.

[3] Although not all commodities are open to the use of all household members (like credit cards or cellular phones), it was assumed that if at least one member had those then the others could use them.

FIGURE 6: DEMOGRAPHICS- House



FIGURE 7: MATERIAL SECURITY



Satisfaction with Life

The following module (see Figs. 8A and 8B) is based on two questions about "how satisfied with life" the respondent is and how the respondent evaluates their "living conditions 5 years later". Answers are on a scale of 0 to 10, increasing one by one (for questions of this type, the respondents were introduced to a ruler on which the corresponding point of their answers were shown). The average values of certain categories are expressed in the Figs. below.[4]

FIGURE 8A: SATISFACTION WITH LIFE
How satisfied are you with your life?
(0: not at all; 10: fully satisfied)



The average for the six cities is four for the first question (Fig. 8A); regarding that five corresponds to the median value of "neither satisfied nor dissatisfied", we can speak of a slight dissatisfaction. Although the male/female distinction did not make much of a difference, disability increased dissatisfaction. The local/migrant difference did not make a big difference on the satisfaction scale, but significant differences occurred at the intra-city level. Whereas Diyarbakır and Gaziantep displayed dissatisfaction by the value 3.1, İzmir and İstanbul gave averages of five.

[4] For these two questions and the following ones, the results are presented on the basis of male-female, disability, migration situation and the city lived in. Of course, it is possible to generate other categories and see whether a difference occurs when compared with the already existing categories. We handled the dimensions we value the most here. We are to go into further detail of certain answers in the analysis part.

FIGURE 8B: SATISFACTION WITH LIFE
Evaluation of the living conditions of 5 years later
(0: Far worse; 10: Far better)



The picture is similar in the case of future expectations (Fig. 8B). The general average on hopefulness about the future was closer to the "future will be worse" end, with a value 4.1. Discrepancies were similar to those of the previous question.

In order to fill in the picture presented by this module, let us start with the issue of education.

Education

We mentioned, under the Demographics title, that 39% of the respondents were illiterate. When we consider all the household members above the age six (n=7509), therefore lowering the average age of our universe, and assuming that the ones already enrolled in primary school will earn diplomas, the percentage of non diploma holders will be reduced to 26%. Due to the possibility that some may not get a diploma, this ratio will probably go up. Even still, it shows a positive trend in recent years in education among the younger generation. To what degree this effort is satisfying is a point to be discussed later on. The important point here is that even if we include all the members aged six and above in 1,863 houses, the education level is still worse. Also, this city-level analysis shows us that there is a serious discrepancy between cities: Whereas half of the household populations aged six and above in Diyarbakır have no diploma (51%), this ratio is just 12% in İzmir.

FIGURE 9: EDUCATION



Another important aspect of education is the gender dimension. In order to explore the gender dimension, we have further analysed the data and obtained the following results:

TABLE 2: EDUCATION WITH GENDER BREAKDOWN (Percentages)

	MEN	WOMEN	SUM
Illiterate	**10**	**26**	**18**
Literate with no diploma	**9**	**8**	**8**
Primary school student/graduate	**46**	**39**	**42**
Secondary school student/graduate	**18**	**15**	**16**
High school student/graduate	**14**	**11**	**12**
University student/graduate	**2**	**2**	**2**
TOTAL	**100**	**100**	**100**

As the Table above makes it clear, in terms of education women on the average are in a very disadvantageous position. More than one quarter of women in the families we have surveyed turned out to be illiterate.

FIGURE 10: EDUCATION- Enrolment Ratio for Ages 7-15 and the Economic/Cultural/Religious Reason for not Sending Kids to School



Additional information concerns participation in schools. Fig. 10, which displays the ratio for enrolment in primary school for the age group 7-15 (n=1837), shows that 12% of the children in the families surveyed (216 children) are not going to school.

As for the reasons for not going to school (from the perspective of the respondent of the survey), not being able to afford school rates the highest (60%). When the reasons that "the child is working" and "is not sent to school to help with the housework" (7%) are added to that, two-thirds of the reasons for not being enrolled appear to be economic. Lack of educational facilities nearby that are suitable for the disabled or those with health problems and the difficulties in access to these facilities rated 14%. It is important to notice that the entry of "not allowed to schools because of religious reasons (head scarves)" was not chosen at all. This said, however, not sending female children to school due to cultural reasons, still appears one of the reasons for not enrolling children to school (nearly 3% of the total female children are not sent to primary education due to their gender). It is of course possible that religious factors might have been seen within the cultural ones.

FIGURE 11: EDUCATION- Problems



When we consider the problems of the all children age seven and above (n=2028) who attend school (primary school- high school- university) from the perspective of the respondents, nearly two-thirds declared having problems at school: More than half of the children (57%) declaring a problem complained about school being expensive (37% of the total), almost 18% said that their homes were not suitable for studying (12% of the total), nearly 15% complained about classrooms being overcrowded (10% of the total) and 7% stated that their schools were far (5% of the total). As a result, it is seen that a significant portion of the enrolled children suffer from problems at school and that these problems are mostly economic in nature.

FIGURE 12: EDUCATION- High School Plans



We could follow, from Fig. 12, that economic concerns stand at the forefront when the high school plans for children aged 0-15 (n=3072) are considered. When parents were asked about their plans for their children aged 0-15, nearly one-third stated that they would either not send their children to high school, did not know what they would do yet, or that they would only send them under certain conditions: 9% of all children in the total household would not be enrolled in high school so that they could work for their families, 4% of the girls (2% of the total) would not be enrolled as they would get married, 11% would only be enrolled if there were a possibility for a boarding school and 2% would only have the opportunity if it would be a vocational school; the situation of 9% percent was unclear. These results underline the importance of economic pressures in the decisions on the continuation of education for children.

FIGURE 13: EDUCATION- Child Labour



Another indicator of the damage of economic pressures on the educational opportunities of children is that 6% of the children aged 7-15 (n=1837) have to work either part-time or full-time (Fig. 13).

Health

Our next module is on health. Our first question targets household members left outside the coverage of SSK, Bağ-Kur, Emekli Sandığı or Private Insurance (Fig. 14). For the 8,673 individuals who participated in our study, it appears that 67% were not covered by any insurance, 33% had Green Cards and 36% were totally without any social protection whatsoever.

FIGURE 14: INSURANCE



Of course, it is a point to be emphasized that one-third of the household members interviewed for this study lacked any health insurance. Among the cities, there is a significant variance. No insurance in Diyarbakır was as high as 91%, whereas this fell to 36% in İzmir. When Green Card holders were assessed, the variance among cities fell (additional information is that having no insurance due to forced migration rated 79%). Individuals with no social security mostly dealt with their health problems on their own; religious institutions and municipalities did not play a significant role (Fig. 15).

FIGURE 15: HEALTH- Ways of Solving Problems (Multiple answers)



Surgery is an important problem that brings serious economic burdens and uncertainties for the population of the study. The total ratio for the houses in which at least one member had had to have an operation in previous two years was 22%. This enables us to formulate a general framework on the issue.[5]

Disability/Dependency

Another item partly related to the health issue is the evaluation of the services for the disabled/dependent. We preferred to approach this issue with a module of five questions. Here, the respondents were asked to consider every member of the household with disability/ dependency (and, of course, the respondent was included if he/she was disabled/dependent). Therefore, the module was asked if the respondent was disabled/dependent or there was a person in this situation in the household. In total, 706 houses fit in this definition (but as there was more than one disabled/dependent person in some houses, the number rose to 970).[6]

[5] A problem faced by those both covered and not covered by health insurance is that doctors may demand extra payment in the name of "knife money" or refuse to do the operation. Of those from whom "knife money" had been demanded, 70% stated that they had paid it (it seems that bills are used in this exchange) and 22% had said that they had not been able to have the surgery as they had not been able to afford the amount.

[6] Of the total amount of disabled/dependent people, 47% were women and 53% men (adjusted figures); when age cohorts are considered, 23% were below 20, 26% above 20 and below 40, 25% above 40 and below 60, and finally 26% above 60. When the age distribution of our sample is considered, we observed that these figures are in line with the results of the country-level 2002 Disabled Survey.

FIGURE 16: SERVICES FOR THE DISABLED/DEPENDENT



Answers to the first question (Fig. 16) show us that 68% had not benefited from services for the disabled/dependent in the previous two years. As "not willing to benefit" was a choice among the answers, the ratio of 68% displays certain problems in the supply of services (which we think must focus on rehabilitation and employment issues). When the institutions that provide services are considered (independent of service quality), we see that, in Fig.17, NGOs and religious institutions got 6% each, local administration 11% and public institutions almost 82% (İŞKUR receiving 3% percent only).

The answers to the question of whether the disabled/dependent face any problems in participating in a series of social activities show us that more than half of the disabled/dependent portion (57%) face difficulties and as a result do not do such things as go shopping, go out of the house (attend weddings, go visiting, etc.), take holidays, go on picnics or go to the cinema, theatre or concerts. Also, 11% of the disabled people were not allowed in certain places due to their being disabled/dependent and 8% were refused to be served (in places like shops or restaurants). By these two questions we observe the serious problems in the supply of services to this population and that the necessary awareness is not widespread in society (Fig. 18).

FIGURE 17: SERVICES FOR THE DISABLED/DEPENDENT



FIGURE 18: DISABLED/DEPENDENT- Daily problems



As a result, it should have been no surprise to obtain an average of 2.1 (Fig. 19) when the evaluation of the services for the disabled/dependent was conducted on a 0-10 scale (0, not enough at all; 10 fully enough).

FIGURE 19: EVALUATION OF THE SERVICES FOR THE DISABLED/DEPENDENT
(0: Not enough at all; 10: Fully enough)



The responses show high variance between cities (Gaziantep 1.2 at one end, Ankara, 3.1, at the other), which is parallel to our former observations. When we look at the subcategories of the respondents, although there was no significant difference, locals were less dissatisfied than old migrants and old migrants less so than new migrants (it is possible that living for a longer time in the city/family ties being restored could be helpful in easier access to solutions). Whether the respondent was disabled/dependent or not did not make a significant difference; but, although the difference is low, it is interesting that females rated higher than males (the possibility that the women are less informed than men on the scale of services that could be available to the disabled/dependent could be due to women having fewer chance to interact with the outside world than men).

Migration

The following module consists of nine questions on migration. As migration could appear to be an important parameter regarding the exclusion issue, it was preferred to go into the details of the migration title. First, from Fig. 20, we are able to learn whether the migrant is the respondent or the respondent's family: we mentioned in the module on demographics that 34% of the respondents were locals; we see that 16% of migrants had moved to the city as a

result of their family's migration and the rest had migrated on their own. We would like to point out the differences in the distribution on migration issue among cities; this could be either because the cities received migration at different rates or as a result of our method for choosing the people to be interviewed.

FIGURE 20: MIGRATION



When we look at the reasons for migration (Fig. 21), it appears that direct or indirect economic reasons (not being able to earn money or lack of education/health services) were predominant. We also see that the ratio for forced migration and migration due to lack of security and safety added up to 13%. As expected, marriage was also among the reasons for migration. It is not surprising that the destination chosen for migration (Fig. 21) was basically decided by job opportunities and having relatives/friends in that place (as the answers were multiple, the sum is larger than 100).

FIGURE 21: REASONS FOR MIGRATION and GEOGRAPHICAL CHOICE



When we analyze whether the people who migrated by forced migration (predominantly in Diyarbakır) had applied for compensation for their losses to the legal authorities, we found that fewer than expected (26%) had applied (Fig. 22). More than half of the applicants had not received replies yet and 22% had received positive results.

FIGURE 22: MIGRATION - Forced migration



Arising from the view that whether post-Migration support is given or not plays an important role in reducing problems afterwards, it was asked whether they had received support in:

* Finding/Renting a house
* Finding a job for someone in the family
* Enrolment of children in school
* Finding a doctor/health facility
* Food support
* Fuel support
* Financial support

And if yes, which of the below was the channel of this help (Tables 3A and 3B).

* Relatives
* Neighbours/Friends
* *Muhtar*
* Municipality
* Charities/Foundations

TABLE 3A: WAS SUPPORT NEEDED? IF YES, HOW MUCH FROM WHERE?

	No need for support	Needed but not asked for	Little help received	A lot of help received	Don't know/ no answer
Finding/renting a house	16,8	62,6	**14,2**	**4,7**	1,8
Finding job for someone in the family	18,9	66,5	**10,1**	**2,4**	2,1
Enrolment of the children in school	27,8	64,2	**5,7**	**0,7**	1,6
Finding a doctor/ health facility	25,0	65,5	**6,6**	**1,0**	1,9
Food support	21,6	65,7	**8,9**	**1,8**	1,9
Fuel support	21,2	66,1	**9,2**	**1,7**	1,9
Financial support	20,4	69,7	**6,4**	**1,4**	2,1

TABLE 3B: RECEIVED SUPPORT: WHO HELPED FOR WHAT?

Support received %	Finding /renting a house	Finding job	Enrolment in school	Finding a Doctor/ health facility	Food support	Fuel support	Financial support	Sum
Relatives	**33**	**21**	9	9	9	8	**11**	100
Neighbours/ friends	**28**	**22**	11	**13**	12	6	9	100
Muhtar	**15**	3	10	12	**15**	**35**	10	100
Municipality	3	2	6	10	**38**	**31**	**11**	100
Foundation/ charity	**36**	2	0	2	**24**	**24**	12	100

The results first show that a portion of 20% did not need support on the issues listed.[7] Between 60-70% stated that they had not applied for help out of fear of rejection or had applied and been rejected. Between 7 to 19% had received support (the most for finding/renting a house, the least for financial support).

When we look at which support was provided and by whom and focus our attention on the top three areas of support (bold numbers in Table 3B), it appears that relatives, in order, gave support for finding/renting a house, finding a job and financial problems; neighbours/friends provided support for, in order, finding/renting a house, finding a job and finding a doctor/health facilities; *muhtars* gave support for, in order, fuel, food and finding/renting a house; municipalities gave support for, in order, food, fuel and financial problems and last, charities/foundations gave support for, in order, finding/renting a house, food and fuel.[8]

[7] This ratio, in most cases, decreases when the ones forced to migrate are considered.

[8] The answers show us that at least some demand was satisfied and not rejected. There could be several reasons behind not applying even though there is need: honour, not being informed of the mechanism of applying for support, and anticipation of rejection if one does ask are among the leading reasons.

FIGURE 23: EVALUATION OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AFTER MIGRATION
(0: Far worse; 10: Far better)



The respondents were asked to evaluate the economic situation and intra-family relations after migration (Figs. 23 and 24). When the averages of the answers on a 0-10 scale (0, far worse; 10, far better) are analyzed, the economic situation appears close to a "neither worse nor better" (5) value. When we consider the discrepancies among groups, gender and disability, situations do not appear to be differentiating. When we take the migration situation into account, the difference between the new migrants and the old (4.7 and 5.4) is worth attention (the average in the case of forced migration is 2.4). But real the discrepancy is among cities. The average falls to 2.6 in Diyarbakır and rises to 5.9 in Ankara (this is an expected result if we recall that the forced migration rated was highest in Diyarbakır [73% of all forced migration] and the average value of the ones coming with forced migration is very low).

FIGURE 24: EVALUATION OF THE INTRA-FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS AFTER MIGRATION
(0: Far worse; 10: Far better)



These results are, being a little bit more positive, replicated for the intra-family relation question. Here again, Diyarbakır rates very low and the average ratio for the forced migration case, 3.7, lowers the average value in that city.

Income- Support

The following module is composed of questions on household income. First, it was asked whether the person earning the household income had been unemployed at any time during the previous two years and, if yes, what had been done to maintain the living (Fig. 25).

FIGURE 25: INCOME



Two-thirds of the respondents stated that the person earning the household income had been unemployed for a while during previous two years, and 28% stated a duration period of seven months or more. For the forced migration cases, unemployment had occurred for 89% and had lasted for seven months or more for 62%. The related question was about what had been done when nobody in the family had been employed for longer than a month during previous two years. More than half (58%) stated that they had faced such a case and two-thirds of them said they had received support from relatives/friends. This signals the continuity of the power of social networks. But 14% stated that they had had to sell assets and 34% had consumed their savings. External support, like from the municipality, *muhtar*, charity or foundations, only rated 10%. When we analyze the forced migration case as additional information, it appears that the situation of no household member being employed had appeared for 84% during previous two years. To sum up, unemployment occurs as a serious problem in the slum areas (accelerated by forced migration) and people depend on the social networks of relatives/friends in order to survive during these periods of unemployment. If such networks tended to deteriorate through time, then the possibility of serious problems for those families would increase.

FIGURE 26: INCOME- Do you have regular household income?



Answers to the following questions complete the above picture. The first question (Fig. 26) is about whether the household has a regular income or not. The general average shows us that 54% of all houses did not have a regular income; this ratio increased to 91% and 84% in Diyarbakır and Gaziantep, respectively. The disability situation of the respondent was not influential on the regularity of income (disability would bring about not being able to work, but enable the receiving of a disability salary), whereas interestingly, the regular income ratio was higher for old migrants than for locals. A possible explanation is that locals are unable to utilize the opportunities of the city while the old migrants pursue possibilities and utilize opportunities. The new migrants (including the ones from forced migration) face reduced opportunities when they arrive in the city.

The next point is learning about household expenditures. Instead of asking the monthly total income of the household (the respondent might be unable to remember everything, there could be in-kind support that is hard to calculate in monetary terms, etc.), we preferred to asked the monthly expenditure of the household. Following that, we asked for the "net minimum monthly income" of a similar family in the same city.

FIGURE 27A: INCOME AND EXPENDITURE- Household/month

What is the monthly expenditure of the household (YTL)- What is the ideal income for a similar family in the same city (YTL)?



n=1863

The numbers are presented in Fig. 27A on a city basis. Two drawings are easy to make: The first is that the stated expenditure was roughly half of the ideal income level (the general average was 503 YTL for expenditure, 956 YTL for minimum income); second, there were serious differences among cities in both expenditure and minimum income levels. For example, the average expenditure was 313 YTL in Diyarbakır, whereas it was 631YTL in İstanbul. Two points deserve attention in this comparison. First, purchasing power differs among cities. One could buy the same basket of goods for different amounts of money in different cities. Second, when the difference in household sizes among cities is recalled (as explained in the section on demographics), the same amount of money has different effects on families of different sizes. In order to overcome these two problems, we worked on the data. First, in order to filter the purchasing power gaps among cities, we pulled down all the amounts in six cities to the same base by using the purchasing power parity index.[9] Next, we converted the numbers from per household to per capita in order to overcome the effects of different household sizes among cities. While doing that, we used the adult equivalence scale of EUROSTAT, weighting the first person in the house with 1, the other members of age 14

[9] As there exists no such indices at city level, we followed the following method: Once the price indices at city level for a basket of commodities was at hand (obtained from TURKSTAT) as well as the configuration of the average consumption basket (again obtained from TURKSTAT) that indicates the share of different consumption categories at the aggregate level, we first randomly selected three commodities from each category and computed the budget required to purchase the same basket in each city, and finally, derived an index as a proxy for purchasing power parity.

and above with 0.5 and members below 14 with 0.3 (for example, for a family of two parents and four children only one being above 14, we divided the total amount by 2.9 [1+0.5+0.5+0.3+0.3+0.3] to get to the per capita figure from the household figure. It is possible to follow the expenditure per capita from Fig. 27B.

FIGURE 27B: EXPENDITURE- per capita/month-EUROSTAT INDEX
(adjusted with PPP)



As can be seen, with this analysis, we get equalization among our cities with the exception of Diyarbakır.

FIGURE 28- DEBT



If there is a gap between the minimum expenditure and the possible income, a way to overcome that is with debt. Of course, if there are concerns about repaying debt in the future this might have both physical and psychological effects on the family. The next question was asked in order to learn whether they accumulated debt to satisfy their basic needs or not. As followed in Fig. 28, except for a portion of 12% stating that they were never in debt, the rest (88%) said they lived in debt one way or another. Families often in debt were 20% and ones always in debt were 13%; the rest—almost half of all houses—took on debt from time to time.[10]

The last two questions in this module are related to the support supplied from the people with whom they have close relations. Fig. 29 shows whether financial or in-kind support was received from institutions and relatives/friends or not and if yes, which made the major contribution to the household income.

FIGURE 29: FINANCIAL AND IN KIND SUPPORT



[10] As already mentioned in presenting our focus group studies, the bulk of debts are either to local shops (groceries/butcheries/etc.) or to landlords. Loans taken from relatives or friends are rare.

38% of the families stated they had received financial or in-kind support in the previous two years. The most support in qualitative terms had been from relatives/friends, but the contribution of support by the municipality had been the highest.[11]

Next, how much support they would receive from the people close to them when they were in need of it for certain issues was questioned. The issues were listed as such:

* When you are ill and need help at home,
* When there is something broken down in the house and it must be repaired,
* When you need advice about your life,
* When you feel anxious/worried,
* When you need someone to take care of the house when you are outside the city.

FIGURE 30: SUPPORT

How much support would you receive from people close to you when you are in need of it?



[11] Answers to both questions are multiple. Ratios in the first question reflect the percentages of the total answers. Ratios in the second answer reflect the ratio of the ones thinking that the support helped the family budget a lot to the total number of families that received support. By considering the focus group studies undertaken before the survey study, we observed that the Social Solidarity and Support Fund is seen to be included under the category of governor.

The answers regarding how much support they received on the issues listed above are displayed in Fig. 30. We saw, in the former questions, that this kind of support is important. We tried to get some idea of how common such support is. If such support is common, we expected to see no problems in receiving this type of support, as it does not require serious sacrifice. The results show that there is support, but that it is not common. Almost one-third of the respondents said they would get support in almost none of the cases. When we turn our analysis to the case of forced migration, we see that the ratio of no support rises from one-third to 50%.

Network

The next module is composed of three questions assessing the "network" dimension. The first question asks the frequency of visits to the city centre for reasons other than work. The chain of logic is that a visit to the city centre is a way of integrating into urban life and therefore a means of socialisation.

FIGURE 31: NETWORK I



The answers (Fig. 31) show us that 30% had never been to the city centre (males 23%, females 37%; force migration 44%) and another 30% went once every two to three months or less. Therefore, this picture of the relationship of the respondents with city life and socialisation is an important point to be discussed. The second question in this module asks

whether they have a chance to visit their relatives/friends and if not, the reasons for that. One-third of the participants stated they had no problems visiting, whereas the rest, 71%, gave some reasons for not being able to visit as much as they would like. Transportation costs were the first item on the list of reasons; the economic burdens of buying presents or having a child to take care of were reasons that were more or less explicably economic constraints. Illness/disability, having to work, or thinking that the streets were not safe enough were other stated reasons. As a result, an important portion of the people interviewed said they were unable to visit the people close to them as often as they would like, largely due to economic constraints.

The last question of the module deals with those who in the previous six months had had a chance to

* Visit a tomb/shrine,
* Attend public training meetings,
* Enjoy a festival,
* Attend gatherings on the problems of the neighbourhood,
* Go to a concert,
* Go to the theatre.

The results are given in Fig. 32.

FIGURE 32: NETWORK II



All others except tomb visits were below 5%. It is open to debate whether the only activity with relative higher ratio (14%) was due to social or religious motives. These results also reflect the situation of the respondents as far as socialization is concerned.

Being Excluded/Excluding—personal dimension

This module deals with the issue of excluding others or being excluded. The first question asks whether the person feels excluded due to a set of reasons or not. The counted reasons are:

* Poverty,
* Level of education,
* Dress/finery,
* Ethnicity,
* Accent,
* Religious belief/order.

FIGURE 33: EXCLUSION
Do you feel excluded due to the reasons counted below?



The answers were in the form of "never", "sometimes", and "most of the time". The general results for the six cities are presented in Fig. 33. The summation of "sometimes" and "most of the time" are seen on the right. As seen in the figure, poverty rated the highest with 46%; meaning almost one out of every two people feels excluded from society due to poverty.

Education level (30%), dress-finery (29%), ethnicity (18%), accent (17%) and religious belief/order (12%) appear in order. The subcategories for this table are presented below in Figs. 34-39.

FIGURE 34: EXCLUDED
Due to poverty



FIGURE 35: EXCLUDED
Due to ethnic origin



Females feel more excluded than males in every aspect. The disabled appear to feel more excluded than the rest, sometimes with a little difference (like for ethnicity) and sometimes with a huge gap (like for poverty). For some aspects (like education), being a new migrant increases the feeling of exclusion (if we also consider the ones forced to migrate, the feeling of exclusion is above the general average: it is 57% due to poverty and 43% due to education). The differences among cities cause significant discrepancies in feeling of exclusion: Diyarbakır rates significantly above the general average for all six titles. Gaziantep generally follows Diyarbakır; İstanbul and Adana also rate above the average for certain titles.

FIGURE 36: EXCLUDED
Due to religious belief/order



FIGURE 37: EXCLUDED
Due to accent



FIGURE 38: EXCLUDED
Due to education level



FIGURE 39: EXCLUDED
Due to dress and finery



The following question concerns to what degree the respondent excludes others. Here, a series of hypothetical traits about the parents of the friends of their own children was prepared and the respondents were asked whether they would ask their children to end this friendship. The traits are:

* Ex-criminal,
* Different ethnic origin,
* Different religious belief/order,
* Alcoholic,
* Mental patient,
* AIDS patient,
* Homosexual,
* Gypsy[12]
* Prostitute[13]

FIGURE 40: EXCLUSION



[12] As known, calling the Romani population as "Gypsy" is not politically correct due to the negative meanings attributed to the word "Gypsy" in Turkish. But we had to use "Gypsy" as the respondents could possibly be unfamiliar with the word Romani.

[13] We would have preferred to say "sex worker" here.

The average of all the answers is displayed in Fig. 40. It is seen that three groups, homosexuality, sex worker and AIDS patient, are excluded heavily. The following four groups, Romani, alcoholics, mental patients and ex-criminals, have high exclusion rates although relatively lower than those of the former. Lastly, the exclusion rates decrease for two groups, those of different ethnicity and religious belief.

FIGURE 41: EXCLUSION
Due to homosexuality



FIGURE 42: EXCLUSION
Due to being a female sex worker



FIGURE 43: EXCLUSION
Due do being an AIDS patient



FIGURE 44: EXCLUSION
Due to being of Romani origin



The Figs. (41-49) display the subcategories of exclusion. It appears that females exclude more than males; similarly, disability increases exclusion. Diyarbakır excludes relatively more in every aspect except ethnicity.

FIGURE 45: EXCLUSION
Due to being an alcoholic



FIGURE 46: EXCLUSION
Due to being a mental patient



FIGURE 47: EXCLUSION
Due to a criminal record



FIGURE 48: EXCLUSION
Due to being of different ethnic origin



FIGURE 49: EXCLUSION
Due to being of different belief



Being Excluded — Social dimension

The three questions in this module aim to reflect the positions of the respondents on how exclusion is experienced on a larger scale. The first question is related to whether the people living in the suburbs are seen as potential criminals by all or a certain part of society or not. As seen in Fig. 50, the general average is 4.5 out of 10, showing that they are slightly not seen as criminals.

It is possible that males are more pessimistic than females and the disabled than the not disabled. Diyarbakır's participants appear to make a difference by rating 5.7 and saying that they are slightly seen as criminals. The second question asks whether locals welcome migrants or not. The general average is 4.4, meaning that the view that locals do not want migrants is refused slightly (Fig. 51). The only difference worth mentioning in the subcategories is that Ankara thinks more positively about migrants. The last question in the module aims to get the opinions of the respondents on whether the employers discriminate against Kurdish people when employment is concerned.

FIGURE 50: EXCLUSION- Social dimension I

People living in the suburbs are seen as potential criminals by all or a certain part of the society.

(0: Never agrees; 10: Fully agrees)



FIGURE 51: EXCLUSION- Social Dimension II

Locals do not want the migrants in the city.

(0: Never agrees; 10: Fully agrees)



FIGURE 52: EXCLUSION- Social Dimension III
Employers do not want to employ people of Kurdish origin
(0: Never agrees; 10: Fully agrees)



As seen in Fig. 52, the general average is 4.4 here, meaning that there is slightly no exclusion. The important difference in categories is among cities: Diyarbakır takes an exclusionary position with 6.1, whereas İstanbul is at the opposite end with 3.

Poverty

The last module is on poverty, which appears to be an important problem in the places of study. The first of our three questions is about the most important reasons for poverty. Here, five reasons were introduced and the respondent was asked to choose three at most.

* Not enough job opportunities,
* Lack of education,
* Unhealthy distribution of income,
* Not willing to work, laziness,
* Discrimination due to ethnicity or religious beliefs.

As Fig. 54 suggests, lack of job opportunities and education were regarded as the two major reasons (89% and 85%, respectively). These were followed by the unhealthy distribution of income (65%). Not willing to work was given by one-third of all, whereas discrimination was given by 8%.[14] Yet, as there was no ranking in answers, it is not clear whether discrimination was really regarded unimportant or that the low percentage was due to exclusion not being among the three most important reasons. Still, we have to pay attention to the claim that exclusion does not play an important role in the creation of poverty.

FIGURE 53: POVERTY I- Reasons



The second question is about the policy that the state should follow out of the three suggested in order to alleviate poverty. The policies are:

* Increasing job opportunities,
* Monthly financial support to fix household income at a certain level,

[14] Analysis of the cities on a city basis provides interesting results: Lack of education rates 74% in Diyarbakır whereas it is as high as 92% in İstanbul; not willing to work/laziness rates 27% in Adana, but 47% in İzmir; income distribution falls to 58% in Ankara, but rises to 71% in Gaziantep; exclusion rates 3% in Ankara, but 17% in Diyarbakır. Last, for lack of job opportunities, it is 84% in Ankara and 97% in Adana.

* Permanent in-kind support to families that cannot earn their basic needs.

A weighted portion chose the first policy, increasing job opportunities (77%), and it is interesting to note that the second choice was not in-kind support but financial support (Fig. 54).

FIGURE 54: POVERTY II- Policies



The last question of the module is related to whether the respondents perceive poverty as destiny and whether they can escape from poverty if they so desire.

When we look at the general results (Fig. 55), it is seen that the respondents were close to being optimistic about escaping from poverty, rating 6.3 out of 10. Those thinking that poverty was ossified and rigid were not very common. Of course, we do not have enough data on how much of this optimism is based on realistic targets and how much of it is a dream. The disabled follow a median path; Gaziantep appears to be more optimistic when cities are compared, whereas Diyarbakır prefers to stay in the median.

FIGURE 55 POVERTY III-Future
Poverty is not a destiny, one can get away with it if tries hard enough
(0: Never agrees; 10: Fully agrees)



Analysis[15]

In this section we provide the results of our econometric analyses to further investigate the exclusion issue. As discussed above, we have put forward two modules of questions on the issue of exclusion. The first one was aimed at measuring the subjective intensity of "being excluded" at six dimensions: Poverty; level of education; dress/finery; ethnicity; accent; religious belief/order. The second one was aimed at measuring the subjective intensity of "excluding others" at nine dimensions: Having a criminal record; having a different ethnic origin; having a different religious belief/order; being alcoholic; being a mental patient; being an AIDS patient; homosexuality; being Romani; being a female sex worker. Here, we wanted to create two "composite indices", one as "being excluded", which would be an aggregate figure of feeling excluded due to a combination of six reasons mentioned above, the other as "excluding others", which would be an aggregate figure of excluding others due to nine different above-cited reasons. So, each respondent would have one score for feeling excluded and another one for excluding others. Once we have computed these scores for each

[15] We have benefited from the kind help by Pınar Ardıç, to whom we should like to express our gratitude. The details of econometric analyses can be asked by the researchers.

individual, the next step was the selection of "independent parameters" that might have an effect over the determination of these two scores.

The Determinants of "Being Excluded"

Here, after a thorough analysis, we have selected the following independent variables:

- Gender
- Age
- Education
- Occupation (as categorised: housewife, retired, unemployed, informal, and formal)
- Covered by a social security or not
- Speaking Kurdish or not
- Migration status (as categorised: old, new, IDP)
- Adult equivalised expenditure, corrected by PPP[16]
- Geography (city where the survey was conducted)
- Disabled-abled
- Order (Alleviate, Sunnite)
- Whether the "breadwinner" family member was jobless more than 7 months
- Material security (a composite index that measures the possessions the household has)

The summary results of the regression analysis are reported below in Table 4.

TABLE 4: FACTORS AFFECTING THE FEELING OF BEING EXCLUDED

Factors	*Relationship*
Age	-***
Education	-**
Knowledge of Kurdish	+*
Old-migrants	-**
Adana, Ankara, Diyarbakır, İzmir, Gaziantep	-***
Disabled	+**
Coverage of a social security	-**
Joblessness more than 7 months in 2 years	+**
Material security	-***

Note that *, ** and *** denote, respectively, 90, 95 and 99 percent confidence interval.

[16] Refer to footnote 9 on page 104.

Of our set of independent variables those that are found statistically significant are reported in the Table above. Let us recall that "being excluded" is the composite parameter that captures the total feeling of being excluded. According to the results, the dependent parameter of "being excluded" is jointly determined by the following independent parameters:

1. Age: As the sign is negative (note that the statistical significance is very strong), we read this as younger people have a tendency to feel more excluded, viz., when one gets older, all other parameters' effects being filtered, one would feel less excluded.
2. Education: The sign is negative (the statistical significance is moderately strong), meaning that with increased education people on the average will feel less excluded.
3. Knowledge of Kurdish: It is expected that (though the statistical significance is weak) those who are able to speak Kurdish (and likely to be of Kurdish origin) will feel more excluded than those who do not speak Kurdish.
4. Old-migrants: Those who migrated before the median year of all migrants in the city where the survey was conducted, when compared with those of the origin of the city, are likely to feel less excluded.
5. Cities: A person living in Adana, Ankara, Diyarbakır, İzmir and Gaziantep, when compared with a person living in İstanbul, is expected to bring less exclusion feeling (with a very strong statistical significance). To put it differently, living in İstanbul would come with a feeling of exclusion.
6. Disabled: Being disabled will bring about more feeling of exclusion (with a moderate statistical significance).
7. Social Security: Coverage of social security will bring about less feeling of exclusion (with a moderate statistical significance).
8. Joblessness: If the family member who is the bread earner has had no job more than seven months in the last two years, then (with a moderate statistical significance) the respondent would feel more excluded, when compared to those who have not experienced such a lengthy period of joblessness in their family.
9. Material security: More material security means less feeling of exclusion (with a strong statistical significance). It is interesting to note that the variable "expenditure per person" is found not to be affecting the intensity of exclusion. So, we may suggest that although the levels of expenditure (as a proxy for income) do not play a role, the levels of accumulation do play indeed in the determination of exclusion.

Other variables, viz., gender, profession and religion, turned out to be not having an impact over the determination of someone's feeling as being excluded.

The Determinants of "Excluding Others"

Here, we have chosen the same independent variables that we have used above plus the parameter of the composite index of "being excluded". We thought that "being excluded" might have an effect on respondent's exclusion attitude towards others.

TABLE 5: FACTORS AFFECTING THE INTENSITY OF EXCLUDING OTHERS

Factors	*Relationship*
Education	-**
Knowledge of Kurdish	-**
IDPs	+**
Adana, Ankara, Diyarbakır, İzmir, Gaziantep	+***
Material security	+**
Being excluded	+*

Note that *, ** and *** denote, respectively, 90, 95 and 99 percent confidence interval.

Of our set of independent variables, those that are found statistically significant are reported in the Table above. Let us recall that "excluding others" is the composite parameter that captures the total scores of excluding others on nine different dimensions. According to the results, the dependent parameter of "excluding others" is jointly determined by the following independent parameters:

1. Education: The sign is negative (the statistical significance is moderately strong), meaning that with increased education people on the average will have a tendency not to exclude others.
2. Knowledge of Kurdish: It is expected that (the statistical significance is moderate) those who are able to speak Kurdish (and likely to be of Kurdish origin) will have a tendency not to exclude others.
3. IDPs: Those who were forced to migrate will have a tendency to exclude others (the statistical significance is moderate).

4. Cities: A person living in Adana, Ankara, Diyarbakır, İzmir and Gaziantep, when compared with someone living in İstanbul, is expected to exclude others (with a very strong statistical significance).
5. Material security: More material security means more excluding others (with a medium statistical significance). It is interesting to note that the variable "expenditure per person" was found not to be affecting the degree of exclusion. So, we can conclude that although the levels of expenditure (as a proxy for income) do not play a role, the levels of accumulation do play indeed in the determination of excluding others—a relatively wealthier family member may be seeing him/herself as belonging to a higher status and underrating those who are socially vulnerable.
6. Being excluded: If one feels excluded, one would have a tendency to exclude others (with a weak statistical significance).

Other variables, viz., gender, profession and religion, turned out to be not having an impact over the determination of someone's exclusionary attitude.

ANNEX

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS		
1	Governor Associate of İzmir	Yakup Vatan
2	Social Services Directorate of the Greater Municipality of İzmir	Semra Aksu
3	Social Services Directorate of the Greater Municipality of İzmir	Cengiz Bayrat
4	KORDEM (İzmir)	İbrahim Altıtaş
5	Ege Kadın Dayanışma Vakfı (İzmir)	Ayşegül Önen & Tülin Özler
6	KAOS GL (Ankara)	Ali Erol
7	Governor Associate of Gaziantep	Ali Cergibozan
8	Social Services Directorate of Municipality of Gaziantep	Muhtar Akyol
9	Altı Nokta Körler Derneği (Gaziantep	Mehmet Polat
10	İnsan Hakları Derneği (Gaziantep)	Mustafa Ercan
11	Cennet Çocukları Koruma ve Yaşatma Derneği (Gaziantep)	Nermin Kayadelen
12	KAYA (Kadın Yurttaş Ağı) (İstanbul)	Meltem Aslan
13	Cem Vakfı (İstanbul)	Celal Dinçer
14	Başak Kültür ve Sanat Vakfı (İstanbul)	Şahhanım Kanat
15	Halkevleri İstanbul Şubesi (İstanbul)	İlknur Birol & Oya Şensoy
16	Lambda (İstanbul)	Öner Ceylan
17	Göç-Der (İstanbul)	Şefika Gürbüz
18	Umut Çocukları Derneği (İstanbul)	Uğur İlhan
19	Ulaşılabilir Yaşam Derneği (İstanbul)	Belgin Cengiz
20	Sosyal ve Kültürel Yaşamı Geliştirme Derneği (İstanbul)	Goncagül Gümüş
21	Governor Associate of Diyarbakır	Ahmet Aydın
22	Türkiye Kalkınma Vakfı (Diyarbakır)	Osman Kazıcı
23	ÇATOM (Diyarbakır)	Sabahattin Dadak
24	KAMER (Diyarbakır)	Nebahat Akkoç
25	GİDEM (Diyarbakır)	Nurcan Baysal
26	Director of SYDTF of Adana	Mehmet Balıkoğlu
27	Director of SHÇEK of Adana	Muzaffer Aygül
28	Social Services Directorate of Municipality of Adana	Ozan Aksu
29	AÇEV (Adana)	Nefise Balyemez & Hatice Çam
30	Türkiye Sakatlar Derneği (Adana)	Halis Kasap
31	Kimsesiz Çocukları Koruma ve Yaşatma Derneği (Adana)	Seda Gökçe
32	Prof. Dr. Emre Alper (Economics Department, Boğaziçi University)	
33	Prof. Dr. Mine Eder (Political Science Department, Boğaziçi University)	
34	Prof. Dr. Fikret Şenses (Economics Department, METU)	

CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS[1]

The General Picture

This Report aimed at analysing the social exclusion problem in Turkey, defined as a process whereby certain individuals are pushed to the edge of society and prevented from participating into societal life fully by virtue of their poverty, or lack of basic competencies and lifelong learning opportunities, or as a result of discrimination, by focusing on people living in slum areas of six metropolitan cities in Turkey: Adana, Ankara, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, İstanbul and İzmir. The theoretical inquiry we conducted led us to believe that social exclusion may have economic, cultural, political and spatial dimensions, each triggering/strengthening one another, with self-sustaining vicious cycles in exclusion processes due to the interactions among different dimensions of exclusion.

The methodology of this research consisted of, apart from a critical literature review, three commissioned papers on various dimensions of exclusion, a series of in-depth interviews with stakeholders and researchers/academics on social exclusion and discrimination, a set of 12 focus group meetings, and a survey of size 1863 (both of which were conducted in the six cities mentioned above). Although it was not possible to statistically represent the slum areas in these cities, we did everything possible to get as unbiased a picture as possible. The research has also benefited from the comments and suggestions of the participants of two workshops (one held in İstanbul and the other in Gaziantep), where the preliminary results of the survey were disseminated.

When we consider the outcomes of the survey study held in six big cities in Turkey, together with the results of a series of qualitative studies held within the project (focus group meetings and in-depth interviews), the three position papers of this research and the results of previous studies conducted on the topic, the general picture we obtain is found to be in line with anticipated theoretical results in that the exclusions experienced in the slum areas (mostly in *gecekondus* in the outskirts of cities but also in deprived inner-city neighbourhoods) have had economic, social, cultural, political and spatial manifestations. When we analysed the possible factors that might have increased the feeling of being excluded, we observed that being young, being less educated, being of Kurdish ethnicity,

[1] An earlier version of this Chapter was sent to feed into the JIM drafting process.

being a new migrant, being disabled, having no social security, being unemployed for more than seven months and having less material security are factors that aggravate the feeling of exclusion. To the extent that some neighbourhoods have particular (negative) characteristics in terms of accommodating, say, new migrants, we would expect an increased feeling of exclusion in those neighbourhoods compared to the overall average.

In order to describe the multi-dimensional facets of exclusion, the following points need to be considered:

- As expected, poverty appears to be a problem which many of the households live with, and to which they may have become inured. Half of the participants in the survey study feel excluded from society because of being in a state of poverty. When the monthly expenditure levels of the households are taken into consideration as the simplest indicator of poverty, this situation becomes self-evident. A comparison among six cities, in terms of the adult equivalence scale (by EUROSTAT) and with adjustments made according to different purchasing power parities corresponding to each city, reveals the fact that Diyarbakır emerges as the outsider whereas the other five rank very closely with each other—thus the poor living in Diyarbakır can be classified as the poorest of those living in six metropolitan cities.
- We have observed the following points as conditions creating the state of poverty (some of these are correlated with each other):
    - Lack of job opportunities in the formal sector (the dual structure of the economy as formal and informal).
    - Insufficient monetary and non-monetary transfers to those in need.
    - Low wage levels of the jobs (mostly informal) at which the majority of our target group is employed with poor qualifications—thus a large group of working poor.
    - For those working in the informal sector, no job guarantee, no social protection and most likely unsafe and difficult working conditions.
    - Problems in accessing capital (first, networks are also poor, unable to provide credits; secondly, to find a collateral, required by private banks, is difficult especially if one is working in the informal sector; thirdly, credits provided by public bodies appear to be difficult to access; and finally, informal borrowers usually charge very high rates).
    - Low human capital level due to barriers to benefiting from educational opportunities, lack of quality in education (such as overcrowded classes) as

well as insufficient public facilities such as libraries (see below for further discussions).

- Poor housing conditions (such as low quality of houses, crowded households, heating problems, poor sanitation), lack of access to health services (both in terms of quality and quantity) and low quality of urban services in slum areas (such as lack of recreational facilities, transportation problems) bringing about a decrease in the labour productivity.
- Problems in accessing business counselling services for small-scale (generally home-based) production/sales.
- Low quality and quantity in the supply of services for training or courses for improving skills.
- Inability to participate in the labour market because of the existence of dependents (children/seniors/disabled) at home—the corollary of which is the lack of kindergarten and centres for the elderly and disabled; another issue to be dealt with in the same category is the greater number of children than the rest of the urban population in most of the households and, therefore, the increase in care time—this greatly varies between cities in the South-east and the rest.
- Lack of access to the labour market due to disability (two explanations can be given: (i) lack of education/training facilities specifically designed/tailored for the disabled; and (ii) few employment opportunities for the disabled—the legal obligation of employment of the disabled is largely disregarded).
- Insufficient care services to the disabled who are left outside the labour market.
- Discrimination for cultural or political reasons (ethnicity, religious beliefs, political ideas, sexual orientation, gender, age, criminal record, etc.), which forms a vicious circle, as low income is conducive to low education which is in turn conducive to low human capital.

Above and beyond what is listed, structural problems, especially in the economic field, exist: High unemployment rates (despite recent growth in the economy), informal and formal structures being intertwined, fluctuations in the seasonal labour demand, a low female labour force participation rate, high rates of child labour, erosion in union rights, inequality in the distribution of wealth and income, and regional discrepancies of development.

- It is apparent that poverty brings about serious problems in accessing the most basic levels of services in the areas of health, education and housing. Concerning the household in general, nearly two-thirds of the households we interviewed appeared to have no insurance or pension possibility, and only half of this population with no social security has access to Green Cards (allowing for basic health care)—meaning that, roughly speaking, one third of our sample has no insurance at all. In passing it is worth noticing that problems in accessing the Green Card, like not being allowed to hold a Green Card due to being relatively better off, because of owning assets despite not being able to access the assets after having been forced to migrate, were voiced.
- Poverty creates important barriers in accessing education as can be seen from the perception of school as a source of expenditure (including the "contributions" demanded by the school managements), bad conditions at home for studying (insufficient space/high household population), lack of books/school supplies/computer/Internet access, children—especially girls—being asked to look after other children/disabled/seniors in the house or doing housework, and children being forced to work part-time or full-time. It is striking that more than one-fourth of the respondents were found to be illiterate at all and less than one-fifth with a secondary school diploma or above. It should not appear as surprising that one-fourth of the respondents stated that they felt socially excluded due to their level of education. This, in return, results in low human capital for the next generation and exclusion from the labour market or being employed in low-waged jobs, creating a vicious cycle of poverty-lack of education-poverty.
- Poverty also affects the place inhabited, possibly creating bad conditions both in the home and in the neighbourhood that could trigger serious health problems. In the same vein, additional suffering occurs as a result of not being able to cover the extra costs of accessing the services for the disabled, due to poverty.
- Problems in accessing labour markets, together with not being covered by health or retirement insurance, lack of education and a series of cultural components, the tendency to have high numbers of children, turn out to be both reasons for and consequences of poverty. There are serious differences among regions when the number of children per household is considered.
- Additional problems in accessing health services due to poverty, other than what was discussed above, were stressed as follows:

- The supply of health facilities declines in the slum areas when compared with the city average, resulting in long periods of waiting, accepting low quality service (see below) or taking the extra time and money costs in order to reach centres where these services are provided in a better way.
- There are serious problems of quality in health services for the slums. Having access to health facilities does not guarantee good quality of services: problems such as lack of personnel and equipment in the health facilities are the most commonly mentioned problems.
- Illegal payments are usually demanded under the rubric of "knife money". This is, of course, a countrywide problem, but the population under discussion generally cannot afford such payments (keeping the average income levels of the country in mind) and, as a result, are excluded partially or fully from health services.

- Further problems in accessing to education services due to poverty, other than what have been discussed above, were stressed as follows:
  - Insufficient level of education services in the slum areas appears to be one of the main problems. Some families have to send their kids to school that are far from their neighbourhoods, bringing about additional stress to their budgets. In most slum areas there are no public libraries.
  - There are serious problems of quality in education. Over-crowded classes, lack of laboratories, computers and other educational materials are the rule in slum areas. Additionally, respondents criticised the low quality of education in vocational schools and indicated that these schools do not promise a future.
  - Preschool education and childcare services as well as provisions for taking care of the elderly are not at a satisfactory level. The implications, as already mentioned, can be re-stated. First, barriers in accessing the labour market: a population that could potentially be involved in the labour market is instead involved with caretaking at home. Second, a portion of the children are burdened with taking care of the population mentioned above and so are deprived of education opportunities.
  - Extra-curricular activities for children, outside of their formal education, are at a very low level.
  - Illegal payments are demanded by schools under the name of "registration fees"; which is, as in the case of "knife money" that was mentioned above, a

countrywide problem, but the population of the slums suffer more compared to the average of the country.

- Some children have problems in school because of the fact that their mother tongue is not Turkish.
- Female children are not allowed to go to school or to continue education after a certain age due to cultural reasons. This situation continues to exist despite the success of awareness-raising campaigns in recent years.
- The current regulation on the ban of head scarves at schools and universities continues to be a heated debate in the country, causing some to argue that the ban in fact excludes girls from accessing education services. Although our survey results did not support such a claim (recall that no explicit reference was made to religious reasons for not sending kids to school), this issue was raised during the Istanbul workshop.
- Education opportunities for the disabled are few in quantity and the services are poor in quality.

- The existence of spatial exclusion was voiced:
  - There is criticism about the supply (both quality and quantity) of certain public services (parks, transportation, sewage system, drinking water, etc.), in addition to the quality of education and health being lower in the slums than the city on average. This returns as a series of costs (like high rates of intestinal infections).
  - Although the borders of the suburbs and inner-city slums are not clear-cut, concerns were voiced that living in certain regions may bring about certain exclusions in some vital areas, including the labour market (for example, only because of living in a certain place, a young person could be called a drug addict at society-wide level).
  - It was stressed that the difficulties experienced by the physically disabled get even worse in the suburbs.
  - It was underlined that the economical difficulties, social patterns and cultural structure of the slums intensify intra-family disputes and violence, especially encouraging drug addiction among the youth, and increase the tendency for crime.
  - Barriers in accessing urban rights due to the limitations of the space lived in were raised.

- Future generations were found to face serious problems. Some are, as mentioned above, poorly prepared for the future. They have been able to benefit either little or not at all from educational opportunities. Extra-curricular activities are very limited. Some are forced to work part-time or full-time and others are obliged to take care of a dependent person instead of going to school. The usual picture in the families with many children is that some work to support the family, some take care of the dependent people in the house and only some receive educations, mostly of poor quality. Dissatisfaction/hopelessness about the future and other reasons may draw them into crime or addiction. The existence of a quite significant group that was not allowed to continue education further in order to "work rather than becoming an addict or committing a crime" was pointed out. Some may prefer to live in the streets. Especially the increase in the number of street children in recent years shows that certain threshold levels have already been crossed.
- There were concerns about the disadvantaged/vulnerable groups facing serious problems in the slums:
    - The problems the disabled face can be summarized as such: the disabled habitants in the places of study, as partially mentioned above, have serious problems with health, education, space and employment. Rehabilitation facilities are few in number; there is a need for qualified staff for the needs of certain groups (like education for autistic children); social and cultural support units are very dissatisfying. But, more importantly, it was underlined that there is serious malfunctioning in defending the rights of the disabled in the public sphere. This causes the disabled to withdraw from society. Also, the children of disabled parents face their own difficulties.
    - The social and economic status of women in Turkey certainly requires further improvement. Female participation in education and in the labour market is very low, women participating in the political decision-making processes constitute a small percentage, cultural barriers continue to discourage women to fully socialise themselves, and intra- as well as extra-family violence is widespread. These problems get aggravated in the slum areas, where women are usually forced to bear many children and take care of the children/ill/elderly/disabled at home, and where the general education level is quite low and patriarchalism is high. Some, in extreme cases, may not even be able to voice psychological or gynaecological illness. More specifically,

domestic violence, especially against women, continues to be a serious problem, yet many women are too afraid (or ashamed) to make complaints. In passing it should also be noted that the minimum age for marriage for girls may get down to 14, which makes girls vulnerable to violence. And finally, the practice of "honour killings" continues to be a problem, despite an increased amount of efforts undertaken to combat it. (Adultery, premarital relationships, rape, and falling in love with someone who is not "approved" by the family, may all be seen as the violations of the honour of the family, in which case male members of the family decide on the execution of the woman.)

- There is strong evidence that immigrants to the city after forced migration constitute to be one of the most troubled subgroups with deeper experiences of problems. Without going through a "preparation phase", this portion becomes "consumers" rather than "producers" in a very short period of time and face serious problems, poverty being the most important, affecting both the present and the future: Low human capital, children mostly working in order to support the family income (and are unable to receive educations), high number of children per household, poor household quality, not enough benefits from social networks like relatives, problems experienced in receiving Green Cards due to having assets in their pre-migration place although are unable to access them.
- The current situation of IDPs continues to remain critical. Although many have so far benefited from the "Return to Village and Rehabilitation Programme", renewed clashes between government forces and Kurdish militants have raised fears of a return to violence and thus doubts about the success of the programme. Apart from the increased tension in the region, several factors continue to slow down the return of IDPs, the most important one being the continued economic underdevelopment of the region.

- Additional problems, other than the ones discussed above, are as follows:
  - Both the results of qualitative and quantitative studies and the complaints raised during the workshops reveal the existence of social, cultural and political processes that are bringing about the exclusion of ethnic groups, most notably the Kurdish people. The fact that one-fifth of the participants of our survey study said that they felt excluded due to their ethnic background is telling.

- In line with the above remark, the Romani people have also been subject to cultural discrimination. Although many members of the Romani community are thoroughly assimilated, those who are not do currently live in distinct neighbourhoods of metropolitan cities. The existence of heavy prejudices against the community reveals itself on the spatial segregation as well as on the discrimination in the labour market (as a result of which most members of the community hold irregular jobs with no social security and are usually engaged in occupations typically associated with Romani people such as flower-selling and garbage collection).
- Problems associated with religious beliefs continue to be a social problem in Turkey, and this equally applies to people living in the slum areas. A significant portion of the respondents in our survey study stated that they experienced exclusion due to religious beliefs/sects. More specifically, the Alevis people are discontent about the preferential treatment of the Sunni sect.
- This aspect may also include the existence of social and cultural exclusion, sometimes at the political level, towards non-Muslims or non-believers.
- The exclusion experienced by the population regarded to be "marginal" by society due to the nature of their jobs (e.g. sex workers), sexual orientation, criminal record, drug-addiction, etc., although not thoroughly addressed in our study, should certainly be given due consideration. We are therefore unable to comment the ways in which these issues manifest themselves in the slum areas.

- A very significant number of the individuals representing the suburbs and the deprived areas of the cities in which the survey was undertaken stated that they experienced exclusion in several aspects, yet the very same population revealed their willingness to exclude certain groups for a set of reasons. Therefore, a significant number of the respondents are both excluded and excluding. With regard to "feeling excluded", we put forward a module of six items—some of which already mentioned above: Poverty; level of education; dress/finery; ethnicity; accent; religious belief/order. With regard to "excluding others", we put a module of nine items: Having a criminal record; having a different ethnic origin; having a different religious belief/order; being alcoholic; being a mental patient; being an AIDS patient; homosexuality; being Romani; being a sex worker. We then formed an aggregate index combining all the first six items into one, and all the second nine items into another, thus creating an index for "being excluded" and another one for "excluding others" in order to determine the determinants of these

indices. Apart from a set of independent variables, education emerged as the important determinant in both cases: More education, everything else being constant, reduces the feeling of being excluded as well as lessen the degree of discrimination towards third parties.

- Last, concerns have been raised about the social exclusion issue being far from receiving the necessary attention in the public sphere, political arena, academia and the mass media.

Policy Proposals: General Framework

When the general picture of exclusion processes is considered, we arrive at these main policy topics which need to be considered in combating social exclusion in general and in the slum areas of metropolitan cities in particular:

- As emphasized before, almost half of the survey-takers stated that they felt excluded from society due to poverty. As poverty is so common, it results in the shrinking of the social networks of individuals—therefore, things that once could be handled with the support of relatives, friends or neighbours are no longer supported with any. Another dimension is that poverty causes serious problems in access to education, health and housing. The policy that should have been followed from the beginning, but is now a crucial prerequisite for combating poverty and social exclusion, is that the public must act with social responsibility and set the priorities for policy action accordingly. In this context, basic education and health services should be understood as "rights", so that basic needs can be satisfied without putting people into bureaucratic troubles (and into the rush to find an insider they know for help), by providing qualified services in an egalitarian, just manner (that would also take care of regional differences). Qualitative and quantitative targets for the future (what should the number of patients per doctor or the enrolment ratio be) may be helpful in order to realize the necessity. Furthermore, social assistance policies should be made more fair, effective and efficient; alternative policies might be considered as well, as in the case of "basic income scheme" (which is a regular sum, payable to all, with the aim of providing all citizens with a standard of living above the poverty line) which can replace the current, scattered social assistance programmes
- Macro-based planning should be conducted to see what the developments in these areas would be in the country in general. For example, studies should be conducted

about the production and employment shares of the agriculture/industry/services sectors and what these indicators should be on a region/city basis. There should be the means to prevent the risk of unemployment for the poor, unqualified people, coming out of the structural changes in the agricultural sector.

- As mentioned before, the high number of children is both a reason for and a consequence of poverty. Although family planning programmes could be used for awareness-raising, in order to have a long-lasting success, social security as well as social care schemes need to be made universal and opportunities in the formal sector be increased, as otherwise children will continue to be seen as a cheap labour for caring the elderly and as contributors to the family budget.
- There should be policies targeted to deal with the structural reasons of poverty.
  - Individual and regional discrepancies in the distribution of wealth and income should be addressed from a long-term perspective and policies be set out to combat them. In that regard, improvements in the slum areas of big cities should be made in the delivery of health and education services as well as in increasing housing standards. Additionally, as the results of our study made it clear, IDPs appeared to be one of the most vulnerable groups, targeted policies should be devised to help IDPs in order to improve their well-being. The increasing discrepancy between the urban and the rural areas as well as between the West and the South-east/East of Turkey, along with the continued clashes in the south-east parts of Turkey, continues to be the main factor behind the migration motivation. Policies should be devised to slow down de-ruralisation in order to prevent with low human capital coming to the cities. It was noted that expansion of off-farm employment and income generation in the rural areas would help reducing migration to the cities.
  - There should be policies for fighting against unemployment (in coordination with the policies of other social issues under discussion). In developing these policies, the structural problems that are both the reason and the consequence of the unemployment issue (e.g., the existence of an informal sector, fluctuations in the seasonal labour demands, low female labour force participation rate, erosion in union rights) should be paid attention. It should be considered that job creation may at the same time provide solutions to other social problems that lead to social exclusion as well. In that regard, acknowledging the high demand but low supply of social services (i.e. care of children/the elderly/disabled) in the areas where we conducted our study, a concrete policy request was voiced for employment

creation by the public in social services. Furthermore, more satisfactory schemes (such as monetary transfers) should be devised in taking care of those who are unable to work.

  - Another structural problem mentioned in relation with the unemployment issue is the existence of the informal sector. This should be handled with care, as it involves other problems, such as high rates of child labour, risky and insecure working conditions, low wages and such. Instead of the methods currently in use for fighting against the informal sector (which remains at the level of the detection of crimes), the source of the problem (unemployment, barriers to education, little vocational training, etc.) should be addressed by both the necessary legal regulations and the macro-level planning mentioned above.

- The most apparent example of social exclusion is the lack of explicit constitutional rights for those excluded people. Those like the Romani, those like of Kurdish ethnicity, those like who believe in the Alevi sect are not legally considered to be a minority according the terms of the Lausanne Treaty (and the current Constitution replicates this position). On the same vein, sexual orientation does not appear in the Constitution. The current article 10 of the Constitution sets out the principle of equality before the law irrespective of "language, race, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such considerations". This article is restrictive on two grounds: First, explicit references to "ethnic origin", "social groups" and "sexual orientation" are missing; secondly, the current formulation is restrictive in the sense that it defines discrimination only *vis-à-vis* the legal structure (laws), whereas discrimination should be defined within a much wider connotation (social, political, economic and cultural).
- The political decision-making processes should be made more transparent and accountable; the political system should be accommodating the positions of the minority groups which are currently unable to represent themselves because of the current election system that does not allow a political party being represented at the Parliament unless it gets more than 10 percent of the votes at the national level. Political participation, both at local and central levels, should be promoted; schemes that encourage direct participation should be targeted.
- Policies should be devised to promote gender equality and to empower women. Targeted policies should encourage the elimination of gender disparity in education, in employment and in policy-decision units.

- The development of all these policies and their application are without a doubt dependent on the efficacy of the institutions. For this reason, it is necessary to create participatory and transparent mechanisms with definite governmental regulations for increasing the efficacy of these institutions, to decrease the amount of bureaucracy and to provide coordination between the units working in this field. Also, it is very important to increase the partnership between governmental/non-governmental/ private sectors working in the social security and support fields.

Policy Proposals: Specific Policy Suggestions

- **Accessing Labour Market**
  - Building up kindergartens/rehabilitation or care-giving centres in order to free a certain amount of population (especially women) who are unable to participate in the labour market due to their social responsibilities in taking care of dependent people at home.
  - Resolving the problems in accessing the education and health services and improving the low quality there in order to increase human capital and thus the productivity.
  - Increasing credit opportunities, so that anyone who wants to start up business should be able to do so with acceptable costs.
  - Designing and improving governmental/non-governmental institutions that could give counselling service for employment and business development. Coordination among various public as well as non-governmental bodies working on this area should be ensured. İŞKUR, in that regard, should improve its methods in job analysis, job requirements, recruitment procedures and job allocation.
  - Organizing vocational or skill-improving training programmes for the young, the elderly, women and the disabled (considering the supply side in employment), possibly and preferably in conjunction with the private sector so that participants may figure out in a better way the current job opportunities.
  - Making sure that the laws for the employment of the disabled people are applied; first, it is required that more effective mechanisms of inspection and regulation should be erected, and secondly, the private as well as the public sector should be exposed to various opportunities in the employment of disabled people so that they

can create their own demands for such people (İŞKUR may well play an increased role in that regard).

- **Health/ Education/Housing/ Spatial problems**
  - Opening study/reading rooms for children and the young, paying attention to their social and cultural activities.
  - Providing education for grown-ups (for parents about communication with their children, fighting adult illiteracy [with special attention to women], for women about female health, for mothers about mother-child health, etc.) in addition to formal education.
  - Designing mechanisms to encourage attendance in schools (like providing breakfast for students); developing the necessary curriculum for children with mother tongues other than Turkish; eliminating costs of education at all with a view to make public schools truly free of charge.
  - Increasing the amount and the quality of the education opportunities for the disabled, and educating expert staff in this field.
  - Designing mass housing developments in order to solve the infrastructure problems and poor urbanization for the inhabitants in the regions.
  - Providing public services such as sewage or drinking water (installing indoor plumbing) in the slum areas.
  - Increasing the quality as well as the quantity of social services.
  - Organizing city planning with respect to the potential problems that are harming disabled people.
  - Developing participatory mechanisms in city governance (a possible way would be to expand the Local Agenda 21 applications to more cities/towns).

- **Children**
  - Rehabilitation services and public centres are to be increased, especially taking into account the increasing necessity for street children.
  - Making kindergarten/preschool education widespread (necessary for both the pedagogical development of children and for freeing the household members who are unable to work because they are busy with looking after children at home).
  - As mentioned above, increasing extra-curricular activities would be instrumental in increasing the positive impact of education on children.

- Encouraging the participation of young population in the political processes, primarily in the decision-making mechanisms, about the city in which they live.
- Establishing/widening public institutions that will provide counselling/guidance for both parents and children.
- Convincing the families that do not allow their children (especially girls) to continue their education to do so (in that regard the Conditional Cash Transfer programme seems to be working effectively).
- Given the fact that child poverty is very important in Turkey, it is also important to recognize that the school can function as well as a social welfare area, where diverse risks ranging from malnutrition to unhealthy and unsafe living space to which poor children are exposed could be detected and eradicated.

- **Vulnerable Groups-Women**
  - Consciousness-raising about certain key issues that are internalized by women and regarded as the natural results of being female (being subject to violence and sexual harassment, not benefiting from education opportunities, limitations on social life, being forced to bear many children, almost fully taking the burden of the care of the children/ill/disabled/elderly).
  - In line with the above point, counselling and guidance services for women should be provided by women's support centres and shelters for women should be erected in the fight against domestic violence; husbands may equally be targeted with an aim to increase their awareness/responsibilities on social and family-related issues.
  - Designing active labour market policies to encourage female labour force participation, which requires in an indirect manner the improvement of social care services.
  - Credit opportunities should be exclusively designed to women who are willing to start up small businesses.
  - Women should be encouraged to actively participate into political life, especially in their neighbourhoods—one possible path might be to set up "women councils" at municipality levels.

- **Vulnerable Groups-IDPs**
  - The restitution of IDPs' violated rights has to be ensured.

- Specific policies should be targeted in order to facilitate the return of those who wish to do so or to improve the lives of those who wish to remain in urban centres. More specifically
    a. Support should be given in terms of providing infrastructure, education and health facilities, to state the most obvious ones, to those who have decided to turn back to their village. Furthermore, agriculture and animal husbandry in the rural areas should be revitalized, and fields should be cleared off land mines.
    b. Assistance should be provided to those who are willing to stay in the city, especially in the fields of education (including adult education and job training), health and access to labour markets.

- **Vulnerable Groups –The Disabled**
    - Increasing society-wide knowledge and consciousness about the state, needs and opportunities of the disabled.
    - Providing job opportunities and rendering the current employment law with regard to disabled people effective.
    - Maintaining education opportunities for the disabled, by way of increasing the quality and quantity of education units, including curriculum development and the training of personnel.
    - Establishing rehabilitation services and providing the disabled with the necessary equipments they may need.

- **Other Vulnerable Groups**

Measures at cultural, political and economic levels should be designed and implemented when dealing with other vulnerable groups who may be less visible:

- With an increasing number of illegal foreign workers in the country, measures should be taken to prevent the (over-) exploitation of these people, a principle which is more than vital for foreign sex workers who may be engaged in that sector without their full consent.
- Nomads, although not amounting to a large number, are likely to face with poverty and social exclusion; therefore, specifically-targeted policies should be devised for them.

- Rehabilitation and job training programmes for ex-prisoners should be made more effective and more comprehensive. Programmes should be designed for the needs of young ex-prisoners.
- The rehabilitation of drug addicts should be expanded.
- Constitutional rights should be given to those who refuse to serve in the military ("conscientious objection").
- The Constitution should be made explicit in guarding impartiality *vis-à-vis* sexual orientation.

Epilogue

The research that we conducted in the slum areas of six metropolitan cities in Turkey has made it clear that a significant amount of people living in these areas are distanced from jobs, income and education, and training opportunities, all of which are triggering poverty-exclusion-poverty chains. Our research has also shown that, apart from economic exclusion, some people were also subjected to a multitude of political and spatial discrimination. Furthermore, cultural barriers were found, in some cases, to prevent people from fully realising themselves. Hence, this multidimensionality of exclusion has translated itself into a lack of access to power and decision-making bodies, with the inevitable result that some are pushed to the edge of society.

Remembering once again that an effective struggle against poverty and social exclusion requires the implementation of social justice at society level, based on the trilogy of distribution, recognition and participation, a long-term agenda (consisting of, principles, legislation, policies, action plans, etc.) with a goal to achieve social justice in all its dimensions, is what is urgently needed. Social justice needs to be tailored, however, to the specific conditions of Turkey—a challenge that the society along with its institutions should grapple with. In that struggle, special attention should obviously be paid to the slum areas of cities, where, inevitably, social exclusion is widespread.

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